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ABSTRACT
The primary focus of this study is with the design of accounting systems
in specific enterprise contexts: more specifically with the sequential
processes for describing the nature of such systems, prescribing how they
should look in the future and bringing such changes into being. Such concerns
are explored at both a general theoretical level and in terms of the detailed
design problems of the accounting systems in the Church of England.
The contents of this study can be seen to be divided into three major
parts. The first takes a critical look at the nature of accounting knowledge,
particularly financial and management accounting, paying particular attention
to it's methodological underpinnings. The conclusion, from this part, is that
this knowledge stock does not adequately deal with the sequential processes of
interest to this study primarily because of the dominant scientific and function-
alist assumptions upon which such knowledge is based which are argued to be an
inappropriate foundation upon which to build to satisfy this problem focus.
The second part presents a case for, and describes the nature of, a methodological
approach based on Critical Theory as the basis for satisfying the sequential
concerns of this study. The third part applies this methodological approach in
the process of trying to both understand and change the accounting systems in
the Church of England.
The conclusion forthcoming from this study is that the approach based on
Critical Theory is a general 'theory' for the sequential concerns of this
study but not the only approach which could fulfil such a claim. However, what
does become apparent is that if the problem focus of this study is seen as
important for the accounting mission then major shifts in the dominant
methodology of accounting thought is necessary.
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM FOCUS AND THE DIFFICULTIES
IN LITERATURE RELEVANCE
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study is concerned with the processes of designing accounting
systems in practice: how to describe* what is going on; how to decide what
such systems should look like in the future (prescriptions*); and how to
bring about any changes where there is a 'mismatch' between the description
and prescription. It is also concerned with applying such processes in
particular empirical situations: in this instance in the design of accounting
systems in the Church of England.
The study is built upon a number of key initial assumptions which end
up as conclusions as well. Firstly that accounting systems exist in enterprise
contexts given that what constitutes existence is problematic. Secondly that
accounting systems express and obtain their meaning from the enterprise
contexts in which they are situated. Thirdly that accounting knowledge, to
date, has failed to adequately describe, prescribe and change the accounting
system in respective enterprise contexts. Fourthly that the primary problem
in accounting knowledge which has prevented an adequate process of understanding
and changing accounting systems in enterprise contexts is to do with
methodological and other issues which underlies such knowledge stock. Even
though these are initial assumptions with which this study commenced they
should also be seen as conclusions which need to be justified by careful and
systematic analysis. The remainder of this Chapter, Chapter 2 and part of
Chapter 3 can be seen as an attempt at such a systematic analysis.
* At present these terms have a meaning as presented with seemingly no
connection between description and prescription. However, as the
Chapter progresses it will become apparent that such a picture is far
too simplistic. But for the moment the argument can progress with the
more simple and traditional understanding of these terms.
However, such an analysis is creatively destructive rather than
constructive and the remaining chapters can be seen as an attempt at amending
such imbalance. The remainder of Chapter 3 consists of an argument for,
and a detailed construction of, a methodological approach based on Habermas'
'critical theory'. Chapter 4 to 7 applies such a methodological approach to
the specific problems surrounding understanding and changing the accounting
systems in the Church of England.
We will start the first part of this argument by building a simplistic
model of the processes of describing, prescribing and changing accounting
systems in enterprise contexts and using this as a benchmark for analysing
the nature of the dominant wings of accounting knowledge: financial
accounting and management accounting. Figure 1.1 is a diagrammatic presentation
of this simplistic model which shows the underlying, defining and sequential
relationships between the key elements. The flow of understanding is
assumed to start with actual systems in operation, in particular enterprise
contexts, moves into descriptions, leads into some form of prescriptive
activity and then finally, where appropriate, into change processes leading
to new accounting systems in operation. Quite clearly such a model is
intentionally simple purposefully omitting most of the complexity even though
some of this is introduced by the 'accounting/language' element which is
to be seen as an all important but ill-defined process for defining boundaries
and natures of the elements presented. This model is introduced in this
simplistic form as it provides a helpful and meaningful heuristic device
for looking at the financial and management accounting literature to see
how actively and completely, as a body of knowledge, it is involved with
these sequential processes as presented in Figure 1.1.
3This model provides the focus for the remaining sections of this
Chapter. Section 1.2 introduces some of the important processes and
problems of defining what is meant by an accounting system generally and
more specifically for this study. This can be seen as part of the 'accounting/
language' element of Figure 1.1. It is a necessary part of this element to
expose, at this stage, since it will help us to be clearer about what is
meant by the term 'accounting system' for the remainder of this study.
Sections 1.3 and 1.4 summarises the financial accounting and management
accounting literature into schools and sub-schools of thought analysing their
respective contribution in the context of the sequential elements presented
in Figure 1.1. Finally Section 1.5 summarises the contents of this chapter
and gives direction to, and explains more fully the rationale behind, the
remaining chapters.
1.2 ACCOUNTING LANGUAGE AND CLASSIFICATION 
The accounting language discussed above in the context of Figure 1.1
is fundamentally centred on the design of definitions. For as Mattessich
(1964/1977) points out:
'... the chief criterion of a good definition is its
power of demarcation - that is the ability to
separate clearly objects belonging to the defined
category from other or similar objects that do not
belong to it'
(p. 18/19)
(emphasis in the original)
Or again more specifically in terms of his understanding of 'definition':
namely of prescribing:
1 ... operational rules by means of which one can test
whether something is an accounting system or not'
(Mattessich, 1972, p. 471)
Such operational definitions and consequent rules comes from a scientific
source where there has been a constant concern to systemise the process of
defining terms. Bergmann (1953) for instance describes an operational
definition in the following way:
4'Let us start from the familiar first approximation
definition of length in terms of rules for the
manipulation of yardsticks. Such rules are now
referred to as the operational definition of the
concept in question and then one usually goes on to
say that such a set of defining operations is the
meaning of the concept' (p. 276)
Quite clearly the rules are intended to become more and more precise as in
the process of all refining measurement scales (cf. Stevens, 1946). Yet
refinement brings its own problems of intersubjective agreement because the
operational rules are not absolute truths as such but depend on, fundamentally
mutual consensus at a point in time. Searle (1969) puts the matter succinctly:
'One of the most important insights of recent work in
the philosophy of language is that most non technical
concepts in ordinary language lack absolute strict
rules. The concepts of game or chair or promise do
not have absolutely knockdownnecessary and sufficient
conditions, such that unless they are satisifed
something cannot be a game or a chair or a promise...'
(p. 55)
The 'thing' which we describe as a chair or game or promise following certain
rules of association is not absolute but dependent on mutual agreement on both
the label and the rules.
Now when it comes to applying such logic to the concept of 'accounting' all
manner of problems ensue. Primary amongst these is whose consensus? Clearly
across many cultures people could agree on both the label and rules for the
concept chair but could they on accounting? The way the accounting community
have coped with this is basically to talk amongst themselves about what they
mean by accounting and assume that is the meaning. However, even within the
community of accounting (i.e. those who call themselves accountants) there
is little unanimity of definition. Or as Scapens (1982) so pointedly puts
it:
... there is no widely accepted definition of
accounting' (p.1)
5Part of the reason could be the lack of rigour involved in the formulation
of definitions to date, as Mattessich (1964/77, 1972) and Laughlin (1977,
1979) have pointed out. However, Mattessich's (1964/77 P. 19) highly rigorous
attempt at formulating operational rules coming from
... examining a large number of micro and macro
accounting systems' (Mattessich, 1980, p. 163)
fails to have won support from the community over the years. So rigour does
not appear to be an. answer.
One definition, with implied operational rules, does appear to have
gained some acceptability in the accounting community. It seems useful to
explore what this definition is and why it should attain such support. The
definition in question is the one by the American Accounting Association in
A Statement of Basic Accounting Theory (ASOBAT) (1966). Accounting to ASOBAT
is the
'... process of identifying, measuring and
communicating economic information to permit
informed judgements and decisions by users
of the information' (p.1)
Thus to them an accounting system is a measurement and communication systein
of economic information. Anything which can be observed which measures and
communicates economic information 'to permit informed judgements and decisions
by users of the information' is an accounting system according to the Committee.
Although many would have serious misgivings about this definition (see
below and Laughlin, 1977, 1979) there are various pointers to suggest that it
commands a high level of support from the accounting community. Firstly
academic debate appears to have reduced considerably on the nature of definitions
since the early 1970's. Part of the reason could be as Mattessich (1980)
suggests disillusionment with the 'a priori approach of the sixties' and a
'reorientation to empirical research'. However, it could also be the
case that researchers felt that the ASOBAT definition was 'good enough'
as a working definition. Secondly what work there has been since ASOBAT
6has been in the area of Financial (or 'External') Accounting particularly
by the accounting professional bodies (cf. Trueblood Report, 1973; Corporate
Report, 1975; Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts, No. 1 (SFAC1),
1978) and all these attempts follow the ASOBAT definition. They all give
primacy to economic measurement and communication for user needs. In fact
as Dopuch and Sunder (1980) point out in their analysis of SFAC1:
'Most of the discussion appearing in the literature
on the objectives of financial accounting during the
past ten years tends to rely on the notion of user
primacy' (p. 13)
Thirdly despite the lack of attention to definition of Management (or
'internal') Accounting in the last ten years or so (cf. Scapens, 1982) the
'conventional wisdom' which Scapens highlights of planning, cost classification,
control and costing all could be seen to have a concern for economic 
measurement and communication for user needs.
However, it would be wrong to give the impression of complete unanimity
in the accounting profession. Sterling (1967) in his review of ASOBAT's
definition sees it as a 'radical change' (p. 97), 'prescriptive not descriptive'
(p. 96) and 'without justification' (p. 97). His view is that previous
attempts at defining accounting had all been sympathetic to undetstanding
what accounting is and how it is defined in practice, whereas he saw ASOBAT
as prescribing what it should look like. If this is so then it would be
expected that if such differences are real and lasting they would be apparent
in more recent attitudes.
This is indeed the case as Armstrong (1977) points out. As chairman of
the Financial Accounting Standards Board he surveyed respondents (presumably
accountants) on the opinion that the basic objective of financial statements
is to 'provide information useful for making economic decisions' (p. 77). His
results and attitudes to these results are presented at length below:
'could there be disagreement with a statement
such as this? I am sure you will be astounded
to learn that only 37 per cent of our respondents
were able to recommend the adoption of this
objective. Twenty-two percent recommended that it
be rejected out of hand; and 10 percent insisted
that it needed further study....
Those who disagreed with this generally took
the position that the basic function of financial
statements was to report on management's steward-
ship of corporate assets and that the information
needs of readers was of secondary importance' (p. 77)
It is interesting to note Armstrong's amazement but more importantly to
appreciate that even within the accounting community there is a basic
disagreement not only about the function of accounting but the very nature
of what constitutes a (financial) accounting system. Likewise in the area
of management accounting as Scapens (1982) points out in his review of the
'conventional wisdom' and whether it is or isn't in practice concludes that
it:
... has had only a limited impact on practice'
(p. 27)
One important implication of this is that the nature and function of a
(management) accounting system is different as portrayed in the textbooks and
as seen in practice.
So the conclusion must be that even within the accounting community there
is little consensus on what does or does not constitute an accounting system.
One can only assume that by adding other parties to the accounting community
the disagreements would increase rather than decrease. But such a situation
causes problems for operationalising Figure 1.1. If we don't know when an
empirical 'thing' is or is not an accounting system how can we describe it
or make any prescriptions about it?
One way out of this impasse is to find the common denominator between
all parties - what it is everybody agrees can always be called an accounting
system. It is probable that a detailed analysis of historical development
as well as contemporary thought would supply the core which would have
universal (in both past and present terms) support. This study is not
about such a search. However, a cursory examination of Yamey's work (cf.
1978A, 1978B) plus some knowledge about contemporary thought would suggest
it is possible to come to a workable definition of this core for the purposes
of this study even though future work may make it doubtful as a generality.
But by claiming core status for such a definition and the operational rules
which make it up one is, in the light of this process, suggesting that it
would be expected to command a high level of consensus agreement.
Based on this analysis given all the above provisos it is claimed that
an accounting system can be called as such if the empirical phenomena:
'Is an enterprise based formal system which expresses
in fundamentally numerical terms past, present and
future financial actions of such an entetyrise.'
There are a number of general points to be made about this definition. Firstly
it is intended to be an operational definition in terms of being able to use it
to demarcate accounting systems. Secondly it is intended to be general enough
to warrant high levels of support. Thirdly it makes no distinction between
various types of accounting systems e.g. financial and management accounting.
Fourthly it tries to abstract from 'purpose' so as not to typecast the
functional nature of accounting systems. However the accounting system in this
definition is fundamentally a language and communication system with all the
implicit purposes which goes with this.
Apart from these general points a number of more specific insights and
amplifications need to be made. Firstly as can be seen accounting systems are
assumed to be situated in the context of enterprises. These enterprises need
to be seen broadly as 'collective human endeavours' which encompasses macro
(e.g. societal), micro (e.g. business) and mini (e.g. household) interpretations.
Secondly the words 'formal system' is intended to refer to interconnected
symbols or elements which find expression in some form of interdependent or
intersubjective way (i.e. writing). Thus an accounting system is made up of
many interconnected symbols or elements which are created by human beings
9but can be seen e if not understoods by others due to the formality used in
the creation. Thirdly these elements or symbols are basically reflections
of financial actions which have or will occur in the context of the enterprise
in which the accounting system is located.
Clearly much more could and should be said about this definition but for
the moment we will leave such discussion. Whether this definition can or
cannot command universal support must remain for future analysis. In the
meantime it will, for the purpose of this study, form a working definition
so as to permit 'rules for demarcation' as to when a 'thing' is an accounting
system which needs to be described about, prescribed to and possibly
•
changed.
10
1.3 A SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
In Section 1.1 it was stated that according to the accounting literature
there did not appear to be a dominant concern with sequentially describing,
prescribing and changing practices, even though such concerns are central to
this study. Such a generalisation needed to be explored since if it is
true we could potentially bypass any reference to this literature in pursuit
of this study. Such a situation for what Could be claimed to be one of the central
concerns of accounting endeavour (understanding and improving accounting practices)
is anomalous at best.
Thus from many different viewpoints* an analysis of the accounting
literature seems a necessary prerequisite to the concern of this study.
Therefore this Section and the one which follows (1.4) looks at
respectively 'financial' and 'management' accounting** to uncover the dominant
concerns of the major schools and sub—schools of thought. Both ections
start with a summary of the major strands of thought and then analyses these
in terms of their concerns in respect of description, prescription and change
intentions.
1.3.1 A Survey Of Financial Accounting 
Possibly the most widely quoted and used survey of financial accounting
is the one put forward by the American Accounting Association (Statement on
Accounting Theory and Theory Acceptance (SATTA), 1977A). They could see
* Other reasons are given in Section 1.1 and others will become apparent
in later chapters.
** Being the major 'wings' of accounting under which most work is
encapsulated.
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three major schools of thought in financial accounting:
'We have discerned three basic theoretical approaches:
(1) classical ("true income") and inductive) models;
(2) decision usefulness; and (3) information economics' (p.5)
Such insights have given rise to refinements and developments of this model
(cf Laughlin and Puxty 1981) and clearly there is much to commend such
a classification.
However, a more recent survey by Davis, Menon and Morgan (1982) is a
much richer model of schools of thought in financial accounting, in this
author's opinion, given, in the end, that all classifications are in effect
limited. Davis et al's model does not contradict SATTA's; its different
classificatory approach leads to a refinement and development of the
Committee's insights as will become apparent.
According to Davis et al the whole of financial accounting can be seen
as alternative "images". The concept of images (cf Morgan, 1980) is valuable
dealing as it does with an exposure of some of the assumptions under which
people see the nature of accounting more generally or financial accounting
specifically. How different it is from definitions and how much it really
exposes underlying assumptions remain open questions however. But what it
does supply is a workable classification scheme upon which analysis, in the
context of this study's concern, is possible.
Davis et al maintain that:
'Four principal images have shaped the development of
financial accounting. They are those which treat
accounting as a historical record, as a descriptor
of current economic reality, as an information system,
and as a commodity'
(emphasis in the original) (p. 309)
•
Before looking at each of these in turn to highlight sub.schools of thought
it is worth reflecting on the relationship between these "images" and SATTA's
"approaches". Davis et al's 'historical record' and 'current economic reality'
images are the 'classical models' of SATTA. Davis et al's 'information system'
is an exact parallel with SATTA's 'decision usefulness' in a somewhat updated
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and developed form due to the work done since SATTA was prepared. Likewise
Davis et al's 'commodity' encompasses SATTA's 'information economics' but
builds on this considerably in the light of more recent developments. In
this way Davis et al's work refines and develops SATTA's work which assumes
of course that the latter was and is, a legitimate classification at the
time of its production.
1.3.1.1 Historic Record Image 
The school of thought which views financial accounting as a 'historical
record' have proponents from many different generations and backgrounds. The
way the history of accounting is written whether it starts in 2300 BC in the
Babylonian empire or 1494 in Italy (see Jencks, 1954) this dominant concern
with historical record appears to be apparent. Likewise current professional
practice and much* of the standard setting process all implicitly seem to be
working under this view in their dominant concern with historic cost principles
and practices. Similarly, judging by both professional and academic curriculum,
the educators believe such a view of financial accounting is both legitimate
and necessary.
Such courses have been greatly aided by the insights provided by accounting
researches in the first half of the 20th Century (cf Hatfield, 1927; Sanders,
Hatfield and Moore, 1938; Paton and Littleton, 1940; Littleton, 1953) in their
various attempts to arrive at 'postulates: 'principles', 'rules' etc. Such
work was given impetus by Grady's (1965) summary and modified and refined
through the various standard setting bodies.
However, the academic side of the community has ceased to adopt this
image of financial accounting exeept in one isolated case - 'events' accounting.
* The concern for designing an inflation accounting standard however does
not fall into this category (see below).
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(Sorter, 1969; Johnson, 1970; Lieberman and Whinston, 1975). This is a
very small sub-school of thought in the 'historical record' image yet it is
important to mention it for it indicates how some, building on this image,
would develop the basic ideas.
In summary the historic record school of thought has fundamentally two
sub-schools which can be conveniently titled Historic Cost Accounting 
(including the design of postulates, principles and refinements through,
related to historic cost standards) and Events Accounting.
1.3.1.2 Current Economic Reality Image 
The second image or school of thought sees financial accounting as
depicting current economic reality. Central to this view is seeing financial
accounting's task to measure income and wealth or specifically "true income"
(as both SATTA and Davis et al describe it). Historic cost is a valuation
basis to these proponents and is but one amongst a range of valuation bases
which individually need to be evaluated as to their 'truth content' in
measuring 'true income'. Many of the earlier proponents of this school of
thought were economists or lawyers (et Canning, 1929; Sweeney, 1936;
Bonbright, 1937; Alexander, 1950; Edwards and Bell, 1961) but many accountants
have both led (see particularly Paton, 1922) and followed such leads. Now
there are libraries full of careful discussions arguing the merits of replace-
ment cost against sales value, current cost accounting against general
purchasing power adjusted accounting etc.
Introduction to such issues was also made at the professional level:
foremost amongst thesebeing the early work by Moonitz (1961) and Sprouse and
Wmitz (1962) in the United States. However, the timing was wrong and
it took many years* before the whole matter of inflation accounting became,
and is still, a dominant controversial topic for the design of accounting
standards.
* Lowe, Puxty and Laughlin (1983) give a summary of all these dates etc.
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In summary the current economic reality school of thought has
fundamentally two sub-schools which can be labelled Income and Wealth 
Measurement and Inflation Accounting. Although the latter is related to
the former it is presented separately to reflect the state of the literature
which does seem to be arbitrarily split on the matter.
1.3.1.3 Information System Image 
The third image or school of thought sees financial accounting as an
information system satisfying the needs of users. Such a view is relatively
recent in the history of accounting given the supposed starting time of 2300 BC
of the accounting phenomena! As SATTA perceptively point out it was gaining
a groundswell during the 1950's and early 1960's (in management accounting)
but essentially was launched properly through the publication of ASOBAT in 1966
which,as discussed in the previous section, gave financial accountin g a strong
'decision usefulness' concern.
What this meant to proponents varied and gave rise to what
Sterling (1970) called a 'decision models' and 'decision makers' emphasis.
The former was concerned with building formal models of decision processes
(particularly micro business investment decisions) and the designing of
information relevant to such models. Such a basic concern is less apparent
in current literature although still present but is clearly seen in the more
recent concern with the design of a 'conceptual framework' in both the United
States and the United Kingdom.
Most advances, and as a result a number of newly defined sub schools , have
come from the 'decision makers' approach: two major sub-schools can be
discerned one of which has given 'birth' to two others. The two original
sub-schools of thought are neatly summarised by Hofstedt (1976): namely
'behavioural accounting research' and 'security price research.' The former
attempts to research the wants of individuals and groups and has resulted in a
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multitude of diverse and often conflicting results.
*
 The latter building
on the insights coming from the efficient market hypothesis looks at the
information content of accounting announcements in the context of security
price movements.**
Two further more definable sub-schools have come from the somewhat
disorganised behavioural accounting research area. The first of these,
'human information processing'*** attempts to analyse at a more general level
the information processing ability and procedures of individuals. The second
of these which we could call the 'information inductance' sub•school,coming
from Prakash and Rappaport's (1977) description ,looksmore closely at the
processes of the sender of information - how he decides on what to communicate
and how this is to be communicated. Previous behavioural accouutiag research
has always looked at the wants of users, the information inductance approach
looks at the wants of senders and the human information processing approach
attempts to analyse in general the wants, and how they are arrived at, for
any user.
Perhaps before closing this section on the 'information system' image
it is important to highlight the embryo of a new sub-school of thought. This
* A reasonable,if somewhat dated,sumnary of this somewhat unclassifiable
work is presented in Dyckman, Gibb ins and Swieringa (1975). A more
recent paper by Colville (1981) would suggest that further summarisation
since that date would not add much to clarifying greater coherence for
as he points out:
"An exhaustive review represents a large undertaking
because the area is shapeless and its content is
fragmented with little semblance of a coherent
structure." (p. 120)
Gomedes and Dopuch (1974) and Kaplan (1978) even though somewhat dated
supplies a relevant summary of this work.
The American Accounting Association's committee report (197713) and
Snowball (1980) present excellent summaries of this work.
16
is a development and refinement of the information inductance approach
seeing the financial accounting information system in organisational terms
to aid organisational control (et Laughlin and Puxty 1981, 1983A; Puxty and
Laughlin, 1983; Laughlin, 1983). However it is not included in the sub-schools
of thought at this stage due to its embryonic nature and lack of adherents.
In summary the 'information system' school of thought has fundamentally
five sub schools. These can be labelled Information for Decision Models,
Behavioural Accounting Research, Security Price Research, Human Information 
Processing and Information Inductance.
1.3.1.4 Commodity Image 
The fourth and final image or school of thought sees financial accounting
as a commodity. This sees the function of financial accounting in terms and
allied to some economic commodity around which there is a demand and supply
with welfare implications. There are three sub- schools of thought which
cluster under this approach.
The first of these views the financial accounting phenomena from a
single person information economics perspective (et Demski, 1972; Feltham,
1972; Demski and Feltham, 1976). This sees the
1 ... demand for information in terms of the ultimate
choice in some choice problem that the individual faces.
Put another way, the demand for information is a
derived demand; information is valued because it improves
the quality of decisions' (SATTA, 1977, p. 22)
Given no actual market to test out choices the process of choice has to be
created by models using assumptions on utility concepts generally and
specifically with regard to outcomes and actions and the costs and benefits
of information as uncertainty reducers in such a model.
The second sub-school views the financial accounting phenomena from an
'agency theory' perspective (cf Jensen and Meckling, 1976) which expands on
the information economics framework to explain both demand and supply of
information in the context of two parties - a principal and an agent. The
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model maintains that the principal will attempt to limit the actions of
the agent which are not in line with the principal's wishes and incur
monitoring costs to ensure this is the case. The agent, on the other hand,
it is assumed, will expend resources to guarantee his actions are in the
principal's interest. This combined willingness to inform and be informed
explains, so the argument goes, why certain financial accounting information
is both supplied and demanded.
This agency model features more prominently in the management accounting
literature as will become apparent later in this Chapter. However, such a
general model has recently gained ground in the area of financial accounting
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Zmijewski and Hagerman, 1981; Leftwich, 1981)
and will continue to do so.
The third and final sub-school in the context of viewing financial
accounting as an economic commodity concentrates on the social welfare aspects
of information exposure. Although a number of American Accounting Association
reports (1975, 1978, 1979) have highlighted the need to evaluate financial
accounting alternatives according to a social welfare criterion few* studies
to date actually get anywhere near operationising such a challenge.
Where this model has been applied is in arguing a case for accounting
regulation (Kelly-Newton, 1980; Foster, 1978; Gonedes and Dopuch, 1974).
The argument goes that financial accounting statements are public goods which
if left unregulated would lead to non pareto optimal effects. Thus the case is
made for accounting regulation in general** although what it actually means in
term of welfare optimal actions remains for future research.
In summary the economic commodity school of thought has fundamentally
three sub-schools. This can, for convenience, be labelled Information Economics,
* The author's joint work (Laughlin and Puxty, 1981; Laughlin and Puxty, 1983A;
auty and Laughlin, 1983) starts to fill this gap however.
** However it is worth pointing out that others, notably those adopting an
agency theory perspective to 'accounting as a commodity', would argue the
exact opposite of this standpoint. In general, according to these arguments,
it is 'better' not to regulate (cf Benston, 1982)
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Agency Theory Approaches and Social Welfare Considerations.
1.3.1.5 Conclusion
In conclusion of this section it is worth pointing out again that
these schools and sub-schools (particularly the labels) are in no way
'absolute' - no classification scheme is. In addition they are clearly
not meant to be exhaustive of the literature under each of the schools and
sub-schools. They are introduced in this form to obtain a general view of
the phenomena called financial accounting so as to allow the following
section to analyse major streams of accounting thought (in terms of
these sub-schools) according to the model presented in Figure 1.1. For
ease of reference Table 1.3.1 summarises these schools and sub • schools as
discussed in this Section.
19
1.3.2 A Contextual Analysis of Sub-Schools of Thought in Financial
Accounting 
The following analysis and the one in Section 1.4.2 will attempt to
position each of the sub-schools of thought in financial accounting
discussed above in the context of the model presented in Figure 1.1 above.
In essence what will be asked of each of the sub-schools are three
questions:
1. Does it attempt to describe* what presently happens in
financial accounting systems in operation?
2. Does it attempt to a) prescribe* without describing
b) prescribe following a aescription, what should happen
in financial accounting systems in operation?
3. Does it attempt to ensure that any prescriptions suggested
are actually brought about in practice?
These three questions encapsulate the important aspects of Figure 1.1. Table
1.3.2 sunnarises the possible answers to these three questions as applied to
all the sub-schools and the following presents the logic behind the
categorisation.
Overarching comments on this total picture in connection with the
interest or lack of interest in the design of accounting systems in practice
will be deferred until Section 1.5 after a similar exercise has been conducted
on management accounting.
1.3.2.1 Historic Cost Accounting 
Historic cost accounting is the most seemingly complete of all the sub-
schools as Table 1.3.2 indicates. It is intended to be descriptive and
* Describe and prescribe are used in the sense defined in Section 1.1.
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prescriptive and has a powerful change processor in terms of the sub-
school's dominance of concern in the regulatory agencies actions (with
suitable legal support) as well as a firm hold over the education syllabuses
of academic and professional institutions.
The assumption from such completeness should be minor conflict in
changes suggested. If we have adequately described what is happening and
are making prescriptions based on these empirical insights then the matter
should be both manageable and more acceptable (within bounds) when change is
suggested and worked out. However, the recent conflicts surrounding
accounting standards - the 'economic consequences debate' as it has come to
be known (et Rappaport, 1977; Zeff, 1978) - would suggest that such a
partially conflict free situation is not always the situation.
A closer examination of some of these conflicts as Laughlin and Puxty
(1981, 1982, 1983A) have done indicate that such disagreement stems from a
fundamentally different 'worldview' concerning the function of financial
accounts. This brings into question the adequacy of the original description
of the financial accounting system in practice. The resulting prescriptions
therefore are building on an inadequate understanding and such is only
apparent when change is being pushed through. Given such powerful change
mechanisms in financial accounting as compared with management accounting (see
later for details) such 'rebellions' become all the more important and
significant in terms of the inaccuracies of the total model as a depictor and
changer of reality.
1.3.2.2 EVents Accounting
The Events Accounting sub-school on the other hand is basically prescriptive.
It suggests what should happen with regard to financial accounting and judging
by the somewhat small following in the literature does not appear to have
convinced many on the validity of the standpoint.
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1.3.2.3 Income and Wealth Measurement 
The Income and Wealth Measurement sub-school is claimed to be
descriptive from which alternative prescriptions as to 'best approaches'
are made. However 1 closer investigation suggests that such claims to
description rely very heavily on economists' conception of reality as
defined in terms of 'income' and 'wealth'. The majority of accounting
approaches which concentrate on measurement issues builds on the insights
of Fisher (1906) and Hicks (1946) as to the concept of income and wealth.
Fisher described income in the context of a series of events or psychic
experiences called enjoyment. Enjoyment to Fisher came from the consumption
of goods and services and income was a monetary measure of this personal
consumption. Hicks added a savings factor to the consumption element and
saw income as the maximum amount a person could consume in a period without
impairing his well offness (wealth) at the start.
Thus income and wealth are not observable empirical phenomena as such:
they are complex constructs by economists. Thus measures of income and
wealth cannot really be called descriptions of reality they are descriptions
of economist's ordering of reality according to economic terms and
economic theory.*
Thus according to this view there is considerable doubt as to whether it
is possible for this sub-school, and also the Inflation Accounting sub-school,
which is simply a more popular development of the former, to be classifiable
as descriptions. The more likely situation is that they are both prescriptive
in terms of what a financial accounting system should look like.
* Such a sentence, of course, should lead into a philosophical debate on
what constitutes a description. The author is well aware of this
problem but must delay discussion of it until later in the study.
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1.3.2.4 Inflation Accounting 
The sube school Inflation Accounting is basically part of the Income
and Wealth Measurement sub-school as indicated above. It is given separate
status due to its overwhelming popularity and related involvement by the
regulatory bodies in bringing about change in the practice of accounting to
make adjustments for inflation.
Like historic cost accounting this looks to be the most complete in
terms of the cycle as depicted in Figure 1.1 i.e. descriptions leading to
prescriptions and then change intentions. However, not very extensive
analysis is required to indicate the incompleteness of such a claim. Three
things are immediately apparent.* Firstly it is not clear whether seminal
works on inflation accounting really are descriptive studies. The two broad
emphases in inflation accounting on general price level adjustments and
current cost accounting are normally traceable to the works by Sweeney (1936)
and Bonbright (1937). However, such treatises and those that followed them
have more prescriptive than descriptive qualities if one follows the logic
discussed above.** Whether they are or not to some, may be irrelevant. However
not to have 'seen a need and an attempt at a solution' (a description) in
term of some form of inflation accounting upon which prescriptions as to
'howtosatisfy this need' can be made leads to immense problems when trying to
bring about real change at the practical level.
Secondly the prescriptions with regard to inflation accounting (the
suggested standards and their logic) lack any real relationship to the
seminal (supposed) descriptive studies on the subject. As Laughlin and Puxty
(1983B) point out in their analysis of the debate in the United Kingdom the
These points are discussed further in the case study and analysis of
inflation accounting in Laughlin and Puxty (1983B).
** The validity of this view once again rests on what constitutes a
description and prescription (see above).
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present standard, plus the previous attempts, are but a dim, even non-
existent, reflection of these original insights. Clearly prescriptions
should be different from descriptions but to be virtually unrecognizable
as coming from such a source can only lead to 'tissue rejection' problems.
Thirdly the resulting change process, particularly in the United
Kingdom, seems to be under considerable attack. The present standard is
provisional for a three year trial period yet the recent private members
motion, half way through this time, calling for an abandonment of the
standard is undoubtedly indicative of a great deal of dissatisfaction. The
major arguments being that both the standard and inflation accounting is
an irrelevancy.*
Whether it is or isn't is not the important question for our present
concerns. The important point to note is that even though on the surface
the cycle from description to prescription to change is to be seen in this
sub-school, on closer investigation the sequential relationship between
elements is in some disarray.
1.3.2.5 Information for Decision Models 
The Information for Decision Models sub-school alludes to being
descriptive of decision models of individuals. However, closer investigation
ems that Sterling's 'interim' arrangement for constructing these models
still applies:
'... decision theories that exist in the economics,
operations research, etc. literature can be taken
as given. Instead of trying to construct our own
decision theories we can search the literature
for the extant decision theories. Thus the "empirical
research that is required is a literature search"
(Sterling, 1970, p. 456)
However, these theories are l in the maini built on prescriptive premises making
the information which feeds such models similarly prescriptive. In fact such
aglobal generalisation need not be defended for as SATTA (1977) points out
* This paragraph was written before the latest expose draft (ED 35) was
issued but the points still stand.
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the majority* of studies in this area have concentrated on the:
'... decisions of investors' (p.13)
which have assumed to be:
'... either simple present value models or
two-parameter expected return and risk
models' (p.13)
Such models coming from the 'finance' and 'financial management' literature relies
very heavily on prescriptive reasoning.
In addition there is very little concern with change processes. These
,limited prescriptive models are built up leading in to suggestions on
appropriate inputs, usually cash flow statements, into such models and there
the analysis stops. Admittedly a number of more enlightened proponents
(cf Sterling 1967; Bird, 1975) touch on some of the issues involved:
If we are convinced that the receivers (decision
makers) are using the wrong decision model, we
have a dilemma. (1) We can transmit the
information specified by their (decision makers')
wrong model which will yield right decisions only
be chance. (2) We can transmit the information
specified by the right model which will be
irrelevant to their (decision makers') model, and
hence right decisions will result only be chance.
(Sterling, 1967, p.106)
but then shy away from such complex empirical questions.
So in general if one can generalise about this as a sub-school of
thought the contents of its insights are fundamentally and only prescriptive.
1.3.2.6 Behavioural Accounting Research
The sub-school of Behavioural Accounting Research is as Hofstedt (1976)
* Clearly there have been studies in other areas notably in collective
bargaining decisions (cf Maunders and Foley, 1974; Foley and Maunders,
1977; Cooper and Essex, 1977) but theseare minority studies in the whole
literature in this sub-school.
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so directly put it:
'Like the famous Topsy... ? (p.44)
which has:
... 'just growed', unfocussed, unuseful
and unloved except by its practitioners'
(p.44)
However,for all its faults it does attempt to be descriptive although some
of the methodological processes involved in making such descriptions are
probably some of the cause for Hofstedt's somewhat derogatory remarks.*
Most studies, given some leniency on the word 'most', seem to aspire to
be generalisations about peoples wants but are unable to achieve such
aspirations. Equally in their desire to generalise they fail to capture the
richness of the particular sample they are studying. This problem
unfortunately is a phenomena not uncommon to many other sub-schools of
thought in accounting as will become apparent. The problem is connected with
methodology as hopefully will become clearer.
However in the meantime it is important to note that Behavioural
Accounting Research apart from lacking coherence, or possibly because of it,
lacks both prescriptive** as well as change qualities. Thus the cycle once
again is incomplete at the moment although no doubt any proponent of this
school of thought would claim that future work will supply these important
ingredients.
1.3.2.7 Security Price Research 
The Security Price Research sub-school is intended to be descriptive
* Chapters 2 and 3 will pick up this methodological problem in much more
depth.
** Some studies do attempt to make suggestions based on their research as
to what accounting information should be supplied but because of the
nature of the research itself it is unclear whether these prescriptions
are generally relevant or only relevant to the groups in question.
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of stock market behaviour and information relevance therein. However
like other sub-schools already looked at its description relies not
directly on empirical phenomena but on the models of this by other
disciplines - in this case finance studies. However, in this case the
problem gets extremely intertwined and tautological as Findlay
(1977) perceptively points out:
Our basic argument is that the finance studies (1)
assumed an information set in terms of accounting
numbers, (2) observed the market reaction, and (3)
concluded that this was the reaction of an efficient
market to information and, hence, that the market
was efficient. The accounting researchers then (1)
cited all of the evidence that markets were semi-
strong efficient, (2) observed the market reaction
to accounting numbers, and (3) concluded that this
was the reaction an efficient market would make to
information and, hence, that accounting numbers have
information content. Although this circularity does
imply that the statement 'markets are efficient and
accounting numbers have information content' is
internally consistent, it hardly proves it to be
true.
(p.110)
Thus although clearly alluding to being descriptive it could be nothing more
than (prescriptive) wishful thinking that markets are efficient and that
accounting information has information content.
However, one thing is sure about this sub-school: prescriptions in
terms ofaxsessing the 'desirability' of a possible piece of information
which has not already been exposed to the market is impossible. The very
nature of the approach relies on observing reactions in price movements
after information has been exposed. Thus the only way to test information
desirability is to expose it to the market and see whether the 'efficient
price makers' use it or not.
In addition to these points it is worth noting that there are some
thane intentions coming from this research despite the questionable nature
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of the descriptions and the lack of alternative prescriptions.* These
change intentions are not directed at the phenomena being described (the
market or the information supplied) but rather at the regulatory agencies
who are attempting to adjust the information set. The arguments of these
proponents (et Beaver, 1973) call for some aspects of deregulation (e.g.
abandonment of the one best way, abandonment of trying to satisfy the needs
of the 'naive' investor) so that the efficiency of the market can do its
own regulation of and decision upon/relevant' information.
In conclusion the Security Price Research sub-school has potentially
descriptive, prescriptive and change elements yet all are based on the
initial view of the efficiency of the market which, if Findlay is right,
rests on a tautology. However, to its merit it does at least attempt to
follow through its insights and develop (in this case leave alone and stop
regulatory agencies tampering with) the area which it is researching. Or
in other words the security price research looks at public quoted companies
and prescribes and suggests changes relevant to these enterprises.
1.3.2.8 Human Information Processing
Human Information Processing (HIP) is fundamentally attempting to
present descriptive models of the way human beings process and use information
in the context of decisions and judgements that they make. As Snowball (1980)
points out there are four basic approaches in this sub-school of thought;
* The prescriptions are that what is (if a description) or what we would
like it to be which we say it is (a disguised prescription) is right!
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what they are and what they attempt is neatly summaried in the following:
'The Bayesian and regression approaches view the
HIP system* as a black box; the Bayesian approach
relates the output of that black box to an
optimal model, whereas the regression approach
provides a mathematical or paramorphic repres-
entation of the black box.
	 The cognitive
style approach rests on a broad conceptualisation
of internal processes of the HIP system, but does
not attempt to describe or represent specific
models of human processors. On the other hand
..• process tracers insist on opening the black
box to watch the mechanisms' inside while it is
working"
(p.313)
It is not the intention at this stage to analyse the insights forthcoming
from this research. However, it is worth noting three points in passing.
Firstly all the approaches o except the process tracing one, borrow well
established methodologies from economics and psychology in their analysis.
Secondly that each approach may possibly supply different insights because of
the alternative methodologies employed. Thirdly that the overwhelming concern
with all the approaches except possibly the process tracing one is to make general-
isations about human information processing.
Of more importance at this stage is to note that insights to date in this
mth-school do not extend to making prescriptions or invoke changes in human
information processing. The Bayesian approach comes nearest to these concerns
by evaluating actual processing in an optimal model but stops short of saying
either that such a model should be in practice or designing change strategies
to allow this to occur.
Thus in conclusion and in terms of the cycle the present situation is
that the insights from this sub-school are fundamentally descriptive.
* The HIP system to Snowball has three elements to it which he describes
as information seeking, information evaluation and information
combination.
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Whether the intention is to move towards prescription and change is unclear
although possibly this may be rather difficult at least in respect of particularly
he first three approaches which deals with the generalised man and his
generalised information processing ability.
1.3.2.9 Information Inductance 
In many ways Information Inductance is only just gaining ground as
a separate sub-school. Prakash and Rappaport (1977) gave it impetus,
meaning and a name. To them 'information inductance' or 'inductance' is:
'... the process whereby the behaviour of an individual
is affected by the information he is required to
communicate'
(p.319)
Prakash and Rappaport argued that insights from this focus could help understand
loth internal accounting (e.g. the motivations to produce information by
internal units) and external accounting (e.g. why management declares one
thing rather than another to external users). Few have picked up this challenge
in the literature although there are indications that such a situation may
well change in the future.
A recent study by Dirsmith and Lewis (1982) however gives enough of a
feel of this sub-school's concern to allow a classification for the purpose
of this Section. Basically it's concern is descriptive - building general
wads as to why people communicate. If Dirsmith and Lewis are symptomatic
of the contributions in the future the concern will be to design broad based
contingency models of peoples' behaviour.*
Whether there will be any descriptive or prescriptive concerns in the
future remain to be seen.
* Dirsmith and Lewis concluded that the act of communicating is 'conditioned
by the extent to which information senders perceive external recipients as
relying on financial accounting information and by the cognitive style
of the information sender' (p.319)
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13.2.10 Information Economics
Information Economics is fundamentally prescriptive: it postulates
a model of action and information usage and choice which ought to be
adopted. It's prescriptive qualities can be seen by the assumptions under
which the information economics approach must work. These assumptions are
many but in general can be summarised as the complete specification of the
information evaluator's decision problem. This involves specifying utility
functions, alternatives, payoffs of outcomes,benefits of alternative sets of
information in terms of reducing uncertainty or payoffs, costs of these
information systems etc. These matters are both complex and rely on a
particular model of rational logical economic action. Yet the complexity
is assumed away and the rational model is untested in an empirical sense,
both indicating the prescriptive qualities of the resulting insights under
this approach.
However, the basic idea as distinct from the actual outworking has
possible descriptive claims. The basic descriptive possibility is that the
decision on the production of information is dependent on the related costs
and benefits (as perceived by the information producer) of that information.
Such a claim which would be conditional on giving meaning to costs and
benefits in particular situations is a descriptive hypothesis. However, such
a general stand even though it may have motivated the interest originally
ina cost benefit approach is not the dominant concern of this sub-school of
thought. The dominant concern is to apply, adapt and develop normative
models from physics and electrical engineering (and more specifically the
insights of Shannon and Weaver (1964)). In this sense it is clearly prescriptive
and one has to read in the descriptive qualities at a very general level.
13.2.11 Agency Theory Approaches 
Agency theory approaches are difficult to classify. The claim by those
working in this sub-school is that they are describing the real world. However,
the nud world to them is made up of two parties (principals and agents)
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contractually bound and each trying to maximise his own welfare and acting
in the context of single periods. Clearly this may be reality in some
situations but to claim generality as a global description seems highly
questionable as a number of authors have suggested (et Fama, 1980; Tiessen
andWaterhouse,1983).
What prescriptions that come from this sub-school are for allowing
such principal / agent relationships to flourish unimpeded because in some
sense they work 'best' if allowed freedom. As a consequence the only change
element has been to attack regulatory agencies for intervening in this market
place for contractual obligations (cf Benston, 1982).
However, like the sub-school on Security Price Research at least the
Agency Theory proponents are attempting to work out the implications of their
descriptions in terms of prescriptions and changes needed to allow such
normative suggestions to come into being. However,like Security Price Research,
it does this on what many would believe to be from a weak and inadequate
descriptive base.
13.2.12 Secial Welfare Considerations 
In many ways this sub-school permeates many of the bthers. However, it is
givensub-school status due to the way such social welfare considerations are
given expression in the literature. This is almost exclusively expressed in
terms of giving justification and direction to accounting regulatory agencies.
Such 'policy' issues have attracted an expanding literature and a new
accounting journal* devoted to such matters - all giving some indication
* Journal of Accounting and Public Policy
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of sub-school status.*
To the extent that such a sub-school is new and developing it is
difficult to adequately classify it using the model in Figure 1.1. However,
it undd be argued that both descriptive (i.e. the economic consequences
literature and analyses of the behaviour of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board and the Accounting Standards Board) and prescriptive (i.e. arguments
from economic theory on the importance for regulation in the accounting
context) are present in this sub-school's literature. However such prescriptions
do not directly follow from the descriptions and do not, at this stage,
lead to suggestions for change in regulatory practices.
* Given of course that all of these sub-schools are arbitrary anyway -
they are simply convenient titles for groups of literature on a common
thane.
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1.4 A SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING
To attempt a survey and classification of management accounting is,
in many ways, an ambitious and difficult endeavour due to the variety which
can be seen under this global heading as recent authors who have attempted
such a task have indicated (cf Scapens, 1982; Otley 1982). However, despite
such uncertainties and doubts about the accuracy of any attempt it is present-
ed to allow some, even if inadequate, appreciation of major schools of thought
and how they appear in the context of Figure 1.1.
Davis, Menon and Morgan (1982), however, are more assertive and confident
in their power of 'images' to capture the richness and diversity of
management accounting. Although not being specific about what these images
are they do give a valuable clue as to possible contenders:
'We find the same situation in the field of manage-
ment accounting where a wide variety of images vie
for the attention of theorists and researchers.
Managerial accounting is intimately connected with
organisation theory and the images shaping the
latter have been readily incorporated within the
former'	 (p. 316)
Certainly some legitimation for this stand can be obtained from the fact that
the SSRC sponsored a survey paper precisely on these relationships. However,
the final report (Otley, 1982) came to the conclusion that such relationships
are not that close in totality although they can be seen on occasions. Otley
maintained that the lack of closure and clarity in both organisation theory
and management accounting made any form of classification and one to one
relationships virtually impossible. He also rejected classifications because
of an important methodological point that highlighting differences leads to
blindness to underlying commonalities.*
* Otley building on Burrell and Morgan's (1979) analysis highlights the
dominant 'functionalist' concern underlying nearly all approaches in
both organisational theory and management accounting - a point which
will be developed much further in Chapter 2.
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tmever, if one constantly bears in mind the limitations of all classification
system such attempts can still be shown to be useful heuristic devices for
looking at the literature.
Classification systems can also highlight similarities between not only
schools of thought but disciplines as well. Thus it can be shown through
a mum classification system for organisation theory and management accounting
that Davis et al's claim has some validity. It is possible to show that
the major schools of thought in organisation theory can be seen in management
accounting even though not always apparent and not always without embellishment
from cemr sources.
1.4.1 A Classification of Organisational Theory
Scott's (1981) historical analysis of organisational theory is a valuable
starting point for demonstrating this claim. His classification system* can
be used to position the various schools of thought in management accounting
given some initial work on trying to see whether any schools of thought
actually exist! Such an endeavour will be attempted in Section 1.4.2 below.
This Section, however, will summarise Scott's insights which are presented
indiagrammtic form in Figure 1.4.1 and described below.
Scott maintained, in effect, that it was possible to classify organisation
theory on two bi-polar characteristics: 'open/closed' and 'rational/natural'.
These characteristics formed important underlying assumptions behind major
schools of thought in organisation theory. Such characteristics, in effect,
mated a two by two matrix into which various major schools of organisational
thought could be positioned.
The characteristic 'open and closed systems' is interpreted in terms of
* This assumes Scott has managed to capture the richness of organisational
theory in his own classification systems. No doubt many would think he
hasn't, however, it is worth repeating that all classification systems are
always limited and always heuristic.
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levels of uncertainty. To be 'open' means that the level of uncertainty
is potentially maximal since the system is always open to possible
disturbances. To be closed does not mean that no uncertainty is present
but rather that the closure manages and keeps the uncertainty at certain
predetermined levels.
The characteristic !rational and natural' are used in the sense
Gouldner (1959) originally used and labelled them. Scott (1981) highlights
the differences as follows:
'The rational system model assumes that organisations
are purposefully designed for the pursuit of explicit
objectives ... The natural system model emphasises
the importance of unplanned and spontaneous process'
(p. 408)
However, in an interesting adaptation and development of Scott's work Boland
and Pondy (1983) expand on this distinction as follows:
'Rational models assume managements are confronted
with an objectively knowable, empirically verifiable
reality that presents demands for action. Guided by
a functionalist framework, managements analyse the
apparent cause and effect relations, calculate costs
and benefits and take action in response to the
requirements of the external environment or the
technology of production. Natural models, on the
other hand, see managements as responsible agents
who interact symbolically and, in so doing, create
their social reality and give meaning to their
ongoing stream of experience' (p. 223)
These insights of Boland and Pondy are an important development of both
Gouldner's and Scott's definitions without contradicting these original
thoughts. The problem with the original is that intentional action can only
be 'rational' according to this classification. However, natural models,
using Boland and Pondy's understanding, can have their own 'user defined'
rationality. The difference being as to whether one assumes a certain model
of rationality before approaching the empirical phenomena or allows the
data to give the observer the user defined model of rationality. It is this
distinction which is latent in Scott's description and more apparent in Boland
and hnidy.
These bi-polar characteristics give four combined assumption sets which
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underly four major schools of organisational thought according to Scott.
Organisation theory was dominated by a 'closed rational' set of assumptions
cluing 1900 - 1930 when the scientific and administrative management schools
of thought were most prevalent (et Taylor, 1911; Fayol, 1949 (originally
published in 1919)). These viewed organisations as a vehicle and machine
for achieving objectives. Largely as a reaction to this machine-like view
the 1930 to 1960 era was domined by the 'human relations movement'
(cf Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939; Mayo, 1945: McGregor, 1960) which worked
under 'closed and natural' assumptions. This approach viewed organisations
as humanistic phenomena but under very limited assumptions (hence the
'closed' characteristic). As a result they didn't move very far away from
the scientific management approach and simply added a humanistic dimension
to these endeavours.
A concern to view organisations in the context of the environments in
which they are placed marked the change in the later 1950's. This still
dominates thinking today in organisational theory although there are many
different strands to this general view. However all without exception have
moved from a more universalistic understanding of organisations (the one best
way) to much more particularistic viewpoints.
Foremost amongst these have been the systems and cybernetic theorists
of the 1960's* encapsulated particularly in the contingency theorists
(cf Burns and Stalker, 1961; Woodward, 1965; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967;
Pugh et al 1968, 1969) who maintained that the nature of organisations was
contingent on particular environmental conditions. An obvious move from this
was to build optimal models of organisations allied to particular environments
for maximum goal achievement - in other words (working under particular
* Scott puts the closure of this school of thought at 1970 but it seems
highly dubious that such 'death' occurred then or has occurred yet.
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'open rational' assumptions.
The latest schools of thought which Scott dated as starting in 1970
even though it is possible to trace it's concern to much earlier* works
under the broad assumptions of 'open natural'. Needless to say there is
immense variety and conflicting models in this school of thought but are
possibly best exemplified by the work of March and Olsen (1976) and Pfeffer
and Salancik (1978). Both these studies show clearly the importance of
environments in organisational understanding but stress the 'user defined'
nature of the organisations' responses to these, goals and decision making.
Most recent work on organisation theory appears to be conducted under this
somewhat unlimited assumption set according to Scott.
1.4.2 A Survey of Management Accounting and its Organisation Theory and Other 
Roots
What will be attempted in the following is to trace major images in
management accounting, marshalling these into sub ... schools of thought and then
demonstrating their relationship to the above model of organisation theories.
We can then return to the main theme which is concerned with evaluating their
descriptive, prescriptive and change qualities (section 1.4.3).
Management Accounting appears to have two major wings to its concern
which we could coveniently title after Bhasker (1981) and Scapens (1982)
'quantitative aspects' and 'behavioural aspects'. To say that such
distinctions are arbitrary is to say nothing new and certainly as will become
apparent the former has behavioural aspects (of sorts) in its concern and the
latter has quantitative aspects (of sorts) in its concern as well. It's
adoption in the accounting literature appears to be because of a dominance of
concern of studies which are more or less one or the other and are clearly'
related to other studies which can be similarly classified.
* Barnard (1938), March and Simon (1958) and Cyert and March (1963) are
three examples of works which probably fit under this heading and all
predate 1970!
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Given the arbitrariness of the division it is still possible to
classify various management accounting 'thrusts' in one or other of these
two domains. Further it is possible to trace chronological 'steps' in the
insights in each domain. Figure 1.4.2 diagrams these steps and the
following overview describes these and their interrelationship. However,
before embarking on this it is important to prevent any possible illusions
caused by using the analogy of 'steps'. This does not mean that all
researches have 'climbed up' so to speak - much current research is still on
the bottom rung - or that the next step up builds on the one below - often
the next step comes out of dissatisfaction and criticism of the one below.
The step analogy is used to show some relationship to the one below it but
not necessarily, and often not, as the foundation for advance.
1.4.2.1 Quantitative Aspects of Management Accounting 
More the Second World War the primary focus in this area of management
accounting was cost control or cost accounting. Concerns for product costing
and control of direct labour, materials and overheads were dominant
(cfSolomons, 1968). Most innovation came from accounting practitioners.
Soon after the Second World War and during the 1950's a growing body of
opinion called for user oriented design of internal accounting systems.
Simon et al's (1954) influential study was instrumental in bringing focus
to bear on the needs of management for accounting information. However, apart
from giving impetus to a user oriented approach few really picked up Simon
et al's more 'conditional' approach to management accounting until much later.
The mixing model of management accounting was to formulate what Scapens
(1982) calls the 'conventional wisdom'* current in textbook and taught today.
This was built up from a particular model of management and their needs. The
* Scapens (1982) highlights five major aspects of this 'conventional
wisdom': planning, cost classification, control, costing and
divisionalisat ion.
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'conditional truth' as Horngren (1975 P. 10) calls management accounting
therefore was conditional on some very limited decision models of
management behaviour. Or as Scapens (1982) so perceptively puts it:
... the neoclassical economic framework played a
central role in structuring the decision models
used by the researchers who were instrumental in
the development of management accounting's
conventional wisdom'. (p. 21)
We will return to some of the assumptions under which such a framework
operates in Section 1.4.2.3 below but in the meantime the important thing
to note is the basic thrust of the content of the conventional wisdom.
Although the move from cost accounting which Horngren (1975) describes
as 'absolute truth' to the 'conditional truth' of the conventional wisdom
can be seen as a 'step' (see Figure 1.4.2) there were a number of developments
in the 1970'swhichwere more of refinement of the latter. These refinements
are fundamentally the introduction of uncertainty into the conventional
wisdom of management accounting. Such concerns were clearly apparent in the
mid to late sixties (et Byrne et al, 1968; Jensen, 1968; Jaedicke and
RAichek, 1964; Thompson and Kemper, 1965) but came to full fruition during
the 1970's.
The fundamental concern was to enrich the basic model by creating
probabilistic problems inside particular aspects of the conventional wisdom
(e.g. a probabilistic cost volume profit relationship (a very popular theme
at the time)) and then use statistical techniques to arrive at optimal
solutions. Linear programming and integer programming were dominant and
because of the limitation of these techniques sensitivity analysis became
widely used as well as statistical decision theory, input-output analysis
etc. etc.
Although this isn't a full picture of these developments it gives enough
ofa view to demonstrate the important point that these developments, important
though they were in the context of the model, did not constitute a step away
from the conventional wisdom but rather a refinement of it.
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However, a step away from the conventional wisdom did occur in the
early 1970's with the introduction of an information economics perspective
to management accounting information design. The information economics
approach which is briefly described above (in the financial accounting
section) was also,and more particularly,applied to management accounting
problems. As indicated above the major contribution to this field was made
byhltham and Demski particular in their 1976 work — 'Cost Determination'.
It's 'step' characteristics centre around the contingent conclusions
which come from the approach or as Demski and Feltham (1976) point out:
1 ... whether one cost assessment alternative is
preferred to another is an inherently contextual
question' (p. 249)
or as Scapens (1982) amplifies:
'The most appropriate accounting technique
depends on the situation, in particular the costs
and benefits of the information' (p. 39)
Thus the contingent truths which Simon et al (1954) were pointing towards
start* to be seen and in marked contrast to the conventional wisdom (suitably
amplified to encompass uncertainty concerns) which looks towards the one best
way to design accounting systems. It is this change which marks a break or
step way from the conventional wisdom.
As indicated in the financial accounting section information economics is
based on a single person model working under limiting assumptions. Thus a
natural move was towards multiperson models. Three such strands of research
can be traceable coming out of this information economics thrust with, it
* Start is the most appropriate word since, as has been indicated, information
economics works under very limiting assumptions. In addition a mass of
more empirically based contingency approaches were put forward in the
behavioural aspects stream of management accounting (see Section 1.4.2.2
below).
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should be added, many of the limiting assumptions which dominated the
school of thought. It is because of this clear 'family resemblance' that
such moves do not constitute a break or a step but rather a development and
refinement of the basic information economics approach.
The first development came in the late seventies with some attempts at
trying to apply 'game theory' to multiperson information system choice (cf
Bairaan,1975, 1979; Sundem, 1979). However, all manner of problems ensued in
trying to apply this in anything like a realistic situation where future
states are uncertain, pay off functions are unknown and actions unpredictable.
The result called for highly unreal assumptions and as a result some degree
of disillusionment with this development as a totality.
However, one class of these models did, and has, found widespread support
and interest ' the models working within an 'agency theory' framework. This
constitutes the second development. The basic model is briefly described in
the financial accounting section above and need not be repeated here. When
applied in a management accounting sense it is dealing with the contractual
relationships between participants who are usually considered to be 'inside'
the enterprise. It's major thrust is still with principal and agent
contractual relationships but in the case of management accounting applications
it is possible to have different expressions of this model. In financial
accounting the dominant concern is with the shareholder (principal) and
management (agent) relationship, however in management accounting it is
possible to see the latter as both agent (to the shareholders) and principal
(to the 'workers'). However, the hierarchical superior subordinate classification
is always present as are the other limiting assumptions whether applied in
financial or management accounting.
The third development often called 'transaction cost theory' or an
'organisation failures framework' comes originally from the work by the
economist Williamson (cf 1975). The relationships between this approach and
agency theory is not always apparent but is real nevertheless as Spicer and
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lalew (1983) and Tinker (1982) point out. Tinker (1982) puts the
relationship as follows:
'Transaction-Cost Theory is more "macroscopic"
in that it focuses on the totality of contractual
relations; Agency Theory, in contrast, adopts a
more "microscopic" perspective by concentrating
on particular agent - principal relationships'
(p. 15)
Transaction-cost theory is about the choice of appropriate 'governance
structures' (systems for implementing and monitoring 'transactions' which
underlie production). Transactions are conducted under explicit or implicit
agreements (or contracts) between all affected parties. An appropriate
governance structure* is one which minimises the transaction costs. An
'organisation failure' occurs when the transaction costs of one form of
organisation (governance structure) can be reduced by adopting a new form.
Clearly information is vital for such a process and although not clearly
related to management accounting or financial accounting the implications
for these areas follow the general point. If particular governance forms
and underlying information systems in particular enterprises have survived
the test of (competitive) time then they clearly, according to Williamson,
must be efficient systems for that particular enterprise. .
This 'contingent' point is the one which binds these four approaches
(information economics, game theory, agency theory and transaction cost
theory together) together. But they are not the same, even though vaguely
related, to the contingency approaches coming through the 'behavioural'
wing of management accounting. Both contingency approaches come from different
roots and work under different assumptions, as will become apparent.
* Williamson maintained there were fundamentally two such structureszthe
'corporate form' or the 'market system'.
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1.4.2.2 Behavioural Aspects of Management Accounting 
A concern about behavioural aspects of accounting system design in
primarily, and most commonly, budgets has long been a dominant issue
in the literature. However, particularly in the early days it was clearly
separated from the processes of designing the 'conventional wisdom' discussed
above.
The first step in this process came in the early 1950's and can best
be summarised as an interest in the effect on people of particular designs
of accounting systems. Foremost and typical of work under this tvasdisg is
by Argyris (1952) exploring the effects on individuals of imposed budgets
and Stedry (1960) exploring the motivational power of budgets.
Although work is still continuing in this area particularly on effects
of participatively formed budgets on behaviour (Swieringa and Moncur, 1975)
and on more laboratory , as distinct from field experiments*, more and more
attention is being devoted to what has come to be called 'human information
processing' (HIP). The essence of this sub-school of thought was briefly
described above in the financial accounting section and need not be repeated
here. The important point to note is that this is an outgrowth rather than
a new step away from these earlier studies. HIP is concerned with the way
individuals process and use information which is clearly related to the impact
or lack of impact of accounting systems design on people. Thus HIP's roots**
probably lie in the behavioural aspects of management accounting — its
application in financial accounting is a spinoff from this.
* Otley (1982) points out the comparative differences between the behavioural
studies as seen in the collection of works by Burns (1972) and (1979).
The progression shows a marked change from methodologically 'loose' field
studies to methodologically 'tight' laboratory studies.
** Partial roots would be more appropriate since the real roots lie in
psychology and economics from which models are heavily 'borrowed'.
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However, in the late 1960's and early 1970's a marked change or step
occurred in this area of management accounting. Instead of looking at the
effect of accounting system design on people many were highlighting the
importance of people in the actual design of the system itself. Foremost
amongst the studies in this area as reflected in budgeting system design
was the work by Lowe and Shaw (1968) and many have followed their lead
(cf Schiff and Lewin, 1970; Tosi, 1975).
Even though such a basic concern can still be seen in the literature
today such a thrust has, like the previous 'step', given rise to another more
generalist sub-school of thought called 'information inductance.' We
briefly described this approach in terms of its financial accounting
applications. However it probably originates from this part of management
accounting and should be seen in such a context. The arguments of these
proponents (et Prakash and Rappaport, 1977; Dirsmith and Jablonsky, 1979)
maintain that the observed biasing behaviour and information manipulation
can be understood in terms of what could be called a general self interested
motivation model (i.e. if information needs to be supplied then the supplier
will choose the information set which yields more rather than less desirable
consequences to himself). The accuracy of this generalisation or its
origins is not the important point at this stage. The point which is important
istonote that information inductance is not a step away but an amplification
and refinement of the impact of people on accounting system design.
A mall step away from this however can be seen in the mid 1970's in
terms of looking at the impact of other organisational factors on the design
of accounting systems. It is only a small step since in many ways this is
a logical extension given the assumption that the system may be caused by
other elements in an organisational setting apart from human beings. The
dominant concern at this level was to apply certain aspects of organisation
theory to management accounting system design. Foremost amongst these has
been the use of contingency theory approaches in organisation theory to the
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management accounting design problem. Two earliest empirical studies were
by Bruns and Waterhouse (1975) who highlighted different control strategies
appropriate for different kinds of organisation and Hayes (1977) who
attempted to trace the contingent variables leading to organisational sub-
mit performance.
However, as Otley (1980, 1982) points out the majority of studies were
not empirical works as such but rather the uncritical theoretical application
ina management accounting context of some current thinking in the organisation
theory literature. Typical examples of this tendency can be seen in Gordon
and Miller (1976) and Waterhouse and Tiessen (1978)).
As can be seen from Figure 1.4.2 contingency theory approaches virtually
dominated this area of management accounting endeavour. However, it would
be wrong to assume that such domination was complete partly due to a number
of critical studies on the contingency approach by authors who had moved
on the organisation theory literature had moved on (et Otley, 1980; Cooper,
1981).* There is clearly a new wave of proponents attempting to apply the
more current and new aspects of organisational theory to teanagement accounting
(cf Cooper et al, 1981; Dyckman 1981). All of these are natural, to be
expected, extensions of this basic concern at this level and do not constitute
a step away from it.
Although such insights are valuable and will continue to be so they are
bounded by the developments made in organisation theory. Such developments
rest and depend on adequate leadership by organisational theorists and
dedicated following by management accounting theorists. Yet even though
accounting systems are grounded in an organisational context it is not
necessary or desirable to wait for developments in organisation theory to
* Both these studies however leave some ambiguity as to whether there is
or isn't a future for these approaches.
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help understand them. It is this new concern with understanding accounting
systems in action using whatever discipline base seems appropriate and useful
for this endeavour is the last and growing concern of the behavioural aspect
of management accounting. It is a step away from the major concerns of
organisation theory applications level although it doesn't necessarily deny
the importance of these roots. Colville (1981) a more extreme proponent of
this view puts the case succinctly in the following:
'The burden of this argument suggests that in
order to understand the many possible guises in
which accounting appears, it is necessary to
gain an appreciation of its purpose and status.
This in itself entails locating accounting in
an organisational context and would imply the
adoption of organisational theory. It has been
argued, however, that organisational theory has
itself been too restrictive and has concentrated
on the more tangible aspects of organisations
at the expense of the processes of which they are
said to be an expression. As a strategy for
overcoming this flaw it has been suggested that
the term organisation be temporarily suspended
or bracketed and that social behaviour should
form the primary topic of research. Similarly,
instead of defining what constitutes behavioural
accounting research and working within those
parameters (a difficult task as our present level
of knowledge does not allow a delimitation of the
boundaries) behaviour should form the basic subject
matter. Although this is a wide brief, it will
allow for an assessment of what is and what is not
relevant in any future attempt to explain the
behavioural and organisational aspects of
accounting.'
(p. 129)
Colville's challenge is to study accounting behaviour per se and use and
judge the relevance of organisation theory or any other theoretical
contribution in that context.
There have been a number of studies over the years on this very basic
theme but most, until recently, have been conducted by non-accountants and thus
not primarily concerned with the accounting system (cf Simon et al, 1954;
Cyert and March, 1963; Pettigrew, 1973). It is probably Hopwood's challenge
and drive which has brought the concern more directly into the accounting
arena (et Hopwood, 1978, 1979A, 1979B; Burchell et al, 1980). The upshot of
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this challenge has been a number of conferences*, continuing calls to
demonstrate the importance of this concern (cf Otley, 1982; Scapens, 1982)
and some actual outworkings of projects (cf Tomkins et al, 1980; Colville,
1981; Tornkins and Groves, 1983).
This then is a new step in the behavioural aspects of management accounting
and is probably likely to grow in importance even though developments will
continue at other levels as well.
1.4.2.3 Organisation Theory and Other Roots Behind the Quantitative and
Behavioural Aspects of Management Accounting 
We now return to the theme discussed above on Davis et al's (1982)
claim that the images in organisation theory can be seen in management
accounting. It was asserted there that such a claim had some degree of
validity given that images are broad conceptualisations and given some
possibility to embellish the model from sources other than the more obvious
organisation theory literature, i.e. subjects which have theoretical models
of organisations but are not part of the direct organisation theory literature
but still can be seen in the context of dominant images.
Such a return to this theme is partly introduced to tidy up the survey
but also so that it is easier to arrive at conclusions about the descriptive,
prescriptive and change qualities of these schools of thought in management
accounting. This important concern which constitutes the major intention of
this Section, (i.e. the whole of 1.4) will be discussed in Section 1.4.3.
Before embarking on this classification it is necessary to make two
assumptions and one minor modification of the model presented in Figure 1.4.1.
* The first was held in 1976 as part of a series of meetings organised by
the American Institute of Decision Sciences in San Francisco. Two further
conferences devoted entirely to the main theme of accounting in an
organisational context, run and organised by accounting theorists, were
held in 1979 and 1981 in Los Angeles.
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The first assumption concerns the positioning of economic theory
in the images of organisation theory as presented in Figure 1.4.1. Much
if not most of the quantitative aspects of management accounting (except
cost accounting) can be traced back and rooted to economic theory —
particularly the neoclassical economic model and modification in this
over the years by economists. Scapens (1982) summarised these connections
as follows:
'In the 1970's researchers modified the neo -
classical economic model on which management
accounting's conventional wisdom was built.
These researchers introduced uncertainty and
information costs into management accounting
models. Agency theory researchers have taken
this modification process a step further by
adding behavioural constraints to the economic
model. The agency model relies on marginal
economic analysis, but includes explicit
recognition of the behavioural responses of the
agent (manager) whose behaviour the management
accounting system seeks to influence or
control.'
(p. 63)
Clearly this is not to say that inputs were not made by other disciplines
amhasmathenatics (re: game theory) and operations research (re:
uncertainty models) but that the dominant discipline connection is with
economics.
Economists have always been organisation theorists even though they
are not normally considered to be part of the organisation theory literature
particularly in recent years. The reasons for this are complex and cannot
be discussed here because they would take us too far away from the main
theme. But the important point to note is that some aspects of economic
dlem constitutes a theory about micro organisations.
The question then is where,if anywhere,does such a theory fit into the
model presented in Figure 1.4.1? Economics is based on a particular model
of man whether in an individual, collective or organisational context. Such.
amanis a stereotype of a person who is 'resourceful, evaluative and
(Meckling, 1976). Neoclassical models assumed away the
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uncertainties in the actions of such people and more recent models have
encompassed, within limits, such unknowns but throughout these changes
the implicit or explicit view of mankind has remained unchanged.
Thus all theories of economics as applied to organisation theory must
of necessity feature in the top half of Figure 1.4.1. Natural models assume
there is some doubt about the way individuals — organisations both see and
act in the world. To the economist this is an impossibility: all action
Uneconomic organisations particularly) is rational in all the senses
described above (in Section 1.4.1) as to the meaning of this word. However,
economic theories do vary on the level of uncertainty they allow and
therefore would feature at different points on the open/closed characteristic
of Figure 1.4.1.
The second assumption concerns the make up of the fourth quadrant in
Figure 1.4.1 (i.e. the open/natural one dealing with the more current thinking
on organisation theory) and the relationship to the new and developing
'accounting in action' sub ... school of thought (in the behavioural aspects of
management accounting). As indicated above this sub-school of thought is
purposefully breaking away from very close links to organisation theory and
dm should presumably not feature in the mapping to Figure 1.4.1. However
it is assumed to be included in this quadrant for two reasons. Firstly the
actual quadrant in totality is undefined and thus whether something is in or
out is to a large extent arbitrary at the moment. Secondly because the
concerns to which the 'accounting in action' sub-school are addressed must, of
necessity, add to the insights of this quadrant even though in the reverse
direction.
The one modification is a very simple one of bringing some scalar on
the characteristics of rational/natural and open/closed. This scalar, ranging
from 'Low' to 'high', is introduced to suggest some sort of discrimination
inside the four quadrants. The way this is done is to make the centre points,
both for the diagram as a whole and outer rims, 'low' and all the corners
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'high'. This is done to indicate what could be called 'family dominance' —
those most obviously situated in a quadrant will be situated in the corners
of the diagram those where doubts exist as to their appropriate 'home'
will be situated near the dividing lines between quadrants. Such a
modification brings greater sophistication to the diagram by highlighting
'boundary' and 'obvious' members.
With these two assumptions plus the modification we can now turn to
making the relationship between management accounting schools and sub-schools
of thought and the model of organisation theories as presented in Figure
1.4.1. The mapping of these relationships are presented in Table 1.4.2.3
and Figure 1.4.2.3 and the logic behind the positioning of management
accounting areas (suitably coded as per Table 1.4.2.3) is described below.
For convenience in the following discussion we will use the following letters
to denote characteristics:
O Open Systems Models
C Closed systems models
R Rational Models
N Natural Models
L Low levels in ...
L/M Low to medium levels in ...
M Medium levels in ...
M/H Medium to high levels in ...
H High levels in ...
Rum a coding of HRHC positions the school of thought at the top left hand
corner.
Cost accounting (Q11) is the epitome of a closed and rational model —
the domain of scientific management in organisation theory. For as Scapens
(1982) so perceptively points out:
'Cost accounting developed in response to the need for
precise measures which could be used in applying the
principles of scientific managementto control factory
costs'
(p. 5)
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Tim it's positioning is HRHC. The 'conventional wisdom' of management
accounting (Q21) however is less rigid than cost accounting* but comes
from particularly the marginalist principles of neoclassical economic theory
which assumes rationality and complete certainty. However, its emphasis
is less certain than cost accounting and probably should be positioned as
MNC.
The adaptation of the conventional wisdom by the addition of uncertainty
models (Q22) created more rigour and rationality and some degree of openness
(in a managed way) to uncertainty. In this sense it is possible to position
this as M/H R LO. The development into information economics (Q31) kept the
rigour and rationality high and created a degree** more openness to uncertainty
considerations (i.e. M/H R MO). Game theory (Q32), approaches keep the
rationality and rigour at a reasonable level but allows more openness to
uncertainty conditions. In this sense it can be positioned at M/H R M/H 0.
Agency theory approaches (Q33) as a particular example of game theory keeps
about the same openness to uncertainty but is not quite as rigorous or
rational. (i.e. MR M/H0) Likewise transaction cost approaches (Q34) drop
again in terms rationality while still encompassing a fair degree of openness
to uncertainties (i.e. LIMP. M/H0). These quantitative developments (Q22 to
Q34)have roots in economic theory as already discussed and thus quite
naturally fit into the top right quadrant of Figure 1.4.1.
The-sub schools of thought connected with the behavioural aspects of
management accounting do not have such a clear focus. However, in general
* As pointed out above Horngren (1975) suggests the distinction is between
respectively 'conditional truth' and 'absolute truth'.
** It is only a degree more because on the one hand information economics
breaks away from the 'one best way' but then on the other hand it restricts
its analysis solely to individuals working under unreal assumptions.
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it is possible to relate these sub schools to the 'human relations' and
'ambiguous' quadrants in Figure 1.4.1.
The 'impact of accounting system design of people' approaches (B11)
is undoubtedly situated in the bottom left hand quadrant. It works on very
closed assumptions about individuals' motivation processes and only captures
some of the interpretation people give to this phenomena. Thus
it can be positioned as L/M N HC. The outgrowth of this concern in terms of
human information processing (B12) maintained a similar level of 'naturalness'
but reduced considerably the lack of concern for uncertainty in the modelling.
However, it is working under very constrained views about the uncertainty
surrounding people's information processing ability and is thus more 'closed'
than 'open'. In this sense it can be positioned as UM N LC.
The change of emphasis in the 'impact of people on accounting system
design' (B21) approach can be seen as shifting quadrants to the bottom right
of Figure 1.4.1. These studies attempt to make sense of empirical situations
with all the uncertainty and conflicting interpretations by the actors in
such situations. However, they are studies which concentrate only on people
and not all other factors in accounting system design. Thus they could be
positioned towards the middle of the quadrant (MNMO). The information
inductance concern (B22) however, judging by the literature, is concerned to
reduce the uncertainties in the models and as a result have rather pulled this
sub-school of thought back into the 'human relations' quadrant. As a result
a positioning of MNLC seems most appropriate.
The 'impact of organisational aspects on accounting system design'
(B31) and 'contingency theory approaches' (B32) come from an organisation
theory basis and thus can be positioned accordingly. The former is related
directly to the more 'ambiguous' quadrant and the latter to the 'systems'
quadrant. B31 is trying to be more open and natural than B21 and thus can
be seen as being positioned at M/H N M/H 0 on the grounds that developments
in organisation theory in this quadrant are moving towards ever high levels of
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openness and naturalness but have not got to those levels yet. B32 is at the
same level of openness but has a much higher level of rationality in its
make up even though it has some tendency towards more interpretative concerns.
Thus it could be positioned at LR M/H 0.
Finally the 'impact of all aspects on accounting system design' approaches
as indicated above in terms of one of the assumptions can be positioned at
MHO on the grounds it is trying to go before, or with, where organisation
theory is going.
1,4,3 A Contextual Analysis of Sub-Schools of Thought in Management Accounting 
We now turn to the important consideration as to whether sub-schools of
thought in management accounting, suitably amplified, have descriptive,
prescriptive and change intention qualities. It will be recalled that
description and prescription are used in their more common meanings i.e. 'what
is' and 'what should be'. The change intention aspect is meant to highlight
the difference between simply saying 'what should be' and actually attempting
to bring such prescriptions into being - the former has no change intention
the latter has maximum.
Each of the sub-schools of thought of management accounting have been
positioned in the quadrants of organisation theory as indicated in Figure 1.4.2.3;
thus it seems appropriate to look at some general qualities of these quadrants
in terms of their descriptive and prescriptive and change intention qualities.
This will be attempted below leading into some more specific points about the
sub-schools.
Fundamentally all the quadrants have a tendency towards description
rather than prescription. However, this disguises an explicit and also
implicit concern with prescription. This explicit concern can be seen particularly
in schools and sub-schools of thought in the top two and, to an extent,
bottom left quadrants - many give tacit recognition of descriptive intentions
but actually see their concern with prescribing what organisations and management
accounting should look like. In many ways these are the more honest of the
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members of these quadrants.
This brings us to the more implicit prescriptive qualities of these
quadrants. The process of description is not absolute, value free or value
neutral*. Every description is undertaken working within some set of
assumptions - the more there are the greater the tendency to inaccuracy
and prescription. The prescriptive quality creeps in because of a tendency
towards 'naturalism' (a Tinker, 1982) in our society and because of this to
'see what one wants to see' and implicitly assume it should continue. Neither
of these points can be fully expanded on here (but will be in later chapters) but
in general 'naturalism' takes the view that 'what is is right' and thus the
descriptions that are made become legitimation for what should happen in the
future (i.e. prescriptions). In such a situation the assumption set becomes
very crucial: the more and tighter they are the greater the tendency towards
probable prescription rather than descriptions.
Following this logic would suggest that prescriptive elements decrease
as one moves quadrants from top left to top right to bottom left to bottom
right. This would be so whether the school and sub-school of thought claims
to be descriptive or not. Further one would expect to see a tendency in
sub-schools at the start of the circuit to be much more unabashed about their
prescriptive intentions as compared with those certainly at the end but also
by those en route. Or in other words the descriptive intentions are 'purer'
by those sub-schools situated in the bottom right hand quadrant as compared
with other similar claims by those sub-schools situated in other quadrants.
One further general point needs to be made about the quadrants and that
is the lack of real change intentions contained in both organisation and
management accounting 'members' of such quadrants. Most schools of thought
are alluding to be descriptive anyway even though some are actually prescriptions
* This point will be discussed at length in parts of Chapters 2 and 3 of
this study.
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(see above). The quadrant which comes nearest to being concerned to bring
about change is the top left. The claims of both organisation and
management accounting schools and sub-schools in this quadrant have been
unashamedly prescriptive and thus have naturally been concerned to see their
good ideas applied in practice. However, even though concerned about it
they have not attempted to design real change strategies relying very much
on the conviction and attractiveness of their ideas to practitioners. The
result has unfortunately been very disappointing for as Scapens (1982)
concludes after an enlightening section on the absence of 'take up' of
such 'good' ideas:
'The evidence of the various studies discussed in
this section does little to contradict the supposition
with which the section began - i.e. that management
accounting's conventional wisdom has had only a limited
impact on practice'
(p. 27)
The remaining quadrants have been less concerned with change because they
have not seen their role as prescribing possible futures.
With this general background it is possible to classify the sub-schools
of management accounting in the same format as for financial accounting (see
Table 1.3.2). This is done in Table 1.4.3. The classifications should be
reasonably self explanatory in the light of the points raised above. In
general as a sub-school gets nearer to, or is contained within, the bottom
right hand quadrant it is more clearly descriptive (given the prescriptive
elements contained in any description - see above). The further away it is
the more prescriptive are the sub-schools' concern. The sub-schools between
these extremes are more or less one or the other as depicted in terms of
ticks and question marks. Thus for instance 'agency theory' approaches (Q33)
and 'transaction cost theory' (Q34) approaches are the centre points of this
distinction. Both claim to be descriptive - the latter possibly more than the
former - but have implicit and sometimes explicit prescriptive aspects to them.
They are therefore arguably neither one thing nor the other - they are
questionably both.
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A word however needs to be said about the 'cost accounting' (Q11)
and 'conventional wisdom' (Q21 ) sub-schools. These both are predominantly
prescriptive but do have some form of 'change intentions'. We have already
briefly seen some of the problems in 021's ability to bring about change
thus a 'question mark' seems most appropriate. However, a confirming 'tick'
has been given to Q11 and some reasoning behind this needs to be given.
The basic reason can be discerned by looking again at the history surrounding
cost accounting. This came about because of the need to find a way to
precisely measure factory costs. The need was felt by practicing accountants,
solutions sought by this body and implemented by them as well. In this sense
they wanted to change practice to be in line with their prescriptions — a
demonstration of high change intention. However, 'cost accounting' as a
meaningful sub-school died out in the 1960's or rather was encapsulated in
the 'conventional wisdom' but it is still important to note the very different
intentions behind the former and the effectiveness of such intentions.
This then completes our summary and analysis of management accounting
in terms of its descriptive, prescriptive and change intentions.
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1.5 SOME CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND THE DESIGN AND INTENTION OF THIS STUDY 
This Chapter started by highlighting in broad terms the concern of
the study i.e. the process of describing, prescribing and changing accounting
systems in specific enterprise contexts. One of the key assumptions of this
study is that accounting knowledge, as expressed in the literature has not
adequately come to terms with such matters. Such a stand needed exploration
for its own sake but more importantly to allow a judgement on which parts of
the literature, if any, were relevant for this study's concern.
We have now looked in a very global sense at the literature in the two
dominant conventional areas of accounting thought (financial accounting and
management accounting) in Sections 1.3 and 1.4. These surveys followed a
necessary diversion, both for such a study and the following work in later
chapters, on what is meant by an accounting system upon which this literature
and empirical expressions are based. However, such an endeavour was a gartial
digression to the main point of trying to see whether the literature is or
is not concerned with the sequential process of describing, prescribing
and changing accounting systems in enterprise contexts.
Four points can be made coming out of the surveys in Section 1.3 and 1.4
which moves towards answering this question. These points also summarises
(to an extent) these two Sections.
Firstly there is a tendency in the literature in the descriptions that
are made to partiality but also with a tendency to generalise from such a
weak base. Examples of partiality can be seen in the dominance of individual-
istic and small group studies, being the total concern of financial accounting
(e.g. 'behavioural accounting research') and still prevalent, but less so,
in management accounting. It is as if these human factors were the only 
important causal elements in .
 accounting system design — a stand which many
management accounting theorists would now challenge fortunately. Examples of
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premature generalisation abound in the accounting literature e.g. the moves
from Bll to B12, B21 to B22, B31 to B32 (see coding details in Table 1.4.3)
in management accounting are very typical. There does seem to be a certain
'desperation to generalise' in the descriptive studies of accounting as there
is in other social science disciplines.* This is no bad thing if general-
isations are appropriate** but to start off with some degree of 'desperation'
to arrive at such a state given the growing concern to use 'laboratory'
rather than 'field' sites (et Hopwood, 1979B)*** is something of a disasterous
combination in terms of the generalisations forthcoming. However, the work
king conducted in particularly B41 in management accounting is making moves to
break out of both partiality and an overbearing desire to generalise. Thus
there are signs of change.****
Secondly there is a tendency in the literature either not to make
prescriptions about accounting system design or only to make prescriptions
on the basis of both the logic in and models from economics and finance theory.
The former tendency which is more overtly apparent in the more current
literature seems to indicate an unwillingness on the part of accounting
theorists to venture into the apparently value laden process of saying what
should be.***** However, as Tables 1.3.2 and 1.4.3 indicate a number of sub-
* At this stage it is difficult to substantiate this point fully. But such
a stand will be amplified and developed in later chapters.
This of course may not be guaranteed. It is not beyond the realms of
possibility that each accounting system is unique to it's organisational
Ildc* This tendency is of course yet another demonstration of partiality in
descriptions.
Ha This connects up with the fourth point which is discussed below.
*IA Alternatively it could be that 'what is is right' is the dominant view —
certainly the arguments from 'naturalism' (see discussion in Section 1.4)
would argue this is the more accurate explanation for the lack of interest
in prescription.
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schools have been classified as having prescriptive qualities and it is
to these we now turn. There are two classes of these sub-schools.
The first set contain the sub-schools 'historic cost accounting' and 'cost
accounting' and these are the exceptions: they are not grounded in economics and
finance theory but with some understanding of the dynamics of accounting
systems in practice. It is the 'some understanding' which has provoked
a number of accounting theorists (cf Meckling 1976; Watts and Zimmerman,
1978*) to claim that such comprehension is incomplete and because of this
prescriptions must be delayed until full understanding is obtained. The
validity of such an attack is clearly open to question. However, the reality
of the situation is that these two sub-schools are somewhat the 'whipping boys'
of the accounting sub-schools leaving them considerably bereft of any
developments. The tendency is to 'abandon all and build anew'.
The second set of sub-schools with prescriptive qualities as depicted
in Figure 1.3.2 and 1.4.3 however do have their roots in and gain their
content from different aspects of models from finance theory and neoclassical
and more modern economic theory. Such models often claiming to be descriptions
of reality are actually enveloped with strong rationalistic assumptions (see
Section 1.4 above); it is for this reason they, like the accounting approaches
which follow them, are either partial descriptions or more favourably (and
that is how they are treated in Tables 1.3.2 and 1.4.3) prescriptions. Either
way there are problems. If such models per se, or as expressed in accounting
phenomena, claim to be descriptive then it is not at all difficult to demonstrate
not only the number of assumptions underlying such approaches but also the
* It is interesting to note that these authors particularly and other
members of the 'Rochester School of Accounting' (Jensen 1976) are
actually falling into exactly the same trap as the theorists they are
criticising - see below and Christenson(1983) and Lowe, Puxty and Laughlin
(1983).
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unrealistic nature of such assumptions. Other problems ensue if such
related economic or accounting models are claimed to be prescriptive
since there appears to be no concern at all to change practices to be
more in line with such prescriptions. Where attempts have been made
(exclusively in financial accounting it should be noted) all manner of
'tissue rejections' have occurred. For instance the introduction of
inflation accounting as a standard accounting practice has had an immensely
rough passage in the United Kingdom particularly. Likewise the 'de-regulation'
encouragements by the security price researchers and agency theorists has
hardly even been considered let alone adopted by the regulatory agencies.
Such rejection could be explainable because the key to change has not been
found but more probably, and to an extent connected with this, it is because
such models are not built on a full and complete understanding of the nature
of the accounting systems in practice which are the focus for change.*
This brings us to the third summary point: apart from a certain
indifference towards a particular bias in prescriptions there does appear to
be a virtual total disinterest in changing any accounting systems in practice.
The regulatory agencies are the only formal enterprises** for encouraging
change in accounting systems design and they only deal with financial
accounting matters. Such agencies are obliged (in the United States) and
encouraged (in the United Kingdom) to exist as intermediaries and interpreters
* Itich is precisely the point many of these theorists were criticising the
more 'traditional' sub-schools about - see footnote on previous page.
** Some would claim that the Universities - Polytechnics are institutions
for encouraging students (the future accountants) to go out and change
the world. However the majority of accounting teachers would not see
the production of such 'accounting revolutionaries' as part of their
brief.
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of societal laws about external disclosure from; particularly, micro -
business enterprises. Thus their existence is not because of a desire
to change accounting practices per se - if they were one would expect
to see management accounting practices on their agenda for instance - but
rather because of government pressures for some sort of regulation. As a
result there is a tendency towards tentative 'acceptable' change intentions
in the action of these agencies and only to be somewhat more radical when
pressure from governments forces such behaviour i.e. inflation accounting
in the context of the Sandilands Report in the United Kingdom.
Fourthly and finally there does appear to be a growing awareness of a
poverty of understanding about accounting systems in practice. In many
ways this stems from the first point discussed above on the partiality of
descriptions but it can be seen to go further than that. Some (notably
Hopwood, 1979D; Burchell et al, 1980; Scapens 1982; Otley, 1982) would see
the issue as Hopwood does:
'Recently I have become ever more aware of how
little we know about the actual functioning of
accounting systems in organisations'
(1979B, p. 145)
Or in other words purely as a problem concerning the poverty in our present
descriptions concerning accounting system in practice. However, others would
take a more critical change oriented reason for such a concern. This is
hinted at by Burchell et al (1980):
'More recently, however, we have witnessed what
might be the beginning of a reappraisal of the
pregiven imperatives of the accounting mission.
Pressures stemming from both academic inquiry and
the problems of practical action have encouraged
some observers to recognise and analyse the
complexities of accounting in action and, on this
basis, to start questioning what has not been
questioned and make problematic what so far has
been taken for granted'
(p. 11)
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but is more directly and clearly stated by Cooper (1981) in terms of one
of the possible strategies for future management accounting research:*
'Another strategy may be to improve our understanding
of the way management accounting systems operates in
reality. Our knowledge of how accounting systems are
used in organisations is incomplete. The rational-
isation, rationalistic and symbolic uses of accounting
are not well-understood or documented. And only
through a well-grounded understanding of how systems
operate can we prescribe how accounting systems should
be changed.'
(p. 198)
Such a concern goes beyond simply trying to arrive at better descriptions
for the sake of it but sees such a discovery as a necessary rerequisite
for prescriptions and change.
On the basis of the above analysis the conclusion would be that to satisfy
this study's dominant concern we would need to build on a stock of knowledge
which is not technically of accounting theoretic origins even though this
study has a central accounting concern. Quite clearly such a move cannot be
lightly taken and certainly not on the basis of the above analysis. Thus Chapter
2 and half of Chapter 3 are addressed to a further exploration of this
consideration. Chapter 2 explores the essential ontological, epistemological
and methodological assumptions underpinning present accounting knowledge allowing
us to see more clearly what actually it is attempting to achieve in the context
of, and in comparison with, the concerns of this study. Sections 3.1 and 3.2
of Chapter 3, based on the analysis of Chapter 2, raise to the surface, and
present an argument for, a particular assumption base upon which to build if
this study's concern is to be satisfied. This argument takes us away from the
assumption base which underlies most accounting thought.
The remainder of Chapter 3 through to Chapter 7 constitutes an outworking of
these conclusions by building a detailed methodological approach in the context
Cooper was writing in connection with management accounting issues but
it is not necessary to see such concern totally in such context. However
it is worth noting that the impetus for such indepth descriptions in quite
the way Cooper is talking about has come mainly from those working in
management accounting.
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of this assumption base and applying this to actually describe, prescribe and
change the accounting system in a specific enterprise context: the Church of
England. The remainder of Chapter 3 presents the details and contexts of this
methodological approach. Chapter 4 provides some important financial and
historical background information concerning the Church of England. Chapters
5 and 6 and 7 present the detailed application of the methodological approach
to the description, prescription and changing of the accounting systems in the
Church of England.
Chapter 8 provides the customary conclusions along with the areas of
unfinished business and future research intentions.
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CHAPTER 2 
UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF ACCOUNTING KNOWLEDGE:
A RECLASSIFICATION AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE PROBLEM FOCUS 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
The contents of this Chapter are addressed to extending the analysis of
Chapter 1 in terms of exposing some of the key underlying factors which underpin
the schools and sub.schools of thought discussed. The conclusion from Chapter 1
was that, almost without exception, the schools and sub-schools of thought in the
two dominant wings of accounting knowledge (financial and management accounting)
do not appear to be primarily concerned with the sequential process of describing,
prescribing and changing accounting systems in enterprise contexts. The likely
conclusion coming from this analysis is that this vast knowledge stock would
appear to be largely redundant for this study's primary concern. Howe-ver, ,
before drawing this conclusion it seems valuable to extend the present analysis
by investigating some of the key underlying assumptions underpinning this
knowledge stock. Such an analysis will allow at least two objectives to be
achieved: firstly it will help to clarify what this knowledge stock is trying
to achieve in the context of it's assumption base; secondly it will allow a
somewhat less emotive, and more positive, process concerning decisions on
adequacy by allowing us to concentrate on arguing the case for a particular
assumption base for the problem focus of this study rather than a more cavalier
approach which implies the irrelevancy of extant accounting knowledge.
Such overall objectives determines the contents of this Chapter and the first
part of Chapter 3. Section 2.1 reclassifies the schools and sub-schools of
thought of financial and management accounting in the context of the classification
schema suggested by Burrell and Morgan (1979). Sections 2.2 to 2.5 looks
comprehensively at some typical individual studies which reflect the entire
range of the reclassified knowledge stock of financial and management accounting.
Such a process allows us a level of intimacy into the spectrum of accounting
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thought which is not afforded by the rather crude analysis of Chapter 1. It
will also allow us to digress a little from the main intent of this Chapter
and see how adequately such studies satisfy the assumption base and intentions
to which they supposedly adhere. Section 2.6 will supply the customary
conclusions and lead into some of the key questions which are faced in Sections
3,1 and 3.2 concerning which assumption base should be used to satisfy this
study's primary concern with regard to the design of enterprise accounting
systems,
2,1 A RECLASSIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING SCHOOLS AND SUB-SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 
This Section has three parts to it. The first attempts to combine the
sub-schools of thought in both financial and management accounting using the
classification scheme of Scott (1981) presented in Chapter 1 which was used
originally only for management accounting. This is the concern of Section
2.1.1. Section 2.1.2 picks up the second concern which is to introduce
Burrell and Morgan's (1979) four part 'sociological paradigm' framework.
The third and final concern (in Section 2.1.3) is to position the sub-schools
of thought in both financial and management accounting in the Burrell and
Morgan framework and give direction through this to the studies to be looked
at in Sections 2.2 to 2.5.
2,1,1 A Joint Classification of Financial and Management Accounting 
In Section 1.4 we used Scott's (1981) classification of organisation
theory to demonstrate how different sub—schools of management accounting fitted
into such a schema. We didn't use such a basis for classifying the sub n schools
of financial accounting very largely because the roots of these 'images' come
more obviously from economic theory rather than organisation theory. However,
as we pointed out in Section 1.4 this is also the base from which much of
raanagement accounting emanates but that still Scott's schema, given some
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embellishment, proved to be a very useful heuristic device for classifying
uch schools of thought.
In a similar way
r
ther ef ore it is possible to use such a classification
scheme for the sub-schools of thought of financial accounting as discussed
in Section 1.3 given some leniency on the specific positioning and the
heuristic nature of the classification scheme more generally. Table 2.1.1 and
igure 2.1.1 presents such a classification analysis: Table 2.1.1 supplies a
coding of the sub-schools of thought and Figure 2.1.1,using such coding,
positions these on the enriched classification model from Section 1.4.
The management accounting sub-schools of thought and their positioning
are the same as in Figure 1.4.2.3 and the rationale behind this was discussed
at length in Section 1.4.2.3. Such a discussion need not be repeated here.
The following therefore will concentrate on the rationale behind the
positioning of the financial accounting sub-schools of thought. ECowever, even
here many of the pertinent points have already been covered at length in
Section 1.4.2.3 and thus only some of the more general criteria will be
discussed below.
As we pointed out in the adaptation of Scott's model economic theory, which
is not stricly part of the mainstream literature on organisation theory,does
share a similar theoretical concern. Further we maintained that due to the
strictures surrounding economic theory the insights forthcoming somewhat
naturally feature in the top two boxes of Scott's model. Thus the financial
accounting sub schools which have a strong economics base (FE1, FE2, FIl, F13
PC1, FC2, FC3*) will naturally feature in these two upper boxes varying only
with respect to levels of rationality and openness to uncertainty.
Historic Cost Accounting (FH1) and Events Accounting (FH2) although not
part of this economics tradition are,however, closely aligned in terms of
positioning in Figure 2.1.1. This is because both have a highly rational base
(in the sense of a uniform interpretation of reality) and vary only in terms
* See coding in Table 2.1.1
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of lack of openness to uncertainty - FH2 is more open than FH1 but
probably not enough to feature in the top right segment.
Human Information Processing (FI4) and Information Inductance (FI5)
because of their kinship to the management accounting equivalents can be
seerias being similarly classified.
This leaves only Behavioural Accounting Research (FI2) to classify.
As pointed out in Section 1.3 this contains immense diversity - so much
so it is difficult to see it as a unified sub-school. However, the overall
emphasis is on trying to discover people's preferences with regard to
Efferent sets of information. In this sense it is somewhat closely aligned
to the area in management accounting dealing with the 'impact of acceunting
system design on people'. Even though it does not have as strong ties to
the 'scientific management' approach it does try to limit both the 'naturalness'
and 'openness' of its subjects and keep the information system stable rather
than unstable. Thus it seems appropriate to position this sub-school towards
the middle of the bottom left hand part of Figure 2.1.1.
As can be seen the majority of the financial accounting sub-schools
feature in the top two segments of Figure 2.1.1. The three sub-schools which
feature in the bottom half of the figure are all positioned in the left hand
segment and all can be traceable back to l and rooted ins their management
accounting counterparts. This reinforces two important points. Firstly the
dominance of economic theory in financial accounting as compared to management
accounting. Secondly the willingness and ability of management accounting
to break out of such a theoretical base and adopt more wide ranging alternatives
and interpretations as well as supplying the leadership on newer financial
amounting alternatives.
Clearly such an observation calls for some form of explanation. However,
this will not be attempted since it is not essential for the present purposes
and apart from this it would take us too far away from the main theme of this
Section. The purpose of this Section has been to combine both financial
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and management accounting so that it is possible to reclassify both
rather than explain varied configurations in these two dominant 'wings'
of amounting. This more limited purpose hopefully has been achieved. It
is now necessary to look at the reclassification schema.
2.1.2 The Burrell and Morgan Framework: An Alternative Classification 
Schema 
Burrell and Morgan's framework is also a four part classification schema
but duds with broader phenomena ('social theory') under deeper 'metatheoretical
assumptions'. Their major proposition is that:
'... social theory can usefully be conceived in
terms of four key paradigms* based upon different
sets of metatheoretical assumptions about the
nature of social science and the nature of society.
The four paradigms are founded upon mutually
exclusive views of the social world ...
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. x)
Burrell and Morgan's major concern is with the general schema which underpins
all social theory,however l they apply such insights to
'... the general area of organisational studies' (p. x)
but always as
'... special cases by which we can illustrate our
general themes' (p. x)
Since the above analysis has put all financial and management accounting sub-
schools into an organisation theory framework we have therefore an immediate
* Burrell and Morgan following Kuhn (1970) call these four alternatives
'paradigms' in a way which is rather inappropriate. The use of paradigms
by Kuhn given the problems in defining what he meant anyway (cf. Masterman,
1970; Laughlin, 1981) is still probably only appropriate in natural science.
Since Burrell and Morgan are at pains to distinguish alternatives to this
view a term which strictly has no meaning outside of natural science
should probably not describe these alternative schools of thought. However
we will continue to adopt Burrell and Morgan's language despite such
misgivings, to allow some coherent continuity in the summary of their
work.
69
connection to Burrell and Morgan's specific application. However, it is
important to note that such a connection links into the general schema
with both its wide ranging applicability and also its assumption set laid
bare. This, of course, is precisely the reason for introducing this
classification schema in the context of this Chapter.
As can be seen in the above quote from Burrell and Morgan their key
discriminators are the 'nature of social science' and the 'nature of
society'. Like all classification schemes these are not claimed to be some
type of absolutes but rather a meaningful heuristic distinction. Or as
Burrell and Morgan put it:
'... we found that we possessed an extremely
powerful tool for negotiating our way through
different subject areas, and one which made
sense of a great deal of the confusion which
characterises much contemporary debate within
the social sciences'
(p. xiii).
SO MICI a classification scheme is deeper and more meaningful for a wide
range of subject areas but ultimately it is nothing more than an 'extremely
powerful tool'.
This, in sum, we can justify the use of Burrell and Morgan's framework
on two counts. Firstly because accounting, as defined in Section 1.2, is
a human endeavour and is therefore a social 'science' using this term
somewhat loosely. Thus if Burrell and Morgan are right about their 'tool'
it would be useful and relevant for accounting per se anyway. But secondly
because we have already demonstrated the close relation between accounting
and organisation theory* and because Burrell and Morgan have already analysed
the latter in terms of their framework, the relevance of using this tool for
accounting becomes more obvious.
* Which , of course,is to be expected in the light of the 'enterprise context'
in the definition discussed in Section 1.2.
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The 'nature of social science' discriminator was presented in a
bi-polar continuum ranging from what Burrell and Morgan called the
'subjectivist approach to social science' to the 'objectivist approach to
social science' with underlying assumptions under each position laid bare.
Figure 2.1.2(1) summarises their entire schema and the following describes
the contents.
Burrell and Morgan maintained that there are four key assumptions
underlying any particular view of the nature of social science: the
ontological (about nature or being) the epistemological (about knowledge),
one about the nature of man and the methodological (about the way to obtain
knowledge). Different emphases on these assumptions leads to different views
about social science. These emphases have very definite patterns according
to Burrell and Morgan which combined give two different schools of thought
which, as noted, they entitle 'the subjectivist approach' and 'the objectivist
approach'.
The objectivist approach has an emphasis on realism as its ontology,
positivism as its epistemology, determinism as its view about human nature
and nomotheticism as its methodology. Realism as an ontological assumption,
assumes that the world apart from the observer is somehow ordered, independent
and unconnected to his perception and labelling. The world outside is:
it is not created by the observers. Positivism as an epistemological assumption
assumes that knowledge equals patterns, regularities, general causal relations
and universal laws. Determinism as an assumption about human nature maintains
that man is part of the ordered universe determined by the rules which guide
and direct all of nature — he is not 'free' to change such inevitable patterns.
Nomotheticism as a methodological assumption assumes that to understand the
patterned universe requires systematic, careful, sophisticated approaches by
the observer which will help expose the underlying causal order which is
taken to be there.
The subjectivist approach to social science has an emphasis on nominalism 
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as its ontology, anti-positivism as its epistemology, voluntarism as its
view about human nature and ideographicism as its methodology. Nominalism 
as an ontological assumption does not assume a natural order in the world,
assuch independent of the observers' perception and labelling. The universe
is given meaning by the observer and that is what it is. Anti-positivism 
as an epistemological assumption assumes that knowledge equals the meanings
which people give to the phenomena under investigation. This is because as
Burrell and Morgan point out:
'The social world is essentially relativistic and
can only be understood from the point of view of
the individuals who are directly involved in the
activities which are to be studied' (p. 5)
Voluntarism as an assumption about human nature maintains that man is a
'free agent' to change but also be changed by the universe of which he is
part. Ideographicism as a methodological assumption assumes that to understand
the meanings about the universe (which is knowledge in this school of thought)
requires a process of intuitive reflection and an ability to expose such
ascribed meanings.
Before turning to the 'nature of society' discriminator it is valuable
to briefly comment on Morgan and Smircich's (1980) development of the above
and why it will not be used in the following. Morgan and Smircich were
concerned to bring some finer tuning on the bi-polar understanding of the
nature of social science continuum. Instead of a two part classification
they introduced a six part one and Table 2.1.2 presents some of the key
assumptions of ontology, human nature and epistemology related to this
development.
This will not be adopted in the following for two reasons. Firstly
because although refinement is to be commended it is doubtful whether Morgan
and Smircich's work actually achieves this. Much of the richness and
variety in both the subjectivist and objectivist areas is only partially
covered by the seemingly exhaustive six part classification. Thus until we
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can see more clearly it is better to adopt a broad based approach (i.e.
the bi-polar one) into which detail can be added rather than assume greater
refinement than there is. Secondly there is good reason to believe* that
the 'nature of social science' actually takes on a different form when the
'nature of society' continuum is added. Thus the nature of the epistemological
approach, may well differ, when positioned similarly on the 'nature of
social science' one but differently on the 'nature of society' one.** This
reinforces again how our understanding of the refined elements of the
objectivist and subjectivist orientations are, as yet, not fully developed.
Not to acknowledge such uncertainty (i.e. by using the Morgan and Smircich
framework) could actually be counterproductive in terms of further development.
For these two reasons, therefore, the development by Morgan and Smircich
although acknowledged will not be used.
Turning now to the 'nature of society' discriminator Burrell and Morgan
also present this as a bipolar continuum ranging from what they call the
'sociology of regulation' to the 'sociology of radical change'. Such
distinctions are an adaptation of the 'order-conflict' debate in sociology
particularly Dahrendorf's (1959) insights and directions in this.
The 'sociology of regulation' assumes a certain unity and cohesiveness
and 'goodness' in society. Starting from such an assumption the purpose of
any explanations are intended to reinforce and uncover the reasons for such
an ordered actuality. Change is seen in terms of improving the 'need
satisfaction' of the institutions in society on the grounds that such institutions
are already basically 'good' but could be 'better'. In this sense the
sociology of regulation is concerned with the nature and improvement of the
* which is demonstrated more fully in Sections 2.4 and 2.5
** Thus in Figure 2.1.2(3) we make a clear distinction between the positivism
and anti-positivism and the ideographicism and nomotheticism when respectively
combined with the 'regulation' and 'radical change' nature of society
assumption.
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'Maus quo'.
The 'sociology of radical change' assumes that present societal
formations are not optimal and can be destroying rather than aiding man's
development. Starting from such an assumption the purpose of any
explanations are to uncover
'... deep seated structural conflict, modes of
domination and structural contradiction'
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 17)
It's concern is not only with explanation but with radical change to
overthrow limiting structures and replace them with new forms to allow
man to be emancipated and to develop as a human being. In this sense the
'sociology of radical change' is concerned with questioning and probing the
status quo and with bringing about alternatives where appropriate for the
benefit of mankind.
Burrell and Morgan combine these two bi-polar discriminators together
to form a four part classification scheme which is presented in Figures 2.1.2(2)
and 2.1.2(3). This forms their 'extremely powerful tool' (p. xiii) for
classifying social theory for as they point out:
'It is our contention that all social theorists
can be located within the context of these four
paradigms according to the metatheoretical
assumptions reflected in their work'. (p. 24)
These four paradigms which combine different aspects of the discriminators
('nature of social science' and 'nature of society') take on their own
unique character and it is helpful to briefly recount what this is. The
functionalist paradigm is highly pragmatic, concerned to discover practical
knowledge which can be put to use, usually problem oriented and is usually
=milted to social engineering as a basis for change. It emphasises order
and stability and works towards a maintenance of this state by suitable
marginal changes. The interpretive paradigm is concerned to understand the
world as it is or rather as seen by those who are participating in the
interpretation. The social world is not 'out there' it is an orderly stable
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world crested by subjective experiences and meanings which need to be
understood in the context of everyday life. A concern for change is even
less likely than in the functionalist paradigm, because order and stability
are assumed to be present and anyway it all depends on whether people desire
changes in the meanings they attach to phenomena. The radical humanist 
paradigm also maintains that the social world is only meaningful in the context
of people's interpretation. However, it maintains that such meanings may be
biased or restricted by existing social arrangements. The whole concern of
this paradigm is to expose such underlying biases, change the meanings and
the social arrangements which causes such 'false consciousness'. The radical 
structuralist paradigm also is concerned with radical change but not in terms
of people's consciousness or meanings but in the real worla Which exists
apart from these interpretations) particularly with regard to the structural
aspects. There is an assumed instability and domination in the real world
particularly in the economic and political system which need to be fundamentally
changed if man is to be fully emancipated and realise his full potential.
Burrell and Morgan then go on to show how these four paradigms explain
and position all social theory constantly referring back in more detail to
organisational theory in this paradigmatic context. The following Section
briefly summarises Burrell and Morgan's view concerning organisation theory
in the context of their paradigms and then relates this back to Scott's
classification and the accounting schools of thought as in Section 2.1.1. This
will then lead into and supply the context for the remaining sections of this
Chapter.
2.1.3. Organisation Theory and Accounting Systems: Scott's Classification in 
the Context of Burrell and Morgan's Framework 
Burrell and Morgan's analysis clearly views all present organisation
theory as being situated in the 'functionalist' area or as they put it:
'... most organisation theorists, industrial sociologists,
psychologists and industrial relations theorists approach
their subject from within the bounds of the functionalist
paradigm' (p. 28)
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the majority of studies fall in this area there have been a few
others which fall into the 'interpretive' segment but
'the paradigm has not generated much organisation
theory as such'
	 (p. 31/32)
and even less still in the two more 'radical' areas.
Thus an initial look at the contents of Burrell and Morgan's functionalist
classification of organisation theory in the light of Scott's classification
should indicate the areas which fit into other segments. Figure 2.1.3 presents
sucha synthesis. Burrell and Morgan isolate five* major schools of thought in
organisation theory which are part of this functionalist paradigm. The
objectivist and social system schools of thought are the most common in
organisation theory but can be easily summarised as being:
'... dominated by abstracted empiricism' (p. 122)
This, of course, is typical of Scott's 'rational and natural closed' and
'rational open' quadrants the former being more aligned to 'objectivism' and
the latter to both 'social system theory' and 'objectivism'. Burrell and
Morgan's 'theories of bureaucratic dysfunctions is based around particularly
the work by Merton (1968) who was basically concerned to explain how socially
deviant behaviour can be seen as a product of social structure. Or in other
words the social structure which is intended to be furthering organisational
goals may in fact hamper such achievement because it is mismatched to the
' people who make up the organisation causing them to be deviant. In relation
, to Scott's classification such a concern can be aligned with his 'ration open'
or 'natural open' depending on the assumptions adopted in the actors analysed.
* Clearly one could take issue with Burrell and Morgan's views about
organisation theory particularly as they seem to ignore large parts
of that literature and rely somewhat heavily on sociological sources.
However, there is enough scope and coverage in their analysis to
demonstrate the points relevant to this Section and thus their
Classification will, with some misgivings, be adopted somewhat
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Burrell and Morgan's 'action frame of reference' and 'pluralism' are at
the boundaries of the functionalist paradigm the former pushing into the
interpretive segment and the latter into the radical structuralist segment.
The 'action frame of reference' as developed by Burrell and Morgan (based on
the work of Silverman (1970) and Parsons (1951)) can really be seen as an
extension of the 'theories of bureaucratic dysfunctions'. It is concerned to
give credence to how individuals give different meanings to different phenomena
(thus drawing on the insights of those more appropriately placed in the
interpretive paradigm) but only in the context of furthering the functional
, concern of organisation efficiency and effectiveness. Or as Burrell and
Morgan put it:
'Action theorists have used notions derived from the
phenomenological perspective to shore up and support
the functionalist point of view.'	 (p. 201)
Pluralism in an organisational context sees organisations as political systems
where power over, and conflict between, individuals and groups dominate activities.
The organisation is viewed:
'... as a plurality of power holders who derive
their influence from a plurality of sources'
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 203)
Pluralism however stops short of seeing such arrangements as dysfunctional
and requiring change but rather looks towards devising a network:
'... of rules and regulations which allow this
process to occur in an orderly fashion and
without undue prêjudice to the survival of
the organisation as a whole'
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 204)
Both 'pluralism' and the 'action frame of reference' are at the extremes
of the functionalist paradigm. Pluralism is not far away from the radical
structuralist concern to overthrow power blocks. Likewise the action frame
of reference is very close to the symbolic interactionism or phenomenological
approaches of the interpretive paradigm. Given a slight change of emphasis
away from the functionist advantage for understanding meanings and these
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would be situated in the adjacent quadrants.
These two schools of thought can be related most closely to Scott's
'natural open' classification. This also has the tendency to be both
diverse and more exploratory of new approaches even though the tendency is
towards the 'interpretive' paradigm rather than the 'radical structuralist'
Thus, despite some misgivings about both Burrell and Morgan and Scott's
full comprehension of what constitutes organisation theory, the assertion
by the former authors that it is dominated by functionalist thinking does
appear to be valid. It is difficult to think of any major schools of thought
inorganisation theory to fit into the other paradigm of Burrell and Morgan's
Riletaa although there are clear signs of developments moving into the
interpretive quadrant (cf. Weick, 1979).
Since all accounting schools of thought feature in Scott's classification
and since this classification fits into basically Burrell and Morgan's
functionalist paradigm then accounting is basically functionalist. Such a
conclusion is clearly dependent on the validity of the above analysis. However,
given the accuracy of this analysis we can now look at the schools of accounting
thought building on Figure 2.1.1 in the context of Burrell and Morgan's
understanding of organisation. This is attempted in the first two columns of
Table 2.1.3.
As can be seen from this Table the majority of sub-schools of thought are
most appropriately placed in Burrell and Morgan's 'objectivism' and 'social
system theory', Burrell and Morgan see little difference between 'objectivism'
and 'social system theory' both to them are 'abstracted empiricism' attempting
to make descriptive and prescriptive generalisations about some sort of abstract
or general organisation. Only the three sub-schools of thought in the behaviour-
al aspects of management accounting (MB 21, MB 31 and MB 41) can be seen as
really breaking out of this traditional. MB 21 (impact of people on accounting
system design) and MB 31 (impact of organisational aspects on accounting
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system design) are typical examples of Burrell and Morgan's 'theories of
bureaucratic dysfunctions' dealing as they do with alternative models of man
and organisations in the context of accounting system design, which are meant
to complement, rather than contradict, such models - all for the good of
organisational viability and development. Likewise the 'action frame of
reference', 'pluralism' and movements into other paradigms are typical
expressions of the work going on in MB 41 (impact of all aspects on accounting
systetndesign) whether in terms of deeper understanding (cf. Hopwood, 1978)
or for change (cf. Cooper 1981, 1983) - the former moving towards the
'interpretive' and the latter towards the 'radical'.
Before discussing some of the limitations surrounding both 'functionalist'
and 'interpretive' thinking* it is important to ascertain the accuracy of
this classification by looking at a suitable cross section of studies in
various accounting sub-schools. This will be done to ascertain basic
assumptions behind these studies. This will demonstrate not only the consequent
accuracy of their positioning in the above classification schema but also indicate
11%) well these studies are working within the assumption set they have chosen.
The next four sections of this ehapter are addressed to this concern.
The last two columns of Table 2.1.3 summarises the intention of
these four sections in the context of Burrell and Morgan's classification and
the accounting sub-schools relationship to such a schema. Section 2.2 looks at
some 	 the studies which adopt 'agency theory' as a basic tenet (coded
N33/PC 2 from Table 2.1.1) particularly some of the studies in the 'emerging
Rochester School of Accounting' (Jensen, 1976). This is intended to reflect
some of the 'better' 'objectivist' thinking in accounting. Section 2.3 looks at
* which will be introduced in Section 2.6 and developed further in Chapter3.
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some of the studies which adopt a 'contingency theory' approach (MB 32)
which are intended to reflect the 'social systems theory' in Burrell and
Morgan's classification. The more 'subjective' studies from the sub-school:
'impact of organisational aspects on accounting system design' (MB 31) will
be looked at in Section 2.4. Finally Section 2.5 will look at two somewhat
diverse studies in accounting* from the 'impact of all aspects on accounting
system design' sub.-school .
As we indicated in Section 2.0 the contents of these four sections are
introduced to satisfy a number of objectives. Firstly to supply a level
of intimacy into studies which are intended to reflect the entire spectrum of
current accounting knowledge, which was not possible through the rather
limiting analytical framework adopted in Chapter 1. In other words it gives an
opportunity for the spectrum of accounting knowledge to demonstrate what it is
doing even if, as Chapter 1 has indicated, it is not concerned with the
accounting system design cycle (i.e. the processes of aescribing, prescribing
and changing accounting systems in enterprise contexts). Secondly it permits
a slight digression to allow us to demonstrate how these studies reflect, however
badly, the intentions and assumptions sets to which they apparently adhere.
* By Pettigrew (1973, 1979) and by those at the University of Bath (cf.
Tomkins et al, 1980; Colville, 1981; Tomkins and Groves, 1983; Tomkins,
1983; Colville, 1983). The choice of these studies is because they
respectively reflect a 'pluralism' and 'social action' emphasis.
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OBJECTIVIST THINKING IN ACCOUNTING: THE EMERGING ROCHESTER SCHOOL 
OF ACCOUNTING 
The 'Rochester School of Accounting (RSA hereafter), is built around
the agency theory ideas* of two of their colleagues: Jensen and Meckling.
Nov agency theory, as already pointed out, is to do with the contractually
related actions of two people (a principal and an agent) both of whom are
mistimed to be resourceful, evaluative, maximising men (REMMS) (Meckling, 1976).
Because agency theory is about the behaviour of contractually related
individuals and small groups it is not therefore surprising that the RSA has
asimilar focus. The concern is with explaining the behaviour of accountants
in the context of accounting thought and accounting system design rather than
the latter more directly. Christenson (1983) calls this a 'meta problem' or
a 'sociology of accounting' (p.5) as distinct from what he refers to as the
'primary problem' (i.e. the actual design of accounting systems).** So ) for
instimce,Watts and Zimmerman (1978) looks at the behaviour of practising
financial accountants and managers; Watts and Zimmerman (1979) with that
of academic accountants; and Zimmerman (1979) with that of cost accountants
but always in the context of accounting choice.***
Thus any explanation concerning accounting system design has to work
through, and be part of, the agency theory framework with all of its assumptions
about the nature of man and his contractual relationships. Simon's early
* Clearly Jensen and Heckling are not the originators of agency theory
approaches per se but they took the idea intó new realms of
possibilitiei in their 1976 work.
** Christenson appears to view these two levels as unrelated which no doubt
the RSA would strongly contend. The latter would view 'primary' being
explained by an analysis of the 'meta' although this is a little difficult
to sustain with regard to the 1979 Watts and Zimmerman study.
*** Wiener to lobby on particular accounting standards (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978);
whether to produce accounting ideas or not (Watts and Zimmerman, 1979); whether
to allocate costs to departments or not (Zimmerman, 1979)
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challenge (1955, 1957, 1959) to the universal view of economic man as a
'resourceful evaluative maximising' being remains unheeded and is explained
away as a 'misinterpretation'. Jensen and Heckling (1976) put it like this:
'Unfortunately Simon's work has often been mis-
interpreted as a denial of maximising behaviour,
and misused especially in the marketing and
behavioural science literature. His later use
of the term 'satisficing' (Simon, 1959) has
undoubtedly contributed to this confusion
because it suggests rejection of maximising
behaviour rather than maximisation subject to
costs of information and of decision making'
(footnote no. 3 p. 307)
Clearly 'satisficing' to Simon was not constrained maximising but a whole
new 'model of man'. Jensen and Heckling along with the majority of economists
do not want to accept alternatives to their model of man therefore they don't
exist!* So sure is their conviction that Jensen and Heckling can with some
confidence state:
'We retain the notion of maximising behaviour
on the part of all individuals in the analysis
to follow' (p. 307)
The doubts surrounding this model of man are clearly immense as we have
indicated in Chapter 1 and in many ways it is possible to reject such an
assumption and with it much of economic theory. However, even though this has
been implied in Chapter 1 it is not the intention of this study to attempt
this immense task. What will be attempted in this Section is to show
through the studies by Watts and Zimmerman two important points: firstly the
strong objectivist (in Burrell and Morgan's sense) orientation of these
studies; secondly that even accepting the agency theory model (with its particular
view of economic man) that the conclusions do not stand up to empirical
test using the methodology to which they supposedly adhere.
* Undoubtedly they can get away with this because the concept is so 'loose'
and can be Shifted around or expanded to accommodate any challenge.
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Looking at this methodology will, in fact, supply a key insight into
the strongly objectivist approach of these theorists. Clearly the following
can only give the briefest of introduction to this and needs to be seen in the
context of the other summaries made by Christenson (1983) and Lowe, Puxty
and Laughlin (1983) along with studies in the philosophy of science.
The RSA are basically concerned to produce:
'... a positive theory of accounting (which) will
explain why accounting is what it is, why
accountants do what they do, and what effects
these phenomena have on people and resource
utilisation' (Jensen, 1976, p. 13)
To achieve this very clear 'objectivist' aim they have attempted to adopt some
form of natural science methodology or more overtly Friedman's (1953) inter-
pretation of this. However, as will become apparent not only has Friedman
misinterpreted what he actually believes in but also the RSA are not following
Friedman anyway!*
Friedman overtly is a 'logical positivist'. Logical positivism is a beLief
(and little more now cf. Passmore (1967)) that propositions attempting to
describe and portray reality actually do so in an objective true way. Friedman
overlooks, of course that human agents and instruments intervene in this process
and cause some bias in the system. As a result a logical positivist approach
has long been dismissed as a viable claim or methodology and replaced by a
number of less assured alternatives. Foremost amongst these, which has come
out of logical positivism,is 'instrumentalism' which is actually what Friedman
is practising and not logical positivism. Instrumentalism has a long history
and is nicely compared and contrasted with positivism by Christenson (1983) in
* Such indeed is the methodological confusion of the RSA as Christenson (1983)
and Lowe, Puxty and Laughlin (1983) and a number of others have indicated.
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- the following:
'Instrumentalism differs from strict positivism in
admitting that theories, although they cannot be
reduced to statements of "what is" are nevertheless
needed in science. It claims, however, that their
utility is only as instruments for prediction and
not as descriptions of reality. Positivism and
instrumentalism both agree that only observational
propositions describe reality'. (p. 15)
Friedman is clearly an instrumentalist even though he may not think himself
to be one for as he points out:
'... the only relevant test of the validity of a
hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with
experience'
(1953 pp. 8-9) (emphasis in the original)
To the instrumentalist there is no distinction between explanation and
prediction. Explanation is 'nothing but prediction in reverse' (Christenson,
1983, p. 15) thus there is no distinction; predictive accuracy is all that
matters and the so called 'explanatory' assumptions upon which the model is
based are irrelevant.
The RSA however although wishing to link themselves to Friedman actually
are not instrumentalists. They clearly see a distinction between prediction
and explanation as the following indicates:
'This theory is intended to be a positive theory,
that is, a theory capable of explaining the factors
determining the extant accounting literature,
predicting how research will change as the under-
lying factors change, and explaining the role of
theories in the determination of accounting
standards'. (Watts & Zimmerman, 1979, p. 274)
The methodological view called 'realism' is really what the RSA is working under.
Realism makes a distinction between prediction and explanation and maintains
that some theories are nothing more than predictions. Realism as Christenson
(1983) point out:
1 ... holds, however, that for a theory to be
considered explanatory, it must be more than 
an instrument for prediction. It must also be
interpretable as a description of a deeper
reality that underlies the surface reality of
the phenomenal domain of occurrences' (p. 15/16)
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Realism draws a sharp line between prediction and explanation and
creates a number of acute problems when trying to relate the two especially
in terms of validity criteria. Accurate predictions cannot be used to
corroborate the 'explicans' in an explanatory hypothesis. This is precisely
because of the differences in prediction and explanation, for as Popper (1972)
points out:
'A true prediction may easily have been validly
deduced from an explicans that is false'
(p. 353) (emphasis in the original)
However, predictions and explanations are related in a somewhat negative
sense. If a prediction from an explanatory hypothesis is found to be false
then the explicans will be false as well. Popper (1972) summarises this
important point as follows:
... a prediction can be used to corroborate
a theory only if its comparison with observations
might be regarded as a serious attempt at testing
the explicans — a serious attempt at refuting it.'
(p. 353)
A'serious attempt' is only possible if the explicans can be independently 
tested via predictions to discover which cannot be refuted at the moment and
which need to be modified. But it needs to be repeated that even if the
explicans can be tested independently and the predictions occur in every instance
this still does not make the explicans 'valid'. It is not necessarily 'true'
as such but rather unrefuted at the present time.
The above is a classical understanding of what is required if the desire
is to adopt an 'objectivist' approach to social theory whether it be accounting,
organisation theory or whatever. They are tough and difficult requirements
to met but the results are universal laws in the funtionalist sense. These
are 	 tenets to which the RSA supposedly adhere although as will become
apparent they appear to be unaware of either the very difficult assumption base
under which they are working or the relative underachievement of their studies.
The following will touch on some of these problems.
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Concentration will be placed on the two studies most pertinent to
describing practices or rather the people who perform the practices. The
studies are by Watts and Zimmerman (1978) on management practices in respect
of lobbying on accounting standards and Zimmerman (1979) on cost accountants'
practices with respect to allocating overheads. The other study by Watts and
Zimmerman (1979) on the behaviour of accounting academics is ignored because
it has similar problems to the other two and has already been criticised in
depth by Lowe, Puxty and Laughlin (1983).
Watts and Zimmerman (1978) attempt to design a general model to explain
why corporate management will or will not lobby regulatory bodies on particular
standards. They test their general theory suitably interpreted with respect
to the responses to the FASB's Discussion Memorandum on General Price Level
Adjustment (GPLA) but their major concern is with the general model.
The building of the model starts with a steady reduction of causal
variables. It begins with the all too familiar assumption which gives the major
focus:
'... we assume that individuals act to maximise
their own utility. In doing so, they are
resourceful and innovative. The obvious
implication of this assumption is that manage-
ment lobbies on accounting standards based on
its own self interest.'
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, p. 113)
This is conducivewith both economic theory and, more particularly, agency theory
which gives clear recognition that even though management is contractually bound
as an agent to the shareholders this does not detract from the former's wealth
maximising endeavours. Utility to Watts and Zimmerman is assumed to be:
1 ... a positive function of the expected compensation
in future periods ... and a negative function of the
dispersion of future compensation' (p. 114)
Compensation, to Watts and Zimmerman, has both pecuniary and non pecuniary
elements but :
'Since it is unclear what role accounting standards
play in the level of non pecuniary income we exclude
it.'
	 (p. 114)
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Pecuniary compensation consists of:
'... wages, incentive compensation (cash, bonuses
and stock or stock options)' (p. 114)
However, the study concentrates virtually exclusively on aspects of 'incentive
compensation' and how this can be affected by lobbying or not lobbying on
accounting standards.
The second stage of the explanatory model looks at the variables which
indirectly and directly affect such incentive compensation. The indirect
variables* are those which are affected by accounting standards and have an
effect upon the cash flows of the enterprise and hence cm -ilw.ent-ive. numpnsstitin.
The direct variable** has a direct effect on such incentive compensation.
These variables are juxtaposed around in relation to the cash flows and direct
incentive compensation in the context of reporting income measures to come to
some global conclusion (with an eye to empirical testing) which can be summarised
as follows:
1. If the accounting standard could lead to a declaration of
accounting earnings increase then there will either be no
submission (if the firm is small) and an unfavourable
submission (if the firm is large).
2. If the accounting standard could lead to a declaration of
accounting earnings decrease then there will be an un-
favourable submission (if the firm is small) no submission
(if the firm is medium sized) and a favourable submission
(if the firm is large).
* Four such variables are put forward namely i) taxes ii) regulatory procedures
if the firm is regulated iii) political costs iv) information production
costs. Where these come from and whether there are more is left to the
readers imagination!
** There is only one which is management compensation plans.
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The third stage involved testing the theory through predictions but not
in the sense of trying to refute explicans but rather as a way of bolstering
the standing of the explanatory theory. However as discussed above predictions
can never confirm an explanatory theory even if they are 100% correct. But
Watts and Zimmerman's predictions cannot be viewed in that way. One out of
eight who were predicted to be against GPLA favoured it. Two out of eight
who were predicted to be in favour of GPLA were against it.and a number of firms
who should have favoured GPLA didn't even made a submission!
Popper would no doubt say that such predictions indicate a basic problem
with the explanatory model. However it is difficult to see which explicans 
are incorrect because the predictions are not related directly and independently
toanyparticular explicans. But such humility does not appear to be in
Watts and Zimmerman's mind for they can boldly claim:
'We believe that the general findings in this paper,
if confirmed by other studies have important
implications for the setting of financial accounting
standards in a mixed economy'. (p. 132)
But there are no 'general findings' given the strictures of scientific method
to which Watts and Zimmerman apparently wish to adhere.
The study of Zimmernan (1979) starts with the important:
'... positive question of why firms persist in
allocating costs in spite of the continued
admonition by educators against doing so:' (p. 505)
This clearly is a valid empirical concern yet Zimmerman's solution to
identify:
'... some plausible reasons why rational maximising
individuals would want to allocate costs.' (p. 505)
is probably not the answer! Plausibility to Zimmerman rests on accounting
adaptations of developments in modern economic theory which, of course, assumes
that economic man is a 'rational maximising individual'. So the two 'plausible
reams' which Zimmerman puts forward naturally involve the empirical validity
of the underlying model along with the specific suggestions.
The first 'plausibe reason' comes, not surprisingly, out of an agency
88
theory framework. The basic argument is that fully allocating out costs to
departments (agents) would be a form of monitoring and controlling the agents
flexibility to 'overconsume' certain 'perquisites' in which, technically, he has
• the freedom and assumed tendency to indulge. Zimmerman puts forward a
number of testable implications from this plausible reason e.g. cost allocations
are more likely in situations where other monitoring costs are high. These are
seen as a way to test the validity of the model in actual empirical situations.
However, no evidence is presented to support or reject such predictions.
The second 'plausible reason' is based on economic modelling to discover:
'... under what conditions does applying an overhead
charge to the production manager maximises the value
of the firm?' (p. 516)
Through a careful and rigorous analysis Zimmerman shows when a centralised
• resource is 'best' allocated out as a notional overhead charge. Once again
based on an agency theory framework the overhead charge is seen as a way to
reduce over consumption by production managers (agents) of a common resource.
Such an analysis is clearly very thorough logically but what of its empirical
validity? - the major concern of Zimmerman it will be recalled. Zimmerman
is in fact bold enough to put forward some testable implications e.g. cost
allocations are more likely in situations where average service costs are
increasing. However no evidence is •presented.
The Zimmerman model therefore is nothing more than conjecture at the
moment. He may attempt to test out his predictions in the future but even if
confirmed in totality this will not necessarily support his model for the
reasons discussed above.
In conclusion, the RSA claims a great deal but delivers little. It's
basic problem is trying to be scientific and attempting to stay very close
to economic theory. To be scientific, in the Popperian sense, is to arrive at
general functionalist laws but is -extremely difficult in the area under consideration.
Likewise to be tied so closely to economic theory means that the methodological
and empirical reality problems which are present in this discipline naturally
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feature in any accounting adaptations of the base. Blaug (1976) puts the
combined problem somewhat succinctly:
'Much empirical work in economics is like 'playing
tennis with the net down': instead of attempting
to refute testable predictions, economists spend
much of their time showing that the real world
bears out their predictions thus replacing
falsification, which is difficult, with confirmation*,
which is easy' (p. 173)
Unfortunately the RSA cannot even get the 'confirmation'* aspect right along
with much economic theory.
The RSA therefore are a typical example of what Burrell and Morgan would
call 'objectivists'. They are the most recent and judging by the citations
of their work the most dominant in this basic area. However) as objectivists,
, asdemonstrated,they are somewhat lacking in terms of their expression of
their adopted assumption base.
* Blaug may be somewhat misleading here in his use of the word confirmation.
Rigorous predictions need to be right 100% of the time for any 'confirmation'
to occur. However if they occur this does not confirm the theory anyway
(see discussion above). In fact, econometric methods can mystify and give
illusions of confirmation in a way which is probably unhelpful and this has
probably led Blaug to be somewhat 'loose' in his language.
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23 SOCIAL SYSTEMS THEORY IN ACCOUNTING: THE CONTINGENCY THEORY 
APPROACHES 
Typical examples of social system theory thinking in accounting are those
who adopt a contingency theory approach to accounting system design. The
basic tenet of this school of thought is that there is no one 'best way'
to organise an organisation, such design problem depends on a number of factors
which are situation specific to the enterprise in question. In a like manner,
therefore, accounting systems are not a mapping of an ideal but rather are an
expression of a number of possible ideas in the context of alternative
configurations of important contingent factors. Thus unlike the 'best way'
of objectivist thinking which is a universal law the 'best way' in such social
mums approaches is variable and depends on a number of contingent factors.
Thus neither its methodology nor its conclusions are that clear cut — which
, isn't surprising in terms of its mid position in the functionalist paradigm
being away from the more obvious objectivist concerns. However its dominant
concern with appropriate design to further goal achievement in environmental
contexts is very clearly functional.
Otley (1980, 1982) and Cooper (1981,1983) have done a masterly job of
summarising the studies in this area and the following will not emulate such
a well performed task. Instead three studies* which, in this author's opinion,
symbolises this field of study will be looked at to demonstrate the functional
centrality of these studies and how well they perform their alloted task given
the assumption set they are working under.
* By Waterhouse and Tiessen (1978), Lowe and Tinker (1976) and Hayes (1977)
A
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An interesting example of a study which adopts somewhat unquestionably
the insights of organisation theory is the one by Waterhouse and Tiessen
(1978) (WT hereafter).* Based on the work in organisation theory WT can
confidently start by stating that such work:
'... has demonstrated that technology and environment
are important variables in understanding the structure
and activity of complex organisations'. (p. 66)
WT then give meaning to these variables from other parts of the organisation
them literature** and then applies this to determine structural matters such
as the make up and functional nature of organisational sub-units. Such
organisational sub-units with their functional responsibilities clearly need
control mechanisms of which accounting systems are part. Thus the design
of these accounting systems is contingent on the design of the control system
which is contingent on the function of the organisation sub-unit which is
contingent on the structural arrangements which is contingent on the technology
and environment of the enterprise in question.
The logic is clear and the accounting system is grounded in an organisation
context yet the empirical accuracy is open to question. The accuracy is not
only dependent on the validity of contingency theory but also the
adaptations of this into the accounting context. With respect to the former
Wrtouch on some of the problems but do not take them seriously and offer no
empirical test as to the latter. However, the functional concern and obvious
underpinning is clearly very apparent in this study.
* One has to wait until the conclusion of WT's paper to get any feel at all
of any uncertainty in this set of literature upon which they heavily rely.
Even then such issues are somewhat casually brushed aside. Equally the
more recent work by these two authors (Tiessen and Waterhouse, 1983) which
adopts unhesitantly agency theory and transaction cost theory into their
contingency framework seems to suggest some reasonably consistent uncritical
behaviour!
** Primarily Perrow (1967) for technology and Duncan (1972) for environment.
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The study by Lowe and Tinker (1976)* is a very untypical example
of studies which can be classified (just) as a contingency approach. It
is untypical because although using much of the literature on organisational
theory allied to the contingency approach it also goes beyond such work into
the deeper and underlying systems and cybernetics foundations. In this
sense it is much more of a truly social systems study.
The study's basic concern is to build a model of what could be called an
'effective enterprise system' which will include and give direction to the
design of the accounting information system. The model is built around the
'architectural design' of Ashby's (1956) law of requisite variety and an
adaptation and development of Simon et al's (1954) understanding of the
different uses of accounting information, in the context of this design.
Organisational performance (0)** in systems theory is a function of the
elements we can 'significantly influence' (N) and those that we cannot 00.
The usual view is that a particular level of (0) can be achieved by predicting
(II) and 'fixing' (N). However, disturbances occur in (11) which require changes
in (N) if the desired level of (0) is to be achieved. Ashby's law of requisite
variety generalises this relationship in terms of degrees of variety in (M) and
(N) in relation to (0). In general it is saying that there must at least be
as much variety in (N) as there is in (M) if (0) is to be unaffected. This
will allow the variety in (N) to match the variety in (M) and prevent any
disturbances in the pursuit of achievement of (0).
Such a law clearly has implications for the design of control systems
of which accounting systems are part. Lowe and Tinker develop this by following
* This was based primarily on Tinker's Ph.D work (1975)
, ** Using the variable abbreviations as in Lowe and Tinker (1976) .
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Simon et al (1954) highlighting when 'problem solving' and 'monitoring'
information would be most appropriate. The conclusion being that problem
solving information is needed for high variety control systems to match
high environmental variety and achieve high performance. Whereas monitoring
information is needed for low variety control systems to match low
environmental variety and achieve high performance. Any other matching
would have an effect on performance.
The empirical model of Lowe and Tinker was not only to test this
general model in the context of performance measures but also to explore the
reasons as to what causes adaptiveness (variety) and why certain information
is used.
This study is undoubtedly a very well executed functionalist piece of
work. It is clearly functionalist since it sees organisations existing and
basically 'good' but requiring some modification of the organisational system
so that greater 'good' can be achieved i.e. higher levels of performance. To
understand using functionalist causal modeling helps to appreciate the areas
which need changing if such a 'better' state is to be realised.
The study by Hayes (1977) is another interesting but somewhat typical
contingency theory/social systems theory approach in accounting. It is
interesting because it attempts to be empirical (in the context of a formal
model) to capture managers of organisation sub-units basic beliefs about
important contingent variables which they believe have a marked effect on
performance. It is typical,however,because of its heavy use of functionalist
tools (i.e. complex statistical techniques particular factor analysis).
His formal model specifies three contingent variables: sub-unit
interdependence, environmental relationships and factors internal to the sub.
wa of interest. He then postulates three possible 'configurations of
importance' for three departments (production, research and development and
marketing) and then goes out to test such propositions using structured
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questionnaires* and factor analysis calling for participants to define
their own criteria of performance.**
According to Hayes his analysis supported his original propositions.
However ) in a valuable interchange of comments (Tiessen and Waterhouse, 1978;
Hayes, 1978) some of the real problems involved in making any sensible
conclusions using the statistical approach adopted became more overt. At
various points in Hayes reply such doubts are very apparent:
'But it should be recognised that such difficulties
as are indicated are a frequent problem in survey
research not unique to this study 	
Shades of grey dominate the area, not the extremes
of right or wrong or black or white' (p. 532)
Hayes is realistic enough to know the limitations of this heavy statistical
approach to real understanding and has, in fact 'moved on' to much more
objective endeavours as will become apparent in Section 2.4.
The above examples therefore are typical of the social systems theory
thinking in accounting. Hopefully enough has been said to indicate the very
real functionalist concern which dominates these studies. Given that this is
nobadthing if one adopts a functionalist approach then the final question
to face is how well are they performing their task given the assumption base
they are working under.
The first important point to note in contingency theory approaches more
generally, and certainly in the studies looked at above, is that all have a
strong prescriptive bias to them***. This and other points are perceptively
* The use of structured questionnaires is typical of functionalist thinking
since it is assumed that there is enough order and uniformity in the world
and that differences in 'meanings' of terms used are a problem but not a
fundamental difficulty.
** much to the consternation of Hayes' critics - see Tiessen and Waterhouse
(1978).
, ft* Even the less obvious prescriptive studies e.g. Hayes (1977) cannot avoid
prescriptive generalisations because the whole contingency approach leads
naturally into such concerns.
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brought out by Cooper (1981, 1983) building on the critical analyses by
organisation theorists (cf. Child 1977; Wood, 1979; Schreyogg, 1980;
Schoonhoven, 1981.)
Whether they are 'good' prescriptions depends on some sort of moral
and empirical arguments. The former in this functionalist paradigm is
resolved by demonstrating the need for the development in terms of greater
need satisfaction or increased organisational effectiveness. It is,in fact,
the dubiousness of this relationship which has caused many of the above
critics to turn against contingency approaches. The latter argument has been
seen, in the context of this study, in terms of the necessity for prescriptions
being able to be actually applied admittedly through change processes however
complicated and far reaching. Such prescriptions therefore must be based on
accurate initial descriptions — without them prescriptions are mere fanciful
dreams.* It is this inability to apply contingency theory approaches because
of poor descriptions in the first place which dominates criticism in the
literature** Cooper (1983) puts the matter succinctly:
'The recognition of multiple (and conflicting)
environmental demands, the doubted linearity of
environmental characteristics and the choices
that are possible for managers, are all fund-
amental problems for designers of organisations
(and their information systems) who attempt to
utilise contingency theory. Most fundamentally
by providing management with a rationale for
action, that is by offering the excuse that
organisational changes are technically (environ-
mentally) essential, contingency theory mystifies
the values that are inherent in any organisational
change'. (p. 279)
* Not that dreams are a bad thing as long as they are coupled with mechanisms
for change. Martin Luther King was famous for his saying 'I have a dream'
but he was also famous for his thorough understanding of situations and
change strategies in the context of such understanding — his dreams were
empirically related therefore.
** It should be pointed out that this global criticism does not necessarily
may to the study by Lowe and Tinker (1976) which is not normally
considered to be a contingency theory approach as such. It may be exempt
as well because of its roots in cybernetics which claims to be a universal
understanding of the actions of animate and inanimate beings in a complex
changing world.
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Cooper's last 'most fundamental' point in different guises is a common
problem to most if not all prescriptions which have an intention of being
applied but are based on an inadequate understanding of why things are as
they are. The problem is that if no attempt is made to actually apply the
good ideas the barreness of the description is never brought to the surface.
Exposing barreness is a painful process since it must bring into question
the whole assumption set under which one is working. This could be why even
- marginal change (and that is all that is to be entertained under functionalist
thinking) is so visible by its absence in accounting thought.
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THEORIES OF BUREAUCRATIC DYSFUNCTIONS: ACCOUNTING IN ORGANISED
ANARCHIES 
It will be recalled that 'theories of bureaucratic dysfunctions' to
Burrell and Morgan revolve around two important insights. Firstly the
recognition that models of 'organisation man' do not 'fit' every organisational
framework which can lead to 'deviant' behaviour. Secondly that to survive
and grow as an organisation requires a matching of framework to the nature of
the organisational participants. Such 'theories' are undoubtedly part of the
functionalist paradigm yet they are a step away from the more objectivist and
social systems approaches and lean more towards the 'interpretive' and
'meaning' concerns of action theory, symbolic interactionism and the like.
They are neither one thing nor the other but hold an uncomfortable and unsure
central position in the paradigm.
This clearly makes a comprehensive analysis of which studies in organisation
theory and accounting 'fit' such a classification somewhat complex. The middle
ground may in fact not even exist given more refinement in defining the
boundaries of adjacent schools. Certainly such doubts surround this particular
middle ground. However, there is a possible* example in organisation theory
which has been adopted and adapted into an accounting context which does fit
such an anomalous classification — the 'garbage can' and 'technology of
foolishness' model of decision processes as seen particularly in the collective**
* It is only 'possible' because certainly this example was not mentioned
by Burrell and Morgan. However, Burrell and Morgan built this classified
type particularly around the work of Merton which may be a rather narrow
base on which to build. But given some careful thought it is possible to
see a more general ethos in this work which could fit other schools of
thought of which the one being discussed is a typical example.
** Building on particularly the earlier works of March, Olsen and Cohen
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works of March and Olsen (1976) and adapted in accounting by Cooper, Hayes
and Wolf (1981).
The following therefore will concentrate on Cooper et al's work as a
typical and certainly the best example of this middle ground position in
the functionalist paradigm. As in the previous sections we are not
attempting to be exhaustive in terms of the studies which can be rightly
classified in this way. We are rather looking at typical examples to
' demonstrate and justify their positioning in Burrell and Morgan's models and
also to see how well they are expressing the assumptions to which they
supposedly adhere.
The 'garbage can' model of organisational decision making maintains
that choices are fundamentally ambiguous. Or as March and Olsen (1976) put
in
'A choice situation is a meeting place for issues
and feelings looking for decision situations in
which they may be aired, solutions looking for
issues to which there may be an answer, and
participants looking for problems and pleasure'
(p. 25)
Thus the meaning of choice changes over time, choice is not always intentional
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 allays rational but is dependent on the particular context and meaning
bytheparticipants in the choice situation.
Such 'disorder' in the choice situation leans heavily towards the
subjectivist view of the world yet March and Olsen create some crude level
of order by suggesting that a decision:
1 ... is an outcome or an interpretation of
several relatively independent "streams"
within an organisation' (p. 26)
They then 'limit' their attention to four such streams although no real
mason for this limitation is given. These four streams therefore become
the focus of attention and the 'fortuitous confluence' of these in any context
becomes the order which explains why particular choices occur. These four
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streams are 'problems', 'solutions', 'participants' and 'choice
opportunities'.
Such a model creates a partial uncoupling of problems and choices.
Previous models of human choice have assumed that decisions are made to
solve problems and March and Olsen's work casts doubt on this model. It all
depends to March and Olsen on whether the fortuitous confluence of the four
streams of 'garbage' in a particular choice situation comes up with 'problems'
first. There is no guarantee that this will occur in all and every case.
Much, if not most, of March and Olsen's work is concerned with refining
and creating greater order in this general model. They do this by attempting
to model the structural processes which lead to the timing of arrival of the
various streams, the expected energy to be expended on and importance of the
decisions and the linkages between the streams.
The result of this extensive modelling and testing allows March and Olsen
tc) make some general conclusions, one of which concerns the types of decisions
which come from this garbage can process. These types of decisions are three
mutually exclusive and comprehensive processes with regard to any one
particular choice situation. The three different processes are by oversight,
by flight and by resolution. March and Olsen describe these three processes
as follows:
'By oversight. If a choice is activated when problems
are attached to other choices and if there is energy
available to make the new choice quickly, it will be
made without any attention to existing problems and
with minimum of time and energy.
By flight. In some cases, choices are associated with
problems (unsuccessfully) for some time until a choice
"more attractive" to the problems comes along, The
problems leave the choice, and thereby make it possible
to make the decision. The decision resolves no problem
(they having now attached themselves to a new choice).
By resolution. Some choices resolve problems after
some period of working on them. The length of time
may vary greatly (depending on the number of problems).
This is the familiar case that is implicit in most
discussions of choice within organisations.' (p. 33)
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Thus even though the choice situations in organisations is ambiguous
it has a certain assumed order to it. Cooper et al (1981) summarises the
first part of this very neatly:
'The essence of such a depiction of organisational
choice is ambiguity with respect to goals, uncertainty
concerning technology and structure, and fluidity of
participation' (p. 177)
Yet neither Marsh and Olsen nor Cooper et al seem to question whether the
creation of generalised order in such a situation is either possible or
appropriate. They lean towards subjectivism in the Burrell and Morgan sense
amitheamove back towards a more objectivist approach which sees the world
as out there with its own order and coherence even if, on the suface, disorder
and differences are apparent. Combine this with a basic lack of concern for
radical change in the organisations being described and we have clear
functionalist thinking in the 'middle ground' of this paradigm.
The addition of the second wing of this approach — the seemingly
prescriptive 'technology of foolishness' — also reinforces this positioning.
It is difficult to know whether, in fact, this technology is descriptive or
prescriptive. However, it seems to be more the latter rather than the
former. The approach seems to be that given the garbage can model and such
ambiguity in choice situations what can we do to choice processes which can
encourage 'non pathological' organisational behaviour? Certainly this is
how Cooper et al would see this 'technology of foolishness' in their
introductory paragraph before describing this approach. For as they say:
'In the presence of ambiguity, the issue of how
action can be effected is critical, for without
such consideration this depiction of organisation
is pathological: undertaking sensible or
intelligent action in the absence of well defined
goals becomes problematic' (p. 178)
The "technology of foolishness' is the 'sensible' and 'intelligent' design
of choice processes for maximum effectiveness in garbage can models and this
of course has strong prescriptive intentions. If true it also shows how the
ethos of the Burrell and Morgan's 'theories of bureaucratic dysfunctions' is
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clearly portrayed in this approach and how it is appropriately positioned
in the middle ground of the functionalist paradigm.
March's* (1971, 1978) "Technology of Foolishness'' has two major elements
to it. Firstly it suggests a re-examination of the prohibitions in the
more traditional theory of choice against imitation,coercion and rationalisation.
Imitation is where the decision maker seeks support for his intended action
by looking to past actions or possible future prohibitions and imitates and
interprets what he sees in such current choice problems. Coercion is a form
of 'organised power' to ensure that those things which should get done are
done. Rationalisation is a process of explaining ex post why particular
actions occurred. It is often associated with an explication and understanding
of goals which were not clear at the time action occurred (cf. Weick 1979;
March, 1978). The second element in the "Technology of Foolishness" is to
encourage playfulness and an abandonment of consistency in the choice process.
To March (1971) this has five major elements to it. Firstly it requires treating
goals as hypotheses, rather than something which are certain and must be
achieved. Secondly it requires treating intuition as real and important in
the choice process and not a thing to be discouraged. Thirdly it requires
treating hypocrisy as transitory. Hypocrisy is taken to be discrepancies
between actions and stated goals which can, if not quashed, hold up initial
action which will ) in the end i give the real goals and remove the apparent
inconsistencies. Fourthly it requires treating memory as an enemy to essentially
* March is normally associated with this technology although as expected
the ideas feature in the collective work of March and Olsen (particularly
Chapter 5)
102
,
discourage imitation of more standard approaches.* Fifthly it requires
treating experience as a theory constantly updating and modifying what is
known i as and when new things become apparent.
Given that there is some confusion as to whether this 'technology' is
a description of what happens or a prescription of what should happen in a
'garbage can' model of organisational choice it is not surprising to see such
confusion transferred into studies which use these insights somewhat uncritically.
The accounting interpretation by Cooper et al unfortunately contains such
tensions and confusions. The way Cooper et al resolve such problems is to use,
in the main March's first element as a basis for understanding accounting
systems as they are and his second element as a basis for making prescriptions
about future designs of accounting systems.
Therefore in terms of description Cooper et al see accounting systems
containing rationalisation, imitative and coercive elements. On the matter
of rationalisation:
'The budget process may be interpreted as a means for
justifying past actions and making them appear sensible
to both the actor and others .... Systems of cost
accumulation and financial reporting may also help to
create an organisational history and resolve uncertainty
about the past' (p. 181)
Likewise Cooper et al see imitative and coercive elements in accounting system
design:
'Accounting systems encourage imitation and coercion by
defining the problematic (by choosing which variables
are measured and reported) and they help to fashion
solutions (by choosing which variables are treated as
controllable)' (p. 182)
This then leads into even higher levels of generalisation to suggest that
accounting systems in practice can be seen as a form of language and legitimation.
* Clearly there is some inconsistency in March's work here since on the one
hand he is encouraging imitation (in the first element of this technology)
and on the other he is discouraging it.
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Undoubtedly these are new and interesting insights but are they
'accurate' descriptive generalisations? Accuracy depends on the assumptions
about the nature of social science and in this case, since generalisations
distinct from the meanings of participants are sought and assumed possible,
objectivist rationale is clearly more appropriate. Yet none of this methodology
is mentioned and the evidence put forward is an adaptation of other peoples'
findings which in turn may have their own methodological problems. It does
seem therefore when one combines this with doubts surrounding the descriptive
nature of March's original insights i that a lot more tighter work is necessary
before these insights can claim to be accurate generalisations* in quite the
way Cooper et al consider them to be.
Cooper et al are also concerned to make prescriptions on the basis of
the insights from the 'technology of foolishness' particularly on the second
element of March's model on playfulness in the decision process. The sociology
of regulation with objectivist leanings (i.e. functionalist concerns) comes
outmost clearly here for as Cooper et al point out:
'... the implication is that playful, creative and
experimental behaviour will help anarchic organisations
adapt and survive in their ambiguous and rapidly
changing environment' (p. 185)
Thus the concern is for marginal change so that existing organisations, as
presently situated with all their garbage can attributes, can survive and
presumably prosper.
Cooper et al's two prescriptions are as follows. Firstly, to design
accounting systems with a reduction in the emphasis on performance evaluation
and so facilitate a feeling of commitment and satisfaction by the participants.
* It needs to be repeated again that one is talking about accurate
generalisations according to objectivist assumptions and not absolutely
accurate generalisations.
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Secondly to design accounting systems in such a way as to facilitate creativity,
innovation and experimentation. Now as we pointed out in the Section on
'social systems theory' approaches prescriptions are 'good' in the functionalist
sense if they increase the viability of the organisation and if such changes
canbeaciplied in actual situations. Cooper et al are honest enought to be
explictly concerned about the former matter in connection with their prescriptions:
'On the other hand, as we have argued in earlier sections
of this paper, an important role of budgetary systems
(and accounting systems) is that of providing constancy
in organisations: controlling options available and
providing a basis for the rationalisations of action.
Such a stabilising force is important, yet the impact
of play within the process may lead to organisational
instability'... (p. 187)
Saclha realisation also raises the very real problem of trying to apply such
possibly dubious 'good' ideas. If as Cooper et al point out 'providing
constancy' is the function of accounting systems in practice then to make these
systems into 'playful' phenomena or 'semi-confusing' (Hedberg and Ycirisson., 1978)
will require some quite complicated change structures which have not as yet
been either faced or thought about. Then there is the nagging doubts that not
all accounting systems either can be changed in the same way or fit such a
general descriptive model anyway.
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2.5 ACCOUNTING STUDIES REFLECTING PLURALISM, SOCIAL ACTION THEORY AND 
BEYOND
According to Burrell and Morgan, as we discussed above, pluralism and
social action theory are organisation theory alternatives at the very boundaries
. of the functionalist paradigm pushing 'upwards' (to the radical structuralist
paradigm) and 'sideways' (to the interpretive paradigm) respectively. This
Section looks at two accounting studies which appear to reflect this
classification with their tendencies 'upwards' and 'sideways'.
These two studies are, as in other sections of this Chapter, not meant
to be an exhaustive summary of work which could be classified in the way
suggested. The studies are symptomatic and typical and are introduced, as in
the previous sections, to demonstrate why they can be classified as suggested,
what such approaches look like, how they compare with others in different
positions and to see how well they are working under the assumptions to which
they supposedly adhere.
2.5.1 Pluralistic Approaches in Organisation Theory and Accounting 
The most apparent pluralistic approach in organisation theory with
apparent accounting implications is the study by Pettigrew
(1973). Pettigrew, building on views of Burns (1961) and Long (1962), sees
organisations as political systems and organisational decision making in terms
ofand expressing power and conflict between actors. He criticises the
organisational insights from March and Simon (1958) and Cyert and March (1963)
(and presumably March and Olsen (1976)) for either their failure to mention
political issues or,where mentioned, their inability to clarify issues
involved. Pettigrew' s analysis however :
'... seeks to complement existing work by exploring
the nature of the 'political' in the context of an
innovative decision process' (p. 30)
Pettigrew's study concentrates on this one area of decisions because of
its very obvious political overtones:
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'One of the major hypotheses of this study is
that such political behaviour is likely to be
a special feature of large scale innovation
decisions ... new political action is released
and ultimately the existing distribution of
power is endangered' (Pettigrew, 1973, p. 20/21)
However, he is at pains to stress the generality of his findings despite
the limitation of, and criticism which could be levelled at him for,
concentrating on one research site and one major decision. Or as Pettigrew
puts it:
'This research has tried to put forward a conception
of decision making as a political process. Many of
the theoretical insights are contextually bound in
the sense that they are most applicable to Large
scale innovative decisions and, in particular, to
those involving a decision unit composed of an
executive leadership system and a differentiated
innovative system. This is not a severe limitation.
The interface between executives and specialists
would seem to be a general problem' (p. 273)
The innovation decision which Pettigrew explored was concerned with the
purchase of a major computer installation by a Midlands based clothing and
furniture company. The study concentrates on the dynamics of the prime
actors and their actions over primarily a two year cycle preceding the final
decision.
Wore looking at some of the results of his study, particularly the
aspects concerning the use of information, it is important to appreciate the
definitional and methodological underpinnings of Pettigrew's work. Pettigrew
hmlaclear understanding of what he was looking for (the political dimension)
amihowhe was going to approach this discovery (his methodology) and the
following will explore what these were.
The political dimension in decision processes is discussed in the context
of,andwith reference it, authority and power but more specifically the latter.
In fact, power is seen as dominant very largely because authority is seen as
a special expression of this phenomena. Pettigrew's conception of power is
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built up around Dahl's (1957, 1961, 1968) understanding* in terms of
demands made, support given and intermediary processes which lead to
both, particularly the latter. Or as Pettigrew puts it:
'First it would involve tracing out the generation
of demands in the decision process... The second
political component requires an analysis of the
mobilisation of support for the demands ...
Such a process of mobilisation is founded not only
on the possession and control of system - relevant
resources but also on skillful use of them'
(Pettigrew, 1973, p. 229/230)
Thus Pettigrew was concerned to understand 'demands' and what factors lead
to 'support' by significant actors and this to him constituted the important
political dimension.
Pettigxew's methodological choice was made on epistemological
necessity:
'An underlying theme is that theories of organisational
decision-making, power, and conflict require a processual
form. Operationalising such concepts necessitates a
longtitudinal research design. It was felt that participant
observation, interviewing and the content analysis of
documents would meet the basic theoretical requirements of
the study as well as the methodological aim of validation
through convergence**' (p. 55)
Such a methodological approach involved active participant observation and
ahistorical interpretive analysis.***
* Dahl maintained that power is a property of social relationships not an
attribute of the actor. i.e. A has power of B to the extent that he
can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.
** Convergence involved the hope of common insights from 'multiple data
sources, multiple observers and multiple levels of analysis.' (p. 53)
*** A model, which Pettigrew (1979) has repeated in his more recent work
on 'organisational cultures'.
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The former involved two years of detailed observation and investigation
while the decision problem was being faced and fought over. The latter
attempted to build a historical model of the ten years previous to this
two year study to give a context for the latter debate. Despite Pettigrew's
careful concern about the validity of this historical survey it was
inevitably selective and partial concentrating on the 'history of computer
activities' in the firm in question and the more general rise of a new
'occupational group called systems analysts.
This then gives an admittedly brief, but hopefully accurate, understanding
of Pettigrew's work. We now need to be looking at this in the context of
Burrell and Morgan's framework. However, before doing this it is clearly
important to briefly comment on his conclusions and their relevance to
information and particularly accounting information. The two are related
for as Pettigrew concludes:
'Control over information was a critical resource
used by Kenny* for mobilising power for his demands.
Because he sat at the junction of the communication
channels between his superordinates, the manufacturers,
and the board he was able to exert biases in favour of
his own demands and at the same time feed the board
negative information about the demands of his opponents.'
(p. 275)
Undoubtedly Pettigrew was not talking explicitly about accounting information
but it could be, and often has been, seen in such a context. In fact the
very point of putting such a study in the context of this Chapter is because
of its accounting information implications. However, it still needs to be
made plain that Pettigrew is not an accountant and was not referring
specifically to accounting information in his dominant conclusion.
We now need to look at Pettigrew's work in the context of Burrell and
Morgan's framework. Firstly the study seems to concentrate more on 'order'
* Kenny was the head of the Management Services Department and one of the
prime actors in the computer decision.
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than 'change' i.e. more the 'sociology of regulation' than 'sociology of
radical change'. The study concentrates on an important, possibly,
dysfunctional element in organisations but makes no reference to, or seems
concerned about, such possible dysfunctionality. Power is seen as nothing
more than an important causal element in organisational decision making and
needs to be exposed rather than criticised. Secondly although there is a
tendency towards the subjectivist view of social science the study has
strongly objectivist inclinations. The concept of power as defined by the
researcher's conceptual model, the assumption that this phenomena exists as
an observable ' thing ' and the apparent concern to generalise , all point
towards objectivist thinking in the Burrell and Morgan sense.
However, neither of these tendencies are that clear cut and obvious.
Thus it does seem appropriate to position this study in the upper middle
ground* of the functionalist paradigm which is where Burrell and Morgan have,
of course, positioned 'pluralism'. Thus it can be concluded that such a
study is an example, with accounting implications„ of pluralistic thinking.
Turning now to commenting on how well the study is working under the
assumption to which it supposedly adheres it is difficult to make any
obvious judgements. The rules which come from the assumptions in this
'upper middle ground' position of the functionalist paradigm are not
altogether obvious.
However there are two interesting interconnected points along with an
anomalous one to note when comparing this accounting pluralistic approach
to the accounting in organised anarchies approach discussed in Section 2.4
which essentially is in the same middle ground but not near the upper
* It is upper middle rather than middle since the very choice of the
subject matter (power) is implicitly critical even though not stated
explicitly. It is also the dominant theme of the radical structuralist
paradigm which,like it or not, it has a tendency towards.
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boundary of the paradigm. Firstly there does appear to be a reduction
in the necessity to generalise about findings in Pettigrew's study as
compared with Cooper et al's work. Secondly and connected with this there
is a willingness and seeming necessity in Pettigrew's work to get involved
in longitudinal work in one organisation rather than the more cross sectional
concerns of March and Olsen and presumably Cooper et al. The somewhat
anomalous third point is to note that Cooper et al have a greater tendency
to make general prescriptions for their general model of accounting systems
in their universal organisation than Pettigrew. It is anomalous since, on
the surface, Pettigrew's study should have a greater tendency towards
prescription given the positioning in the paradigm (i.e. moving towards
radical structuralism with its sociology of radical change element) and given
the presumably easier task of changing one organisational rather than the
generalised all.
These differences may or may not be more apparent than real and could
be explained by the bias in the selection process of the studies looked at.
However if they are real differences then they show the interacting effects
of the two continuums i.e. studies with varying views about the nature of
society but with similar views about the nature of social science may have,
in fact,different approaches to the latter. It is for this, and other,
reasons the more sophisticated discriminator on the nature of social science
as suggested by Morgan and Smircich (1980) was not adopted and used in the
design of this Chapter (see Section 2.1).
2,5.2 Social Action Theory Approaches in Organisation Theory and Accounting 
The studies to be looked at which appear to fall under this heading
are by Tomkins (1982) and Colville (1982). These studies are highly inter-
connected dealing with accounting systems in a social services department and
police force under the jurisdiction of the same Treasurer in the same County
Council.
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They also have the great advantage as distinct from the majority of
studies looked at in previous sections of making plain the assumption set
under which they are working. Such an assumption set is contained explicitly
in Colville (1981) and can be implied from Tomkins and Groves (1983).
Therefore, before looking at some of the detail of these actual accounting
studies it is helpful to look at these statements concerning assumptions and
relate these back to Burrell and Morgan's framework.
The empirical work of Tomkins and Colville is grounded in, and works
under, the assumptions of 'symbolic interactionism' particularly as
• exemplified by H.G. Blumer. As Meltzer, Petras and Reynolds (1975) point out
there are basically two major schools of thought in symbolic interactionism
which they describe as the 'Chicago' and Iowa' schools respectively. These
titles refer to studies and students at these respective university institutions
and particularly the two 'father' figures: H.G. Blumer and M.H. Kuhn. Although
both are symbolic interactionists and can be traced back to common roots from
the ideas of particularly G.H. Mead and more fundamentally German idealism
(see Chapter 3) they differ in important ways, as Meltzer et al point out:
'Although both Blumer and Kuhn claim to be interested
in what goes on 'inside the heads' of humans, their
approaches to this subject matter differ significantly.
Blumer's advocacy of a special methodology lays heavy
stress upon the need for insightfully 'feeling one's
ways inside the experience of the actor' ... Kuhn sought
to 'empiricise l
 Mead's ideas, reconceptualising or
abandoning those he deemed 'non empirical' and developing
observational techniques that were consistent with this
aim. His writings repeatedly sounded the call for ....
methods that would meet the 'usual scientific criteria"
(p. 57/58)
Thus Kuhn is more 'objectivist' in the Burrell and Morgan sense and Blumer
is more 'subjectivist'. Symbolic interactionism does seem to 'straddle' the
divide between the paradigms as Tomkins and Groves (1983, p. 369) suggest. Thus
although Burrell and Morgan make a distinction between social action theory
and symbolic interactionism - the former positioned in the functionalist
paradigm and the latter in the interpretive paradigm - it is probably more
correct to see part of the latter contained in the former thus allowing this
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basic approach to 'straddle' these paradigms.
annkins and Colville basically adopt a Chicago School approach to
symbolic interactionism in their studies. Colville (1981) basing his
insights on the seminal work by Blumer (1969) sees the basic premises of this
approach as follows:
'Firstly it is asserted that human beings act
towards things on the basis of the meanings that
things have for them. Secondly because the world
is experienced intersubjectively, symbolic
interactionism further asserts that the meaning
which individuals attach to things are themselves a
product of social interaction in human society.
Thirdly, these meanings are modified and handled
through an interpretive process that is used by each
individual in dealing with the signs he/she encounters.
This leads not only to shared definitions of reality
but to reciprocal definitions' (p. 124)
Thus, reality is a function of the meanings that people attach to phenomena
and, action is related to, and in the context of, such meanings. However such
subjective meanings can be shared because of the social interaction process
:which allows and encourages a convergence of views.
The research which is conducted using this basic approach must therefore
be 'grounded' (et Glaser and Strauss, 1967) in specific situations looking
, forth shared meanings in that situation rather than looking particularly
for global generalisations. Or as Tomkins and Groves (1983) put it:
'In such research one must, therefore, commence
from specific real world situations; the main
intention is to answer the question 'what is
going on here' not (with the exception of the
Iowa approach) to provide generalisable
conclusions for wide segments of society. If
individual definitions of situations and responses
do prove to be widespread across locations and
time, then general formal theories may be
formulated'
(p. 370)(emphasis in the original)
This is an important and marked change in emphasis from other studies looked at
inthisChsTter. Generalisations are very clearly secondary and even unimportant
to those working under symbolic interactionist approaches in the Blumer sense.
This isa clear indication of the shift from objectivist to subjectivist thinking
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but not too far away as to deny that any generalisations are possible or
desirable.
Symbolic interactionism ackowledges the possibility of change but
this is always set in the context of developing alternative 'meanings'. The
very idea of social interaction which formulates meanings ensures that these
can change. In addition the approach can expose and suggest alternative, deeper
meanings to the interacting parties in the hope of bringing about changes in
shared meanings.* However, as an approach it is not primarily concerned with
developing new 'physical' phenomena around which new shared meanings can
congregate; the concept of change, therefore, is restricted to developing the
'real'** meanings (with all the 'macro—factors' (Tomkins and Groves (1983) p. 370)
laid bare) behind 'existing' phenomena.
In sum taking all these points together symbolic interactionism, in the
Blumer sense, and since Tomkins and Colville are working under this approach
they too, can be positioned on the far right hand side of the interpretive
paradigm in the Burrell and Morgan framework. This is, of course, where Burrell
and Morgan put this school of thought anway.
The studies by Tomkins (1982) and Colville (1982) look towards uncovering
and comparing what are the shared meanings concerning the accounting systems
in a social service department and a police force working from the same County
Council. The comparison is possible because superficially a number of accounting
and finance phenomena appear to be common: both have the same Treasurer
* Tomkins and Groves (1983) p. 370 stresses the importance of this activity
while purposefully leaving the nature of this exposure suitably vague to
counteract the predicted critiques of Wilmott (1983) and others — see
their further comments in Tomkins and Groves (1983A) p. 413.
** Quite clearly what constitutes 'real' meanings is problematic as Tomkins
and Groves (1983 and 1983A) indicates and cannot be resolved absolutely
whether one uses Wilmott's (1983) suggested 'critical hermeneutics' (cf. .
Thompson, 1981) or any other methodological approach — see Chapter 3
for further details on this point.
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who basically oversees the work from a finance viewpoint; both are fed
similarly structured 'formal' accounting information; both have a similarly
named 'semi formal' accounting system. However, closer investigation
indicated some very basic differences in the meanings ascribed to the
accounting and finance function.
The differences highlighted were three. Firstly in the importance
ascribed to finance and accounting functions generally in the two functional
areas, The Social Services saw such functions as central the Police Force
as more secondary. Secondly in the functional usage by the two areas of the
same 'formal/official' accounting information. The Social Services found
little use of this somewhat dated information whereas the Police Force used
part of this information for control purposes. Thirdly in the design of
the similarly named (commitment accounting) semi—formal /off icial accounting
system. The Social Services had a highly formalised responsibility accounting
system while the Police Force maintained an informal somewhat ad hoc system.
These differences and the reasons for them are discussed at length in
the two papers and presumably these together constitute the shared meanings,
which together they are trying to expose. Presumably is probably the right
word for two reasons. Firstly it is left to the reader of these papers to
make the connection between the more conceptual studies (e.g. Colville (1981))
and the empirical work — the language of the latter is not clearly related
to that of the former. Secondly because no-where in these papers is there a
discussion of the process of taking these insights back to the prime actors
to discover whether they truly are shared meanings. Clearly these may or may
not be significant points but an adequate answer to them is necessary if one is
to make any sensible judgement on how well these studies are working under the
assumptions to which they supposedly adhere.
However, one thing is clear Tomkins and Colville have not only broken out
of a 'desperation to generalise' they have in addition suggested that even
generalisation with regard to the same functional systems may be a fanciful
dream. Tomkins (1982) puts the matter succinctly:
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'As with so many academic papers one must conclude
that more widespread research is needed to clarify
these issues by examining more Police and Social
Service organisations. ... At least one thing is
clear; if we want to understand in some depth how
accounting information is used, one must study
particular situations and local influences and
perceived matters of importance to local officers
in respect to both operational effectiveness and
individual parts of the accounting system. It is
suspected that while the accounting systems are
geared to budget compliance in all Police and Social
Service organisations in the U.K., the precise form
of the system and the importance of different
components in the system varies with local
circumstances' (p. 21)
This is undoubtedly a significant change in, and emphasis for, accounting
research endeavour and its conclusions.
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2.6 CONCLUSION 
The contents of this Chapter have been primarily concerned with key
underlying assumption underpinning our present accounting knowledge stock ;
to understand further what such insights are trying to achieve given the
analysis of Chapter 1 that this is not to do with the accounting system design
issues whichare of importance for this study (i.e. the sequential and related
processes of describing, prescribing and changing accounting systems in
enterprise contexts),
There are four summary points which can be drawn from the contents of this
Chapter before we turn to the implications of these for our still unfulfilled, but
dominant, concern.viz the relevance or irrelevance of accounting and other
knowledge for this study's dominant problem focus. Fistly the majority of
schools and sub-schools of thought can be classified as 'objectivism' and
'social systems theory' in the Burrell and Morgan sense. Burrell and Morgan
see these approaches 'dominated by abstracted empiricism' with heavy leanings
towards the approach adopted in the natural sciences. Clearly it is rather
generous to many of the earlier schools of thought to describe them in this way
since, as Mattessich (1980) p. 167/8) so perceptively points out most schools of
thought comirig into existence in the late 1960's early 1970's borrowed heavily
from ,and attempted to 'mimic', the natural sciences. Since,as we pointed out
in Chapter 1,most of the newer schools of thought in both management and
financial accounting came into existence after such dates they naturally fit
such a stereotype. However, as Mattessich points out,and the discussion on
the Rochester School of Accounting (Section 2.2) indicates,such a 'mimic' is
both extremely demanding and seriously underachieved.
One further point needs to be made which refers back again to the problems
of the 'middle ground'. In one sense there is really not that much difference
between the studies discussed in Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 all could be combined
and seen as 'abstracted empiricism'. All rely on cross sectional data and
generalisable conclusions -both clear signs of 'abstraction'. They are,
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however, separated because they show different emphases and in many ways
indicate how acocunting studies can 'cheat' (with their contingent rules) on
the natural science rulings to which they implicitly adhere while still
keeping up some degree of an appearance of 'rigorous scientific respectability'.
The second summary point, and somewhat connected with the above, is
the very real 'desperation to generalise' in the majority of accounting
schools of thought. All of the studies looked at in Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4
which are, it will be recalled, typical examples of all accounting schools of
thought except the 'impact of all aspects on accounting system design' school
(MB 41 in our coding — see Table 2.1.1.) have this basic tex‘desacy. •Tme:1‘
Pettigrew's 'pluralism' study (part of MB 41) sees generalisations as important
and necessary to legitimate the longtitudinal study adopted although somewhat
sceptical about need:
'Fortunately, generality is something over which the
researcher has a certain amount of control'
(Pettigrew, 1973, p. 269)
Only the symbolic interactionist approach of Tomkins and Colville stands out
as seeing generalisations as a secondary and even impossible consideration.
The third summary point is that all of the present schools of thought in
accounting are clustered in and around the bottom right quadrant of Burrell and
Morgan's framework. Most of the studies fit most appropriately into the
functionalist paradigm with its realist, positivist, determinist and nomothetic
assumptions about social science — its overarching concern for explanations
of the status quo, social order, consensus, social integration, solidarity,
need satisfaction and actuality. Only the symbolic interactionist approach of
Tomkins and Colville have broken out of this paradigm and somewhat 'crept'
over the borders into the interpretive quadrant with its change to working
under social science assumptions which are nominalist, antipositivist,
voluntarist and ideographic but still retaining similar assumptions about the
nature of society.
The fourth and final summary point, which is a natural extension of the
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third, is to note the emptiness of accounting schools of thought in the top
two quadrants in Burrell and Morgan's framework and consequently the absence
of a concern for, particularly radical, change. Undoubtedly there are a number
of individual studies which make moves towards the 'upper' quadrants (cf
Burchell, Clubb and Hopwood, 1981; Cooper and Sherer, 1982; Cooper 1983;
Puxty, Soo, Lowe and Laughlin, 1980; Chua, Laughlin, Lowe and Puxty, 1981;
Chua, 1982; Tinker, Merino and Niemark, 1982; Tinker, 1982) but the vast
majority of studies and schools in accounting are situated in the bottom half
of Burrell and Morgan's framework. As indicated in Chapter 1 change does appear
to be exogenous to accounting endeavour although our analysis of thinking in
the functionalist paradigm suggests this need not necessarily be the case.
However, inevitably by adopting a functionalist and an interpretive perspective,
the concern for change will always be curtailed, whether exercised or not,
to developing organisations as they stand rather than in any way calling for
a deeper evaluation of, and change in, such institutions.
These four summary points help to highlight the key issues which need to
be faced if we are to judge which, if any, of our present accounting knowledge
is relevant and upon which we can build upon to satisfy this study's dominant
concern. The primary issues which need to be faced are twofold. Firstly
should we be building on functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist or
radical structuralist thinking to satisfy this problem focus with all the
underlying ontological, epistemological, methodological etc. assumption which
come with such paradigmatic positions? Secondly which particular approach
inside the selected Burrell and Morgan paradigm constitutes the most fruitful
basis upon which to build to satisfy this problem focus?
It is to these questions we now turn in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 3 
AN ARGUMENT FOR AND THE NATURE OF A CRITICAL
THEORY APPROACH TO THE DESIGN OF ACCOUNTING
SYSTEMS
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
The argument and contents of Chapters 1 and 2 have lead us to asking some
fundamental questions concerning the appropriateness or otherwise of particular
assumption bases to satisfy this study's dominant concern. This Chapter is not
only addressed to presenting an answer to these questions but it is also
concerned with presenting a detailed methodological approach based in and
around and the assumption base chosen.
The contents of this Chapter therefore can be divided into two parts: the
first (Sections 3.1 and 3.2) containing an answer to the questions posed at the
end of Chapter 2; the second (Sections 3.3 to 3.5) which looks at critical
theory more generally and aspects of Habermas Critical Theory* more specifically
as an approach under the selected assumption base and as a way to satisfy the
methodological needs of this study's dominant concern.
The first part (Sections 3.1 and 3.2) presents an argument for an
approach for this study which is based on critical theory established in the
radical humanist paradigm of Burrell and Morgan's framework. As an aid to
establishing the key issues to be faced Section 3.1 sets Burrell and Morgan's
framework in its dynamic historical philosophy of knowledge context. This is
important since it grounds the issues to be faced with regard to justification
to one dominant question: do we need Kantian or Comtean accounting to satisfy
this study's concern? Thus Section 3.1 is solely concerned with setting up this
dominant question. Section 3.2 attempts to answer it and having answered it sets
* Throughout this Chapter we will use 'critical theory' as a collective term
for the various ideas and thoughts of all those connected with the Frankfurt
Institute of Social Research. On the other hand 'Critical Theory' will
always refer to a particular expression of this collective school of
thought.
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some supplementary questions (which also have their own historical roots
discussed in Section 3.1) answers to which, in the end, leads to a justification
for the use of critical theory in the contest of this study.
The second part (Section 3.3 to 3.5) does three things. Firstly it supplies
an understanding of the basic intentions, or underlying themes, of critical
theory. Secondly it shows how this underlying theme is completely compatible
with this study's dominant concern. This, of course, is yet another form of
justification for the use of critical theory. Thirdly Habermas' expression
of this dominant theme which is claimed to be the most developed alternative
available is expanded at length to formulate a model f or the design of accounting
systems in enterprise contexts. Section 3.3 discusses the first two of these
concerns and Sections 3.4 and 3.5 the third.
Thus the Chapter is a philosophical journey starting with some important
overarching questions and ending with some refined and detailed points which
only have any meaning and sense once the previous issues in the excursion have
been explored.
3.1 HISTORICALLY BASED SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE 
AND THEIR CONTEXT IN BURRELL AND MORGAN'S FRAMEWORK 
The following schools of thought in the philosophy of knowledge are not
intended, or claimed to be, exhaustive; they are selected on the basis of their
relevance in locating the roots of Burrell and Morgan's paradigms (particularly
the fugionalist and radical humanist ones), to allow a crystallisation of
the issues to be faced in making a case for critical theory in the context
of this study.
Burrell and Morgan's framework has clear historical roots in schools
of thought in the philosophy of knowledge which in turn supplies the
meaning to not only the horizontal axis (nature of social sciences) but the
vertical (nature of society) one as well. Such an appreciation gives greater
credence to their framework as well as supplying a much needed dynamic
context for their model. This in turn crystallises the issues to be faced more
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clearly in the nature and location of these paradigms as well as permitting
clear questions to be faced when one is deciding which paradigm is
appropriate - clearly this latter point is the guiding principle for the
introduction of this intended development.
An overview of the following discussion is presented in diagrammatic
form in Figures 3.1(1) and 3.1(2). Figure 3.1(1) presents, in summary form,
the history and philosophy of science in terms of major schools of thought
from early 1500 to the present day. Each school of thought is titled in a
way which is hopefully recognisable and in brackets below each are some of
the more dominant important proponents. Clearly many of the subtleties and
sub-schools of thought are not contained in this somewhat generalised picture.
This is, of course, recognised — it is a selective picture to give meaning to
the Burrell and Morgan's framework. Figure 3.1(2) picks up this theme and
locates each school of thought within such a framework highlighting respective
interrelationships. As can be seen the major shift and change occurred at
the age of enlightenment with the advent of German idealism particularly
through Kant's thinking. It is this change which supplies important
insights into the Burrell and Morgan framework and one which highlights the
major differences between the functionalist and the radical humanist
paradigms. However, this discussion is premature since first we must trace the
elements in Figures 3.1(1) and 3.1(2) more closely.
Scientific endeavour was not well developed in the early 1500's. Bacon
(1561-1626) is a typical and often quoted example of those early masters. He,
like so many of these early scientists, believed in:
'... a reasonable God, who had created a reasonable
universe and thus man, by use of his reason could
find out 'the universe's form' (Schaeffer, 1968, p.31)
Bacon, like other early scientists, believed in order and unity in the material
world and that man through scientific endeavour could discover this orderliness
despite his 'fall' from a relationship with God and the effect (if any) this
had either on the world he was investigating or his perceptual powers.
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Although Bacon can be seen as the rearguard of early science he can
also be seen as the vanguard of a movement which has come to be given the title
of 'rationalism'. Dominant in this school are Descartes (1596-1650), Spinoza
(1632-1677) and Leibniz (1646-1716). All took the major tenets of Bacon's
position if not all the Christian implications and believed in the orderliness
of the material world and the ability of reason to obtain an:
... absolute description of the world uncontaminated
by the experience of any observer' (Scruton, 1982, p. 14)
SoLeibniz, for instance, believed that it is possible to divide the world
into 'substances' (or as he called them 'monads') and 'properties' - the latter
being aspects of the former. The monads exist independent of the experience
of the observer but can be made known through, and discovered by, reason.
Rationalism was largely a continental movement but in Britain a very
Efferent school of thought which has come to be known as 'empiricism' was
becoming dominant. Notable proponents of this view were Locke (1632-1704),
Berkeley (1685-1753) and Hume (1711-1776). Empiricists argued a contrasting
'experience-oriented' view concerning the discovery of knowledge or as Brown
(1969) puts it:
'In contrast with the rationalists who tried to erect
. philosophical systems by means of reasoning on the
basis of allegedly self-evident truths, the empiricists
stressed the part played by experience in knowledge.
They argued that we have no ideas at all other than
those derived from experience which comes to us via
our senses. Statements (apart from those of pure
logic) can be known to be true or false only by
testing them in experience' (p. 60/61)
Mnm, for instance, personalised knowledge to such an extent that nothing could
be confirmed by anybody unless that person had actually 'experienced' the
phenomena in question.
These splits in the nature of scientific knowledge gave rise to two major
developments: the age of enlightenment as expressed particularly in German
idealism and the refinement of rationalism and empiricism into positivism.
Both of these developments are of profound significance for the structure of
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scientific knowledge more generally as well as for understanding the framework
of Burrell and Morgan. All more current schools of thought which can be
loosely classified as scientific can be traced back to these two major
developments. In addition without the introduction of German idealism three
out of the four paradigms in Burrell and Morgan's framework would not have
existed. Thus the following will concentrate in more depth on these two
developments and discuss more briefly the other schools of thought which have
come from such developments.
We will start by looking at the age of enlightenment and more particularly
the prominant figure of Kant (1724-1804). There are clearly other important
figures in this age of change (e.g. Rousseau and Voltaire in France and Lessing
in Germany) yet it is probably Kant who crystallised the intentions most
fully and upon whose insights most further schools have been built. Kant is
also important since his insights link to the rationist and empiricist traditions
and are built out of criticisms of these iaeas particularly those of leihniz
and Hume. Thus to understand the nature of these criticisms helps to appreciate
the reasons and justifications for what is depicted here as a fundamental
split in scientific knowledge.
It is in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason first published in 1781*, that
insight into these fundamental criticisms can be discovered. This critique
despite its title was primarily motivated by being very disturbed by Hume's
empiricist ideas, but, in Kant's critical analysis of Hume, he also fundamentally
challenged Leibniz's stand as well. To Kant neither experience nor reason
is alone able to provide knowledge. The first provides content without form,
the second form without content. Only in some appropriate synthesis is
knowledge possible. Such knowledge is genuine and legitimate in terms of
* See Kemp-Smith's (1929) translation of both first and second editions
of this critique.
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claims about an independent world; yet it is impossible to know this world
and the objects in it independent of the point of view of the observer.
Scruton (1982) puts the matter succinctly:
'Objects do not depend for their existence upon my
perceiving them; but their nature is determined
by the fact that they can be perceived. Objects
are not Leibnizian monads, knowable only to the
perspectivelesi stance of 'pure reason'; nor are
they Humean 'impressions', features of my own
experience. They are objective, but their character
is given by the point of view through which they can
be known' (p. 18)
This somewhat novel conception of truth and objectivity needs to be
understood further and can best be seen in the context of some of Kant's
interconnected terms and ideas with respect to knowledge. Kant maintained
that there are both a priori truths and a posteriori truths. The former
are truths 'independent of experience' and the latter truths derived
from experience.* A priori truths to Kant are either analytic (i.e. all
bachelors are unmarried) or synthetic (i.e. all bachelors are unfulfilled)
the latter saying something meaningful while the former is definitional. Kant
maintained that a priori synthetic knowledge is possible but always from the
perspective of the knower or knowers which in turn has implications for a
posteriori truth.
But how is synthetic a priori knowledge possible? This to Kant is the
fundamental question in metaphysics and can be answered by what he calls
'subjective' and 'objective' deductions. The subjective deduction arrives at
the actual cognitive processes of knowing, making judgements and deciding on
truth and falsity by the knower(s). The objective deduction consists in a
positive, critical and rigorous attempt by the knower(s) to establish the
content of a priori knowledge. What are the grounds for this knowledge as
* The following will concentrate on the a priori truths initially since
these supply the important context for understanding a posteriori
truths.
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distinct from the subjective faculties which allows us to call it knowledge?
littat are the presuppositions of experience? These deductions (transcendal*
deductions as Kant calls them leading to a theory of 'transcental idealism')
make synthetic a priori knowledge possible and legitimate.
Uncovering synthetic a priori knowledge also interacts and affects the
mature of a posteriori knowledge. If we uncover the presuppositions of our
'experience' then this clearly affects such experience not only by putting
it more clearly in a context but actually l maybe,changing the basis of the
experiential approach.
Allied to this is the problem of empirical existence. If all experience
has presuppositions to what extent is a posteriori knowledge 'appearances'
only as distinct from knowledge of 'things - in - themselves'. This has
clearly been a problem to Kantian followers since, as pointed out below,
Kant was not altogether clear as to whether anything actually exists at all.
In sum then Kant put forward a number of important landmarks and radical
issues. Firstly he showed the fallacy that a posteriori truths are the only
form of knowledge. This contradicts the empiricist stand. Secondly that it
is possible to arrive at synthetic a priori truths which are true to the
knower(s) doing the discovery through reflection, argument and critique. Such
truths also implicitly impinge and interact on the nature and design of a
posteriori truth which is true to the knowers but also possibly true per se.
Thirdly that contrary to the rationalists there is no such thing as universal
a priori knowledge concerning objects in the world discerned through 'pure
reason'. All a priori and a posteriori knowledge has to be seen in the
=text of the knower or knowers and his (their) perspectives.
* Defined by Scruton (1982) as some process which: '...'transcends' the
limits of empirical enquiry so as to establish the a priori conditions
of experience' (p. 23)
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These last two points, as we pointed out above, clearly have posed
some difficulties in those following Kantian thought since it is possible
to see in this that knowledge (particularly a posteriori knowledge) is nothing 
more than 'appearances' agreed to and accepted by the particular knower(s) -
subjective meanings in other words in the Burrell and Morgan sense. Kant was
not clear about this in his own mind (Scruton, 1982, p. 42) as to whether there
was anything which could be seen as a 'thing - in - itself' as distinct from
an agreed appearance. As a consequence many schools of thought following
from Kant have given different emphases to these 'levels of subjectivity',
in the Burrell and Morgan sense.
Two major schools of thought which give different emphases to this
subjectivism debate are what could be conveniently titled 'critical theory'
and 'phenomenology' - the former taking a more 'objectivist-subjectivist'
stand and the latter a more 'subjectivist-subjectivist' viewpoint.* What is
also interesting to note is the relationship between the levels of subjectivism
and the levels of critical reflection involved in the approaches. It is
probably true to say that Kant was more implicit rather than explicit about the
level of 'radicalness' in the design of synthetic a priori knowledge. What
seems to have happened is that those who have adopted an 'objectivist-subjectivist'
interpretation of Kant's work have also developed a more radical understanding
of the design of synthetic a priori knowledge.**
* The political economy of the later Marx is even more of an 'objectivist'
'objective' subjective approach, as are a number of other derivative
schools of thought from the 'phenomenology' wing. Many of the latter have
been omitted from the present discussion so as not to confuse the picture
or the points being made - but see Section 3.2.2 below for more details
on these approaches.
** We will pick up this important point and develop it a little further in
Section 3.2 below.
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Clearly these two schools are neither cohesive groups nor exhaustive
of the possible schools coming from Kant's basic insights. They are grouped
in this way partly because they have some recognisable meaning in the context
of the literature and relationships between dominant actors (see Figure 3.1 (1)
for details) and partly because they can be traceable back to, and reflect,
a fundamental lack of clarity in Kant's work.
Turning now to the second major development in the philosophy of science
following the somewhat unsatisfactory split between rationalism and empiricism
we find yet another dominant individual: Comte. Comte (1798-1857) like Kant
was concerned to integrate these streams but in a way which preserved the
essentially qualities of both rather than critically redesigning their contents.*
Comte's solution was in what he termed 'positivism'.
Comte believed that the history of the human race revealed three main
stages of development. The first, the theological, where there is a supposition
that being comes from the action of a supernatural person. The second, the
metaphysical, where the mind searches for 'abstract forces' behind phenomena. -
But in the third, final and most mature stages (the scientific or positive)
man's mind applies itself to the scientific study of the laws according
to which all things supposedly obey. Or as Comte (1853) himself defined this
'ultimate' state:
'In the final, the positive state, the mind has
given over the vain search after absolute notions,
the origin, and destination of the universe and
the causes of phenomena and applies itself to the
study of their laws, i.e. the invariable relations
of succession and resemblance' (Vol. 1 pp. 1-2)
Thus to Comte this third and final stage was the ultimate and to which, over
time,alldisciplines gravitate towards, even though at different speeds. Thus
his hope, and expectation, was that there would be, in the end, a •positive science
* A classical integration rather than Hegelian synthesis in other words.
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of society (which he called sociology) which he eagerly anticipated.
Comte's concern therefore was with the nature of this 'ultimate' level
of knowledge which of course had no semblance of the theological or metaphysical
but was located in an amalgam of:
'... both the empiricist and rationalist traditions'
(Habermas, 1978, p. 4)
As will be recalled the empiricist tradition maintains the dominant importance
of experience and perception through the senses to discover facts. Comte
concurred with this basic view but maintained that rationalistic thinking in
conjunction with observation was vital. To Comte, as Habermas (1978) points out,
'Methodological certainty is just as important as
sense certainty' (p. 75)
Thus much of Comte's endeavour was to arrive at a 'unity of method' - the
positive method. The conglomerate and interacting relationship between method
and substance and its affect on knowledge is succinctly captured by Habermas
(1978):
'Science asserts the priority of method over substance,
because we can reliably inform ourselves about substance
only with the aid of scientific models of procedure.
The certainty of knowledge demanded by positivism thus
means simultaneously the empirical certainty of sensory
evidence and the methodological certainty of obligatory
unitary procedure' (p. 75)
The basic tenets of Comte have more or less lived on to this day somewhat
unscathed through 'logical positivism' and 'instrumentalism' and still can be
traceable in particularly 'realism' and to a lesser extent in 'theoretical
realism' (see Figure 3.1 (1)). As Kolakowski (1972) points out probably the
high point of positivism came during and soon after Comte's death:
'Positivism dominated the spirit of the age to such an
extent that even Kantians sought to interpret Kant -
or to amputate his thoughts - in such a way as to retain
only what was compatible with a broadly conceived
positivism'. (p. 122)
However, doubts and a re-assertion of Kantian insights led to the critical
schools of thought of 'empirio criticism' (of Avenarius and Mach) and
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'conventionalism'* (of Duhem and Le Roy) during the later part of the
nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries. This led however to
another high point in positivism with the emergence of the logical positivists
in the 1920's particularly in the Vienna Circle which has in turn given way
to the 'instrumentalist' and 'realist' schools of thought in the sense used
in the discussion of the Rochester School of accounting thought in Chapter 2.
The latest member to this family of positivistic approaches is what Keat and
Urry (1982) call 'theoretical realism' building on particularly the insights
of Harre (cf 1970) and it is important to make one or two points about this
school of thought in the context of this discussion.
Keat and Urry's 1982 postscript to their 1975 work on Social Theory as
Science like so many eminent postscripts** provide valuable insights into
what the authors were originally saying and how they have changed. Keat and
Urry's postscript supplies just such insights and makes some extremely
important summary points concerning their newly termed 'theoretical realism
(TRhereafter) and how it differs from realism and instrumentalism which
presumably is one form of what they call empiricism ***. TR to Keat and
Urry (1982) has four major distinguishing marks which separates it out from
traditional positivism:
* Which edges towards but holds back from a phenomenologist approach.
** For instance Kuhn or Habermas
*** It is assumed Keat and Urry relate these two in this way although
their language is a little loose on these connections.
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'First TR rejects the positivist limitation of
scientific ontology to the observable 	
second ... TR rejects the positivist requirement
of definining the theoretical vocabulary of rules
linking it with observational terms... Third
TR denies the adequacy of positivist analyses of
scientific laws as statements of universal
regulations.... Fourth,in place of these basically
Humean views of explanation (and causation), TR
maintains that scientific theories explain
observable phenomena by describing the mechanisms
and structures through which various often un -
observable entities possess the 'power' to generate
these occurrences' (p. 231 and 232)
These are neither realist nor instrumentalist and certainly not positivist
intentions. Thus Keat and Urry have to coin a new name: TR. Even though
these tenets smack of Kantian overtones Keat and Urry are keen to disavow
any connection with idealism and see their position firmly in the 'empiricist'
tradition which they minimally define as:
'... consisting of the following claims: that the
truth or falsity of scientific theories cannot be
established by a priori argument alone (thus the
rejection of traditional epistemological ration-
alism); that scientific theories must be evaluted
by reference to their consistency or inconsistency
with the perceptual information acquired by humans
through the operation of their sensory equipment;
and that there is therefore a central role in
scientific inquiry for the testing of theories in
terms of their consequences for perceptually
determinable states of affairs. And we suggest
that, in this minimal sense of term, TR can properly
be regarded as 'empiricist', as can positivism.'
(p. 233)
Now there are some problems relating all this together. On the one hand
Keat and Urry are, to use Kant's terms, agreeing that synthetic a priori
knowledge exists but on the other apparently denying its existence. This is
clearly a difficult position to hold because essentially it is an attempt at
bringing Kant and Comte together which really doesn't appear possible. However
it does allow these authors to evaluate and see both Marx and Habernas*, both
of whom come from a Kantian rather than a Comtean tradition, in the context of
* Keat (1981) is exclusively concerned with Habermas' insights.
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this somewhat uneasy amalgam of TR which attempts to 'bridge' both
traditions. The success of their evaluations must be seen in the context
of the validity of the tool they are using which must in the end be open
to question.
Before closing this Section with a brief discussion on the positioning
of these schools of thought in Figure 3.1(2) a word needs to be said about
the pragmatists approach of the American's Peirce and James. This basically
is traditionless it takes a bit from here and there in its practical, down-to-
earth, 'getting-on-with-life' approach. Kolakowski (1972) puts the context of
this somewhat sardonically as follows:
'After a period marked by the dominance of trans-
cendental idealism and British versions of
Hegelianism the United States produced a philosophical
style that long enjoyed the reputation of being
'typically American' (p. 181/2)
Finally referring to Figure 3.1(2) we have in this diagram attempted to
position these various schools of thought in Burrell and Morgan's framework.
The positioning is clearly meant to be more indicative than necessarily
accurate. Perhaps the key point to note is the positioning of Kantian and
Comtean insights. Basically these are depicted in the corners of respectively
the radical humanist and functionalist paradigms. They are, in these positions,
the classical opposites of each other since: neither works under any similar
boundary assumption. They are positioned where they are in the Burrell and
Morgan framework because Comtean approaches assume order and regularity in
the outer world which one is subservient to in observational practices. Kantian
approaches on the other hand rests more on beliefs and possibilities which can
affect both understanding of, and reaction to, the world 'outside'. Change in
this sense is always possible. A natural interpretation of these two approaches
in the Burrell and Morgan sense is as depicted in Figure 3.1 (2).
To a large extent having positioned the core the 'spokes' naturally arch
out in the directions suggested. Three comments need to be made,howeverlwith
regard to some of the less obvious positionings. Firstly although 'empirio
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criticism' and 'conventionalism' are clearly pushing towards a more
subjective interpretation of the processes of science it is difficult to
lam whether in any sense one is more subjective than another and whether
either actually cross over into the interpretive paradigm. Secondly it is
difficult to accurately position 'pragmatism'. However, it does seem
appropriate to see this as part of the functionist paradigm with its practical
functional concerns and tendencies towards more subjective interpretations,
but with the pragmatist Mead forming an interesting and complex link to the
phenomenologists.* Thirdly the positioning of 'theoretical realism' and
the connections to it are more problematic. As depicted above it does seem
to sit somewhat uneasily between the functionalist and radical structuralist
paradigms. It's concern with the unobservable, with power etc. and with
observation, rigour and understanding etc. and its rejection of idealism
would all seem to point to this somewhat ambivalent positioning. As to
linkages there is a clear line and relationship to realism and the whole
positivist tradition. Yet there is also a possible link through what could
be called the later Marx which is normally dated from around 1846 following
his somewhat critical study of idealism.** Whether the later Marx did or
did not adopt theoretical realism in his work is open to debate but certainly
Keat and Urry would claim so.
* See section 3.2.2 below for more details on this.
** This study (The German Ideology) is seen by Burrell and Morgan as a
fundamental break in Marx's commitments away from Hegelian dialetics.
In fact it is the ideas of the later Marx which to Burrell and Morgan
constitutes the radical structuralist paradigm which we have depicted
as 'political economy'.
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This then concludes a far too brief (to give justice) analysis of
major schools of thought in the philosophy of science. It has hopefully
achieved what it set out to achieve which is to trace the roots of primarily
the Burrell and Morgan paradigms. The polar divide is fundamentally between
Kantian and Comtean. The next Section will discuss which of these, in what
form, constitutes an appropriate basis for satisfying this study's concern.
Before moving to this it is worth reflecting on the insights of this
Section in the context of the dominant functionalist thinking in accounting
which we discussed at length in Chapter 1 and 2. In general we could
conclude that accounting thought has fundamentally followed a Comtean
tradition. - Kantian developments have been virtually non-existent. But
this is not surprising when one looks at the development patterns of other
social science disciplines which have similar dominant Comtean traditions.
This is not intended to be a derogatory judgement it is merely an Observation
which shows the greater standing and support given to Comtean as against
Kantian thought and how one may well be 'swimming against a powerful tide'
to call for a universal epistemological shift from the majority view (Comtean)
to the minority one (Kantian). It is for this reason the following Section
is not calling for such a radical shift it is rather facing this possibility
in terms of relevance to this study's concern.
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3.2 KANTIAN OR COMTEAN ACCOUNTING AND OTHER QUESTIONS 
The following discussion will be addressed to two fundamental questions.
Firstly with respect to this study's concern do we need a Kantian or Comtean
form of accounting in the sense used in Section 3.1? Secondly,given an
answer to this,what sort of Kantian or Comtean derivative or school of
thought is required? Section 3.2.1 answers the first question and Section
3.2.2 the second.
It is a purpose oriented analysis rather than some more abstract
discussions on the truth or falsity of the various positions. In so doing
it begs the question as to whether anything is true or false per se. On
the one hand by seeing certain approaches better than others does not deny
the possible existence of one approach which is true but maybe not relevant 
for a purpose. On the other hand by adopting this approach could imply the
'relative' nature of all knowledge systems. The following leans more
towards this latter interpretation but will not be drawn into a discussion
on what is essentially an unresolved problem in the philosophy of knowledge.
3.2.1 Kantian or Comtean?
Turning to the first question on whether Kantian or Comtean accounting
is an appropriate basis for the design of processes of describing, prescribing
and changing practices it is necessary to remind ourselves initially of the
major differences between the two systems of thought. With an eye to the
purpose in hand and with some acknowledged simplifying of complex ideas
Table 3.2.1 presents a comparison between the two systems. This Table centres
around the differences concerning the assumed contexts (on which inquires
are to be conducted) and the different models and outcomes of inquires with
regard to such contexts.
Table 3.2.1 is simply a focussed summary of the more detailed discussion
concerning Kantian and Comtean systems of thought in Section 3.1 above. Both
are concerned with certain phenomena which we have called in Table 3.2.1
a 'world'. To the Kantian such a world is part synthetic a priori and part
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a posteriori always interpreted through the knowers by reflexive reason,
observation and discourse and always potentially open to be changed. To the
Comtean such a world is orderly, existing and outside of the observer which
needs to be understood and controlled so as to permit survival and preservation
of the human race. Such a world needs to be discovered through essentially
non-reflexivestrictly ordered reasoning processes and controlled observation
to arrive at general predictions and explanations leading to technical
control.
But which basic system of thought is more appropriate for the design of
accounting system in practice - for the processes of describing, prescribing
and changing these systems? To answer this we must initially remind ourselves
again of how we have defined these systems. Basically we have seen the
accounting system as an enterprise based financially oriented language
system. The crucial question therefore is: is this language system a
universal ordered phenomena or a 'specific-to-the-enterprise' system. If it
is the former then clearly we take a Comtean approach if it is the latter
we adopt a Kantian view.
Accounting is but a subset of language (cf. Jain, 1973; Belkaoui, 1978;
Laughlin, 1981) more generally and thus there must be lessons to be learned
from language theorists with respect to this basic question. Basically
there are two fundamental positions held by language theorists which are
encapsulated in the early and later Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's early
work (1922) maintained that there was some ideal form of language to which
all natural languages should emulate. Such work was, of course, much welcomed
by Comtean theorists particularly by the logical positivists of the Vienna
circle but much to the consternation of Wittgenstein as Kalakowski (1972)
points out. Such a basis gave natural support to the positivists more
recent developments into language and also their basic ethos of universality
claims. Wittgenstein's later work (1953), however, rejected all his early
work and maintained that ordinary language had its own, often unique, meaning
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to those who were using it and such was both natural and appropriate having
no need to refer to some allusive universal model. This clearly has Kantian
overtones and is undoubtedly the dominant approach in the philosophy of
language today (cf Austin, 1961; Searle, 1969). Wittgenstein's later work
has also given meaning and impetus to the many schools of thought in the
'hermeneutic' tradition which links up with what we have termed Kantian
'phenomenology'.*
The claim to universality in language therefore is not the normal view
by language theorists even though some form of generality is not ruled out.
Katz (1966), for instance, building on the later Wittgenstein maintains that
there are some quite abstract generalisable qualities in all natural languages.
These ,combined with 'local' aspects constitute each and every linguistic
description. Or as Katz (1966) puts it:
...every linguistic description has a common part
consisting of the set of linguistic universals and
a variable part consisting of the generalisations
that hold only for the given language' (p. 109)
However ) the important point to note is that such common elements are highly
general and abstract basically to do with structural matters (e.g. 'every
sentence of a natural language contains both a verb and a noun phrase subject
to that verb; their exists a very small number of fixed, universal phonetic
features etc' (Katz, 1966, p. 10)). In this sense it is an outgrowth and
development of the later Wittgenstein ideas rather than a return to his
early understanding of language.
If this is the approach language theorists are adopting (i.e. a derivative
of a Kantian approach) and accounting is a form of language then logically
the latter should follow the former. Certainly some have been pushing for
this approach (cf. Mattessich, 1964/77, 1970, 1972, 1980; Laughlin, 1977, 1981)
* Further discussion on this point will be made below.
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but few indeed have followed such a lead. This of course is to be expected
given the dominance of functionalist (Comtean) thinking in accounting. However,
it is surprising that given accounting has long been seen as a form of language
that accounting theorists have, in the main, consistently failed to see,
learn from and use the insights forthcoming in the philosophy of language.
Such insights persuasively call for Kantian rather than Comtean developments.
Although this can, and possibly should, be taken as a general and far
reaching criticism of accounting developments it will not be pursued here;
rather we will return to our main theme concerning whether Kantian or Comtean
insights are relevant for this study's concern. The conclusion must be if
we are interested in accounting systems in enterprises and if these are
language systems of such enterprises and if such latquage sustems at as tXya
philosophy of language depicts them then Kantian rather than Comtean developments
must be sought. This is indeed our standpoint.
3.2.2 Which Kantian Derivative?
If we are to adopt a Kantian approach for this study which is the most
appropriate derivative? This is, as will be recalled, the second question
of this Section. In Section 3.1 we made the choice basically between three
possibilities: either 'critical theory' or 'phenomenology' or 'political
economy' which of course reflected respectively a radical humanist, interpretive
and radical structuralist perspective in the Burrell and Morgan sense. However,
as we pointed out in Section 3.1 although this is a meaningful classification
it is not an exhaustive understanding since a number of other schools and sub-
schools are contained within these broad categories. Thus to be exhaustive
in our choice we at least need to be aware of these various alternatives
although the basic decision process probably still remains the same.
A somewhat more detailed but still not exhaustive depiction of schools of
thought coming originally from Kantian thought is presented in Figure 3.2.2 and
is briefly discussed below. The two key developments coming from Kant can be
traceable to Fichte (1762-1814) and Hegel (1770-1831),along with the 'young
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Hegelians' particularly Marx*, both gave different emphases to the more obscure
and unclear elements (on subjectivity and radicalness) in Kant's thinking.
Fichte can be seen as an early 'transcendental phenomenologist' and Hegel an
early 'critical theorist' or in terms of Burrell and Morgan's framework founder
members of the interpretive and radical humanist paradigms respectively. From
these leaders further schools and sub-schools have been developed which link in
with developments particularly from what could be called 'disillusionised
functionalists' (e.g. Mead and Weber). But an understanding of Fichte and Hegel
and the differences between them are key in making sense of all the schools of
thought which can be connected with these two Kantian followers. Thus the
following will look more closely at Fichte and Hegel and will discuss somewhat
more briefly the schools of thought which can be connected to them.
To understand reality, to Fichte,required understanding the nature and
structure and functioning of the conscious mind. Something exists but what
we see is not some actuality but the reflection of the projection which comes
from our own conscious mind. Thus what we see is nothing more than our original
projection. We see what we want to see depending on what we wish to project onto
the outer world in the first place. Thus any change in this projection must
bemediated through the conscious mind of the projector. Change in phenomena,
even though existing, but without meaning, is neither contemplated nor possible
inFichtean thinking. Taken together Fichte gave Kant a highly subjectivist
mist and in so doing removed the more radical change-in-the-world possibility
in Kantian thinking.
Such basic thinking was taken up and developed further by Husserl (1859-
1938) to give greater strength to 'transcendental phenomenology' as a school of
thought. Husserl's notion of 'intentionality' (i.e. the idea that consciousness
always has an object which constitutes it) is both central to his thinking as well
as implicit in Fichte's understanding. Reality is not constructed by consciousness
* When talking about Hagel in the remainder of this paragraph it is assumed
this includes the 'young Hagelians' as well.
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it is revealed to it through the act of intentionality. Such is a refinement
rather than a denial of Fichtean thought and like this walks a tight rope
between the existence or non-existence of objective reality.
There are at least three major schools of thought which can be directly
traceable to the insights of Fichte and Husserl which vary in terms of the
assumptions under which they work. Firstly there is, what Burrell and Morgan
call, 'existential phenomenology' particularly in the sense expressed through
the work of Schutz who was concerned with understanding how individuals interpreted
their every-day life. Second there is the French existentialist movement notably
led by Sarte which has similarities to the insights of Schutz but also
differences. Rather than just understanding, Sarte was concerned to demonstrate
the 'pathos' of such constructions in the hope of bringing change to such views.
The third development is in terms of ethnomethodology as particularly expressed
by Garfinkel concerned with not only understanding what people hold to be
reality but also the more implicit assumptions behind these views in the context
of the social roles they hold.
Allied to these more directly traceable schools of thought from Kantian
ideas further looser connected schools can be discerned which feed into the above
discernible areas. The 'hermeneutics' school of thought which has been given
meaning by Dilthey, Weber, Gadamer and the later Wittgenstein is a typical
example. This language based school has referents in both idealism and positivism
although probably it is built on a rejection of positivism rather than a full
acceptance of idealism - certainly this would be the case with the later
Wittgenstein. Likewise the 'symbolic interactionist' approach of the somewhat
liberal pragmatist Mead and his exponents Blumer and Kuhn can be seen in a similar
light. However, both Dilthey and Mead, the two leaders in these respective
areas, both recognised and drew upon the insights of the enlightenment in the
formulation of their respective viewpoints. But they, particularly in hermeneutics,
added a new dimension to the insights of the various more 'mainstream' Fichtean
schools of thought as the directional arrows in Figure 3.2.2 indicate.
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The second developmental stream of thought from Kant is, as pointed out
above, traceable to Hegel (1770-1831) and the 'young Hegelians' (particularly
the younger Marx) and it is to their insights we now turn. Hegel's ideas
like so many German philosophies, is difficult to fully understand and thus
the following can only touch on some of his more complex thinking with respect
to particularly epistemology. There are three major elements in Hegel's
epistemological system: first knowledge which comes from consciousness and
comprehends 'spirit'; second this 'spirit' (Geist) which is expressed though
and can potentially be seen in reality; third reality itself which is the
outworking of spirit. Consciousness to Hegel is both part of spirit itself
as well as potentially seeking for a comprehension of spirit which is apart from
the seeker. The state of absolute knowledge is when human consciousness becomes
aware of its location within 'absolute spirit' and 'absolute reality' (the
perfect society) reflects such comprehension. In this sense consciousness and
the external world are viewed as two sides of the same reality. They are
locked together in what Hegel calls a dialectical relationship where each defines
and influences the other by a critical process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis
until the absolute states of knowledge, spirit and reality are reached. In this
happy state perfection is reached and subject and object or thought and being are
one and the same.*
Hegel was thus concerned to interpret Kant in a more radical change oriented
way than Fichte. Part of the reason could be the greater confidence in the
existence of 'things-in-themselves' but a more likely reason could be Hegel's
belief in both the presence of an 'absolute spirit' and the inevitable historical
dialectical process between thought and being to arrive at such an ideallic
state.
* This is of course the classical 'philosophy of identity' so often associated
with Hegel.
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Hegelian followers were divided on their attitudes concerning the
presence of 'absolute spirit' which is explainable by Hegel's lack of clarity
on the matter and a somewhat simplistic view that somehow the Prussia of his
day was the embodiment of the perfect society. The so called 'right-Hegelian's
retained the belief whereas the 'Left' or 'young Hegelians' took the view that
the 'absolute spirit' did not exist waiting to be discovered but had to be
created by man.
The young Marx and others (particularly Feuerback) maintained that there
was no 'absolute' above and beyond man - religion and the state were not
manifestations of the absolute spirit but man made and open to change. All
objectivications in the social world were man made according to Marx and
Feuerbach and through the Hegelian processes of dialectics and historical
analysis man could become aware of through his conscious processes what he
has created, why he has created it, the dangers of it as it stands leading to
suitable emancipatory changes.
Whether Hegel or Marx have captured what is true and lasting is not
important at present. What is important is to note the radicalised interpretation
of Kant through Hegel and the younger Marx and the differences between this
development and the Fichtean one. The result has been the creation of a
number of schools of thought from this line of development which are markedly
different from those which have come from the Fichtean line.
The first school of thought which comes closest to the Kant - Hegel -
young Marx development is what we have called 'critical theory'. Such a school
of thought can be discerned both in the writings of these and also others but
as a school it probably got its primary impetus from the development of the
Institute of Social Research founded in Frankfurt in 1923. It is from the
members and associates of this Institute (particularly Horkheimer, Adorno,
Marcuse and Habermas) that the greatest impetus and focus for critical theory
can be found. It was the intention of these main figures of the Institute:
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'... to learn from and synthesise aspects of the work
of, among others, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Weber, Lukacs
and Freud. For Habermas certain traditions of Anglo-
American thought are also important, especially
linguistic philosophy and the recent philosophies of
science ... the aim being to lay the foundation for an
exploration in an interdisciplinary research context,
of questions concerning the conditions which make
possible the reproduction and transformation of society,
the meaning of culture and the relation between the
individual, society and nature' (Held, 1980, p.16)
The remaining schools of thought which come from this Kant - Hegel -
young Marx line are those most closely associated to the later Marx. Whether
there really is a young and later Marx in quite the extreme sense of a
Wittgenstein model is open to considerable dispute. However, his publication
in 1846 of 'The German Ideology' did mark a change in his thinking or rather
what he considered was important to write about. Marx's later work is based
around:
... the political economony of capitalism. 'Structures',
'contradictions' and 'crises' take over from the concepts
of 'consciousness', 'alienation' and 'critique' reflected
in his earlier work' (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 329)
In general as Burrell and Morgan so perceptively point out:
'Marx's overall change in orientation was aptly expressed
by Lasselle, one of his contemporaries who described him
as 'Hegel turned economist, a Ricardo turned Socialist'.
This description summarises succinctly the two developments
which characterise the thought of his later years, in which
he moved away from a radical idealism towards a radical
interpretation of 'bourgeois', 'positivist' economics' (p. 329)
Whether this is a development of his original ideas or a particular
outworking of these in an important empirical area is difficult to discern.
However, there certainly was a change in emphasis and a change in paradigms
in the Burrell and Morgan sense. To the later Marx 'structures' were independent
of individual consciousness which existed and could and should and would
(because of contradictions inherent in them) change through crises.
There are two major schools of thought which come from this later Marxian
thinking along with a possible third. The first which Figure 3.2.2 calls
'Russian social theory' is later Marx in the Engels-Plekhanov tradition which
gave greater meaning and importance to 'dialectic historical materialism'. The
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second ('contemporary Mediterranean Marxism') is more in the tradition of a
Leninist interpretation of the later Marx which attempted to recreate his
thinking more fully in the context of Hegelian thought on the grounds that
Russian social theory had mistakenly emphasised certain aspects at the cost
of underemphasising others. The third possible school of thought is 'conflict
theory' which is a combination of the somewhat all pervasive thoughts of
Weber and the later Marx. It comes most obviously out of the functionalist
paradigm and Weber's critical insights but links up with aspects of both Engels'
and Lenin's interpretations of Marxism.
This far too brief exposure of derivative schools of thought from Kant at
least makes plain the crucial issues which must be decided upon if an answer
to the second question, with which this present Section opened, is to be
discovered. The fundamental issue to be resolved is whether it is right to
adopt a more objectivist change oriented interpretation of Kant (Hegel and
the Young Hegelians) or a more subjectivist more status quo interpretation
(Fichte and Husserl). Clearly there are many subsidiary questions that have to
be faced (e.g. do we adopt a symbolic interactionist approach as distinct from
a transcendental phenomenological alternative) but the fundamental issues remains:
are we to be Hegelian or Fichtean Kantians?
Ultimately there is no right or wrong answer to this either generally or
specifically with respect to this study's concern. However, an argument can be
mde out for this study's concern that whatever approach is adopted it must not
curtail flexibility with respect to both understanding and the possibility for
critique and change. On the basis of this a Hegelian approach looks most
appropriate since it keeps open the possibility for both subjective and objective
interpretations of the 'real world' as well as encouraging critical analysis
and possible change. A Fichtean approach reduces both the possibility of
objective existence as well as critique and change. In a similar manner the
later Marxist schools of thought in the Hegelian tradition curtail flexibility
of approach by their concentration very much on economic structures. This is not
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to say that such insights are unimportant but rather, in this author's opinion,
that these later Marx works are an explicit outworking of the young Marxist
ideas making much of the flexible general insights of the latter too regimented
and detailed. In addition, apart from being only concerned with economic
systems, Marx's later works are not time invariant but time specific to the
capitalism of the latter part of the nineteenth century as Habermas (1976, 1979)
so persuasively argues.
The answer therefore to this second question is that an approach based on
critical theory should be able to satisfy this study's concern, in the light of
the above discussion due to its ability to handle both subjective and objective
interpretations of reality and its potential for encouraging critique and
change.
Although such qualities are vital for this study it could be argued that
they have a more general applicability to all accounting endeavour. No matter
how one defines the nature of accounting or how one sees the accounting
mission the basic questions will always be: is this a !subjective' or
'objective' phenomena and do we want to only understand or not only to understand
but change as well. If one is undecided about how to answer these questions
the most obvious approach which keeps flexibility in the forthcoming answers is
one based on critical theory. In such a way a universal case can be made for
the adoption of this approach.
However, we are not pushing for this universal viewpoint our concern, as
we have indicated on many occasions, is with an approach which is relevant
to this study. But such concern with its dominant interest in accounting
practice and the need to see 'theory' in such a context is, in it's own way,
or so we would claim, central to the accounting endeavour. If this is so then
there are grounds for making critical theory more central too...
We will not pursue this line of argument here but the following Sections
(3.3 and 3.4) are based on the premise that critical theory is relevant for this
study certainly and maybe more generally.
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3.3 SOME INSIGHT INTO THE HISTORICAL AND THEMATIC CONTEXT OF CRITICAL 
THEORY 
Despite the variety of ideas which could legitimately be called critical
theory one theme is common to all: the need for change in society and the
necessity for theoretical insights both to give leadership for, as well as to
be geared towards, such change. It is this theme, with it's roots in not only
Kant, Hegel and the young Marx but others also, which underpins all critical
theory. However, it is this dominant theme and the adequate expression of it
in theory-led practical action which has caused the greatest problem for, as
well as a great deal of scepticism about, critical theory.
Such an underlying theme a the details on its nature and the problems in
its expression needs to be understood before any model based on this approach
is presented. Without such an analysis there is a tendency to give far too
much credence to what is essentially a good idea rather than a tried, tested
and sophisticated approach. Thus this Section is addressed to such a
contextual analysis while the following sections sets up a model based on some
of the ideas of Habermas which is firmly set in the issues, problems and
factors raised in the following.
Before embarking on this initial analysis it is important to reflect on
the relevance of critical theory's dominant theme for the accounting concerns
of this study. Clearly not enough is known about this theme at this stage to
be categoric and exhaustive in such a reflection. But we certainly know more
than we did in Section 3.2 where we discussed the relevance of the 'roots' of
critical theory for this study. We now have some understanding of the nature
of the 'plant' which comes from these 'roots' and we can, even at this stage,
make two points on the relevance of this theme for the accounting concerns of
this study and in so doing provide yet more justification for the relevance of
critical theory in this context.
Firstly critical theory puts the need for change as central: it-starts
from the basis thatnot everything is 'ideal' and 'good'. In many ways it
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is even more aggressive than that: everything is not ideal and not good
and needs to be changed so that human welfare can be advanced. Such a
strand of thought as applied to accounting practices is central to this
study's concern. This study starts from the premise that such practices
are not in an optimal state but require change and development, not in the
limited functionalist sense - although such partial change isn't ruled out -
but possibly in a way which alters such practices beyond recognition. Such
a possibility cannot be ruled out and is at the heart of critical theory.
Secondly critical theory links the desgin of theory directly to practice
and change. Theoretical knowledge is not valued for its own sake in critical
theory but its very nature and design is both claimed to be necessary for, and
directed towards, practical action and change. In a like manner we have looked
at our concern in terms of the processes of sequentially describing, prescribing
and changing accounting practices with the theory part of this cycle (description
and prescription) similarly allied to practice and change and having no meaning
outside of such. However, it is interesting to note that critical theory does
not use the terms description and prescription to depict their theory part and
we along with them will move away from this language as the following sections
unfold. The reason that critical theory does not use these terms, as will
become apparent, is because of the heavy 'scientific' overtones in their
everyday meaning and the inevitability and necessity for prescriptive elements
in the process of any form of description.
Thus like our analysis of the 'roots' these two points demonstrates the
relevance of the impressions of the 'plant'. We now need to turn to a
development of this dominant theme in critical theory and the problems in its
outworking both to set the scene for the specifics in the following Section and
to allow a final judgement on relevance.
Critical theory as developed through the Institute of Social Research is
grounded in Marxism but highly critical of it as well. This apparent
inconsistency can be understood if one sets the creation of the Institute
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in its historical context. Between 1917 and 1920 Marxist theory and its
composite expression in revolution and change looked secure and accurate.
February 1917 saw the end of Tsarism in Russia and the rise of the Bolshevik
party; 1918 saw the end of the German imperial system and, even though the
more establishment democrats took over power, all number of more radical
socialist 'rumblings' were clearly apparent. In Hungary a Soviet Republic
was established after the bourgeois government resigned. In Austria and
Italy socialist rumblings and strikes were frequent and apparent.
However, such developments lost momentum from around 1920. In Europe,
particularly in Germany, Italy and Austria, the revolutionary socialist
advances were checked. The 'inevitable' revolution and overthrow of the
ruling classes did not occur. On the contrary Nazism and Fascism rather than
Marxism was gaining ground. Even in Russia where revolution had occurred
things were not developing in the way Marxist theory predicted. Deviations
from the Leninist pathway were apparent and the seedlings of moves towards
'Stalinization' were clearly to be seen.
It was in this spirit of a need for change and the apparent inoperability
of Marxism to bring this about that provided the backcloth for critical theory
and more specifically the motivation for Felix Weil to sponsor the creation of
the Institute of Social Research in 1923. The first director, Carl Grunberg
still sought solutions to these issues from later Marxism. However, the
second director, MaxHorkheimervappointed in 1931 at the height of Stalinism
and Naiism took a very different view on Marxist thought and gave critical
theory much of its present identity, as well as gathering together many
of its most important proponents.* Horkheimer's inaugral address set up
the basic agenda for critical theory. Such an agenda, as Held (1980) points
out had three somewhat interconnected points or themes:
* Particularly Adorno (to whom Habermas was a research assistant in later
years), Marcuse, Fromm and Pollock.
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'... first ... suggests the necessity of re-specifying
'the great philosophical questions' in an inter-
disciplinary research programme. The second theme,
more implicit but made clearer in later essays, is a
call for a rejection of orthodox Marxism and its
substitution by a reconstructed understanding of
Marx's project. The third emphasises the necessity
for social theory to explicate the set of inter-
connections (mediations) that make possible the
reproduction and transformation of society, economy,
culture and consciousness' (p. 33)
These three themes are interlinked - the first two being a necessary
explication of, as well as clearly related to, the third. For instance
Horkheimer set on the agenda of the Institute broad based philosophical
questions but not for their own sake but rather because they were part of the
social theory which would lead to the 'transformation of society'. Likewise
he, like other critical theorists, was sympathetic to the important (Marxist)
concern with this basic relationship between theory and practical change
but felt its particularly expression through historical materialism failed
to achieve the desired result. It is in this sense, of course, that critical
theory is both sympathetic and unsympathetic to Marxism which needs to be
seen in the historical context of thwarted change.
Such a grand agenda with its central concern for the 'transformation of
society' and the necessity to design theory in such a context was the major
motivation behind the ideas in critical theory but also the one which has
also caused the most problems. Rather than transforming German society
brItheimer and the other prominent members of the Institute were expelled by
the Nazi government of Germany. They took up residence in New York in
1935 and California in 1941. The gap between theory and practice became
more and more marked since not only were they unsure about which society
they were trying to change but were unaware of all the subtleties of this
somewhat alien American culture as well as being unsure of changes in the
German culture following the outbreak of the Second World War. In such
situations a retreat to theoretical viewpoints was the expected reaction but
this in turn caused a lot of problems to the critical theorists of the
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Institute due to their dominant view on the necessity for such theorising
to have practical expression.
The way the critical theorists coped with this dilemma, given the
situation they were in whether in America or in Germany on their return in
the 1950's, was to concentrate on the theoretical pre-conditions for change
and development. Instead of transforming society directly their involvement
was at one stage removed namely to highlight the important issues which need
to be faced and resolved if transformation is to occur.
This partial retreat from the actual struggle for emancipation to the
preconditions for it is necessary but not a necessary and sufficient satisfaction
of critical theory's dominant concern. It is clearly necessary to explore the
important preconditions which could allow or prevent emancipation, transformation
and change but unless these are actually tested out in actual processes of
change it is difficult to know whether the correct preconditions have been
specified.
It is this retreat into preconditions and the uncertainty concerning the
adequacy and accuracy of these for the emancipation and consequent transformation
of society which has dominated the criticisms of critical theory. These
criticisms have primarily come from those who might label themselves Marxist
who while agreeing with critical theory's emancipatory aims see the pathway
to such goals through very different practices.
AS a way to introduce some of critical theory's main concerns it seems
appropriate to look at these in the context and through the perspective of the
criticisms levelled against it. Held (1980) cites Anderson (1976) and Therborn
(1977) as being some of the most eloquent of the Marxists' attacks on critical
theory and from these and others divides the 'charges' into four main areas.
Firstly there is the charge that critical theory is a form of 'metaphysical
humanism' with all the Hegelian and idealism overtones and concentration on the
importance of individuals versus structures. Secondly the charge that critical
theory is more philosophical than practical making it distanced from more
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practical political concerns. Thirdly and connected with this is the charge
that critical theory is preoccupied with 'superstructural phenomena' making it
more distanced from the real determinants of social life. Fourthly and
finally the charge that critical theory is remote and distanced from working
class politics. Held (1980) attempts a rebuttal of these charges and in the
process provides some valuablt insights into the fundamental nature of critical
theory and it's differences from a more traditional Marxist viewpoint. It
seems helpful therefore to look at Held's analysis.
On the first charge concerning 'metaphysical humanism' Held (1980) shows
that critical theory is not unconcerned about structures but that an exclusive
concern with such matters has failed to achieve the originally transforming
desires of Marx. As Held perceptively points out there is no exclusivity about
the concern in critical theory with humanity versus structures: both are
important. Yet critical theory would maintain that Marxist exclusivity of
concern with structures has not succeeded in terms of either revolution or
transformation of society leading to the view that if Marx's original aim is
to be achieved the human factor needs to feature strongly in the analysis.
Held (1980) puts the matter succinctly:
'... At a theoretical level the reduction of Marxism to
dialectical materialism trivialised the significance
of human agency, and, at a political level, justified
the exclusion of the mass of people from active
participation in decisions that affect their lives. As
Marx indicated in the Theses on Feuerbach, idealism
restores insight into the 'active side' of materialism
... The retrieval of precisely this aspect of materialism -
the interplay between sensuous human activity and nature,
between human subjectivity and second nature - enabled
the critical theorists, at various stages in their careers,
to restore to the centre of Marxism some of the most
radical and subversive elements of Marx's work. The latter
are encapsulated by the view, defended by Horkheimer,
Adorno, Marcuse and Habermas, that the process of emancipation
is inseparable from the struggle for self-emancipation'
(p. 358)
On the second charge concerning the espoused dominant concern of critical
amorists with philosophical and theoretical issues at the expense of practical,
especially Marxist political, matters Held (1980) highlights three points which,
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to an extent, we have touched on already in this Section: firstly that
critical theorists' interest in theory and philosophy has a practical import;
secondly that such theoretical base needs to be wider than Marxist political
economy in the minds of critical theorists due to the perceived failure of
traditional Marxism to achieve desired change and development; thirdly to
note the present speculative nature of critical theory in terms of actually
achieving the change which it promises. Held (1980) puts these collective
points succinctly as follows:
'Far from reflecting a distance from practical political
problems their interest in theory and critique was
directly related to an ambition to analyse new forms
of domination, undermine ideology, enhance awareness of
the material conditions of life circumstances, and to
aid the creation of radical political Movements'
(p. 361)
But it is the case at present that critical theory:
'... has not provided an extended discussion of the
strategy of the party necessary to overthrow the
bourgeois state'
(Held, 1980, p. 360)
We are therefore looking at preconditions which could aid the creation of
radical political* movements but which remains in a state of conjecture and
apparent distance — a point which Held himself raises in a critical comment:
'I agree, moreover, that the level at which some of the
critical theorists work often makes the relevance of
their ideas to social and political events hard to
grasp'
(Held, 1980, p. 364)
On the third charge concerning critical theory's apparent preoccupation
with 'superstructural phenomena' and the irrelevance of this for understanding
* As we will see shortly 'political' to critical theorists is interpreted
in a wider sense than in Marxism.
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the 'real determinants of social life' Held (1980) takes us into the heart
of the differences between this approach and traditional Marxism and in so
doing amplifies and develops the above two insights. Marxism maintains that
the 'superstructure' is distinct, separate and secondary to the 'sub-structure'
or economic base (dominated by the 'mode of production') with changes in the
latter having only ripple effects leading to changes in the former. Critical
theory, on the other hand, maintains that the two, although separate,* are
interlocked and interlinked giving a greater importance to the superstructural
humanity elements:
'... Their work sought to expose the complex relations
and mediations which prevent the forces and relations
of production from being characterised simply as
objective - as things developing 'over the heads' of
human agents. An analysis of the components of
culture, of identity formation, etc. is necessary
because 'history is made' - by the 'situated conduct
of partially knowing subjects'. The contradiction
between the forces and relations of production does
not give rise to a fixed crisis path. The course of
the crisis, the nature of its resolution, depends on
the practices of social agents, and on how they
understand the situation they are part of. Critical
theory does not downplay structure, but seeks to
examine the interplay between structure and social
practices, the mediation of the objective and
subjective in and through particular social phenomena.'
(Held, 1980, p. 361 and 362)
On the fourth and final charge that critical theory is isolated from
working class politics Held (1980) shows that despite it's 'preconditional'
nature (see above) it is concerned with political action but in a developed
sense of this term which goes beyond, but encompasses, traditional views about
such matters. Held (1980) puts these points as follows:
* See Section 3.5 below for more details on this 'separateness'
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'... the criticism of 'lack of involvement' itself
presupposes an attachment to the view that the
only form of legitimate political involvement is
active participation in day to day working class
politics. One of the significant achievements
of critical theory is, in my view, to have shown
that there are many ways of contributing to the
project of human emancipation and that the terms
of reference of the political are wider than is
often thought'
(p. 362/363)
Put another way critical theory is not disinterested in the political struggle
between classes but sets such a struggle in the context of a wider 'political'
processes which is designed to lead (if the preconditions are correct) to the
real emancipation of humanity:
'The Frankfurt school and Babermas sought to extend
and adapt the insights of Marx's work in order to
reveal the complex factors which hinder people
coming to consciousness of themselves as capable of
different action'
(Held, 1980, p. 363)
Quite clearly Held's argument against Marxist criticisms will not
necessarily be convincing to those who believe in such a creed and in the end
both schemes of thought are of necessity vulnerable because of the preconditional
nature of both despite their mutual reliance on historical analysis. Both
traditional Marxism (in all it's diverse forms) and critical theory (a further
'brand' of Marxism) base their implicit or explicit prescriptions for the
emancipation of society on the basis of historical analysis: Marxism maintains
that the 'contradictions' in the 'substructure' produces crisis, revolution
and fundamental change in society historically which gives clear direction to
the areas of attention for future change; critical theory, on the other hand,
maintains that the Marxist analysis of past societal change is too simplistic
which needs to be enriched by a more dominant position for humanity and
evolutionary advance which, in turn, gives a different set of variables for
attention if future change is to ensue. Which model of change is correct
*ends on a number of factors not least of which is what one means by
emancipation and how one measures it's presence or absence — issues which have
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yet to be fully resolved. Thus both are sets of preconditional beliefs
about the best route to the achievement of a somewhat ellusive goal
(emancipation) with varying levels of application and success.
We clearly have many examples of new societies coming out of revolutionary
class struggles following Marxist processes yet few outworkings of advances
following the creeds of critical theory, which seems to suggest we should
attempt a redressing of this imbalance before evaluating either scheme in
terms of the mutually agreed, but ellusive, goal of emancipation. To do this
we need some actual applications of this approach to help this evaluatory
process. This present study is attempting, in it's own small way, to help in
this respect by using certain aspects of critical theory as a preconditional
tool to bring change and development in a particular empirical setting using
accounting system design as it's perspective.
We clearly need to be much more refined about our understanding of
critical theory and to do this we will turn to some of the insights of one of
the leading critical theorists: Jurgen Habermas. Habermas is the latest and
possibly most famous of the associates* of the Institute of Social Research
who not only built on the previous members but took critical theory into new
and unexplored areas. Thus the following Section and Section 3.5 will
concentrate on Habermas' interpretation of the reinterpretation of critical
theory's dominant theme.
Habermas' more recent work is a highly complex and far reaching structure
which concentrates on the importance of reason and dialogue and the blockages
* Habermas' association was theoretically total but only partial physically.
He was an assistant to Adorno but then moved to Heidelberg, returned to
Frankfurt in 1964 to take up a chair in philosophy and sociology before
moving in 1971 to where he is now:to the Max Planck Institute in
Sternberg, West Germany.
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in both which hamper change and development. As McCarthy points out in his
introduction to Habermas' Communication and the Evolution of Society (1979)
the 'research programme ? * of Habermas can be typified as a three-tiered
interconnected structure:
'The ground level consists of a general theory of
communication - as Habermas calls it, a universal
pragmatics - at the next level this theory serves
as the foundation for a general theory of
socialisation in the form of a theory of the
acquisition of communicative competence; finally,
at the highest level, which builds on those below
it, Habermas sketches a theory of social evolution
which he views as a reconstruction of historical
materialisation' (p. xvii)
Clearly given the on-going nature of this research programme there are
problems in all three levels and their relevant interconnections. Level one
analysis (upon which the other two rest) relies very heavily on a priori
judgments which can ultimately only be justified by dialogue. But we need
unmmnicative competence to be able to dialogue which is of course what we
are dialoguing about! The dangers of infinite regress are great indeed. Level
two analysis rests on discovering key, but highly problematic, motivational
elements to lead individuals and groups to adopt the insights from the level
one analysis. Level three analysis relies not only on being communicatively
competent but also on the absolute necessity of such competence if change and
development in human/structural phenomena is to occur so that the social
evolution towards a new and better society is made possible. But this causal
linkage with communicative competence as the central element has yet to be
categorically demonstrated.
Thus as a 'research programme' there is much still to pursue if Habermasi
Critical Theory is to constitute a mature body of knowledge. This is not to say
that it is better to wait until all issues and problems have been resolved before
* Such a phrase is meant to capture something of the hypothetical nature
of insights to date. They are not 'results' or 'finished products'
but part conclusions from an on-going 'research programme'.
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one starts to use some of the insights of Habermas. On the contrary the
actual process of using some of these ideas (given their tentative nature)
particularly in terms of practical outworking will add to the development
of Habermas Critical Theory.
Based on this view Section 3.4 below develops a particular strand of
Habermas' ideas which can be directly related to the particular focus of this
study: the design of accounting systems in actual enterprise contexts. Such
ideas which forms basically an empirical approach can be seen to be part of
the third level of Habermas' 'research programme' and thus builds on the
first two and is part of the necessary processes through which, it is postulated,
social evolution will occur.
Section 3.5 on the other hand attempts to make plain the connections
between this approach, and it's accounting focus and the theory of social
evolution put forward by Habermas. This will, also provide a necessary expansion
of his ideas surrounding the third level of his research programme as well as
giving a greater appreciation of some of the 'preconditional' problems discussed
above.
157
•
3.4 HABERMAS' MODEL OF THEORY AND PRACTICE AND ITS RELEVANCE AND 
APPLICABILITY IN THE DESIGN OF ACCOUNTING PRACTICES
3.4.1 Introduction and Overview 
This Section which must always be seen specifically in the context of
the issues raised in Section 3.3 forms the crucial link between all that has
gone before in this study and all that will follow. It presents the general
model of Habermas' which sets up the preconditions and format for an
interconnected relationship between theory and practice set in the context
of social evolution, emancipation and development. It then applies this
specifically to the accounting design issues to which this study is addressed.
As a prelude and overview of this argument Figure 3.4.1 presents a
diagrammatic presentation of the model in question. The elements in this
model come from a mixture of Habermas' ideas but son e of the core structural
aspects come from his new introduction to Theory and Practice (1974). However,
it is an amalgum of a number of strands of his highly diverse thinking although
it would be wrong to see it as in some sense a cumulative summary of his work
to date even at this 'third level' where we have situated this model.*
Habermas sets this model in the context of what could be called researchers
and researched (or 'target group') - the latter being the primary actors or
changers. However as Heller (1982) points out he is not really concerned with
the detailed application of this model per se (i.e. who are the researchers
or the researched and what are they researching anyway); he is more concerned
with the generalised, as Heller (1982) describes, 'theory of the organisation
of enlightenment' rather than 'the theory of organisation'. Who takes on the
role as researchers or researched and the detailed context which gives such
* His work for instance, in Legitimation Crisis (1976) tracing and postulating
the 'crisis' looming in modern capitalism is also a 'third level' study but
does not mesh neatly into the model under discussion although certain
linkages can be seen as will become apparent in Section 3.5.
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role definitions is not a secondary issue but an issue to which Habermas
does not address himself.* However, one thing is sure: with the model's
concentration on dialogue and consensus the processes of change and development
and emancipation are to be seen in the light of small groups rather than
some amorphous 'society at large'. In other words incremental change is
anticipated rather than some form of total shift - the latter comes about by
ammulative changes in the former.**
To Habermas there are three interlinked stages*** in this incremental
change process. Firstly there is the formulation of critical theorems about
whatever the researchers are researching which are 'radicalised' through a
'theoretical discourse' until a 'true' consensus by the researchers is
achieved. Secondly this 'consensus or theory' is then taken to the 'researched'
and through a 'therapeutic discourse' followed by a 'radicalised theoretical
discourse' both researchers and researched come to a joint 'true' consensus
on the nature of really what constitutes critical theorems about whatever
it is that is being researched. Thirdly with both researchers and researched
'enlightened' together on whatever the matter is under debate the next stage
is to conduct a 'radicalised practical discourse' between these parties on
practical actions to be taken. The upshot is a 'true' consensus on practical
actions which are to be undertaken by the primary actors (the researched)
particularly.
* This is of course not surprising in the light of the discussion in
Section 3.3 which showed the 'pre-conditional' concern of critical
theorists.
** This of course is to be expected with Habermas' view about 'social
evolution', rather than 'social revolution'.
*** We will in the following refer to these as the three stages of Critical
Theory rather than Habermas' three stages of Critical Theory.
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The words 'true' (consensus) has always been couched in inverted commas in the
above and it is important to understand why this is so. Consensus to Habermas
is, as Hesse (1982) points out, his 'theory of truth': truth and falsity are
set exclusively in the context of the quality and nature of discourse which
when certain conditions are fulfilled leads to a 'grounded', 'justified'
consensus and truth to the dialoguing partners. Thus underlying all is
Mthermas' universal pragmatics or the validity claims of discourse.
The following Sections pick up elements in this model and develops
them further-however, before we do this it is important to make a few comments .
concerning the expression of this model in the context of the accounting concern
of this study. As we have already pointed out Habermas is not categorical on
what should be the focus for this model. Most of his rare referents have
been to the researched themselves and their political struggles but, as
Held (1980) points out, to Habermas:
'... the terms of reference of the political are
wider than is often thought' (p. 362/3)
Thus the design of accounting systems in enterprise contexts is as legitimate
as any other as a referent because even if one has to see this as a political
system - which Habermas doesn't really require anyway - then it is possible to
do so given Habermas' leniency on the definition of 'political'
Thus the focus for operationalising the model would be therefore the
design of accounting systems in particular enterprise contexts. It could not
be used at some sort of global general level unless somehow or other every
researcher and everybody in every enterprise which possesses an accounting
system could be brought together so that a consensus on enlightenment could
occur. Or 'every 'researcher' could be Whered together to arrive at the
consensus on critical theorems. Such procedures are clearly impossible from
apractical viewpoint but they are also undesirable. Critical theory, as
will be recalled, is based on Kantian rather than Comtean assumptions and
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does not assume, unlike the latter, that order and general traits are
'there' and need to be discovered. To Kant and ,those who follow his line
of thought generality is not impossible but cannot be assumed until
demonstrated. Thus incremental investigation is both necessary and desirable.
Therefore the concentration initially, maybe permanently, will be on the
design of accounting systems in particular enterprises and will proceed through
the three stages as indicated.
Critical theorists, as has already been pointed out, do not use the terms
description, prescription and change. Such terms do not capture the richness
of this model even though it is possible to relate the two. Consensus on
theory and enlightenment has similarities to description but goes a long way
beyond the traditional meaning of this world. Likewise consensus on practical
action is the unified expression of prescriptive and change tendencies but
cannot really be neatly captured by these terms. Thus from now on these
expressions which have to date given meaning to the 'processes for designing
accounting systems in practice' will be replaced by the three consensuses
on theory, enlightenment and practical action discussed briefly above.
This then concludes a far too brief but nevertheless important overview
into the model which will be further refined in the following Sections and
will form the basis for the empirical approach in later chapters. Section
3.4.2. discusses the important underlying validity claims of discourse which
form the vital backcloth to allow judgements on the ' validity of the consensuses
in the three stages of Critical Theory. Section 3.4.3 clarifies and develops
these three stages both in the context of the insights from Section 3.4.2. and
in terms of its focus on the design of accounting systems in enterprises. As
we 	 already pointed out the focus for the application of this model is not
a settled phenomena. It may or may not have general applicability but this is
not our primary concern. Our concern and claim is that it is an appropriate
model for the design of accounting systems in enterprise contexts and it
is in terms of such a framework the model will be discussed.
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3,4.2 Underlying Validity Claims of Discourse 
As we have already pointed out Habermas maintains that the:
presuppositions and procedures of discourse are
the basis for establishing the truth of statements and
the correctness of norms.'
(Held, 1980, p. 331)
Such a stand requires a careful analysis of language and discourse to
establish the basis for what he calls an 'ideal speech situation' in which
the consensus is 'grounded' or 'justified' and the specific outcome is truth
and correctness for the parties in the discourse. This endeavour is
encapsulated in Habermas' theory of communicative competence.
What Habermas is doing is creating what he calls a 'rational reconstruction'
of the elements in communicatively competent discourse, which is in some
way universal and above specific applications. It is for this reason that in
Figure 3.4.1. the row variables have been divided between 'underlying validity
claims of discourse' and the three particular expressions of these. The former
are the universal rules the latter are the particular applications to arrive
at particular consensuses. As we will see it is sometimes rather difficult to
WT the two separate but there are important reasons for this division. The
primary reason being that to do so provides a sort of abstract 'rule book'
which is outside of the particular problem which is being discussed to which
reference can be made as to the particular standard of discourse.
Habermas builds his argument on a detailed understanding of one of five
'pragmatic universals': performative verbs (assert, promise, command etc.)
These verbs appear in every speech act and, thus, according to Habermas, should
provide the basis for a comprehensive understanding of speech acts. Such verbs,
and related speech acts, can be divided into four basic classes: constatives
(to assert, to describe etc), regulatives (to order, to advise etc),
representatives (to admit, to conceal), communicatives (to say, to ask etc.)
which in turn refer to certain 'domains of reality' and rest upon certain validity
claims. Thompson (1982) captures all these interrationships from Habermas':
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'What is Universal Pragmatics?'* in a tabular form which is presented
in Table 3.4.2. (1)
Thus when we make statements about 'the world' to another then we are
making a constative speech act which calls for a truth validity claim: is
it really as you say it is? When we approach anybody at all on anything
including the above or more particularly with some advice, recommendation,
order etc (regulative speech acts) we naturally bring into question a correctness
validity claim: is it right for you to do what you have done? Likewise the
very fact that somebody speaks to another (a representative speech act) calls
into question the sincerity of the speaker (i.e. another validity claim):
is this person deceiving me?, is this person pretending? Finally the actual
process of speaking (a communicatives speech act) calls into question
intelligibility (i.e. another validity claim): what does that mean? how should
I understand that?
Thus more than one validity claim is invariably raised with each speech
act. When I say something about the world to another I am, in effect, raising
all four validity claims: truth, correctness, sincerity and intelligibility.
However, it is likely that the first ('truth') will prove
	 more difficult to
satisfy. Likewise when I suggest something in the way of advice I also raise
all validity claims but will need to work very hard at the 'correctness' one
if I am to secure your motivation to follow such a lead.
Clearly this is more a diagnosis of the issues rather than some solution
to the problem of the supply of a universal rule book for satisfying validity
claims. Habermas approaches such a need from two angles. Firstly to suggest
the importance and nature of 'symmetry' in the attitudes and actions of the
parties to the discourse. Secondly, and set firmly within this context, to
* In Habermas' Communication and the Evolution of Society (1979) pp. 1-68
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develop the detailed attributes of an ideal speech situation. The first
can be likened to the superstructure of the ideal speech situation and the
second the substructure - without the former the latter is in-operable.
Turning first to the matter of symmetry Habermas (1971) makes the
following point which constitutes a major underlying assumption:
••• the structure of communication itself produces
no constraint if and only if, for all possible
participants, there is a symmetrical distribution
of chances to choose and to apply speech-acts' (p. 137)
As Thompson (1982) points out such symmetry in terms of equal chances is
given different meaning through each of the four classes of speech acts. A
symmetrical distribution of chances with respect to applying Iconstatives'
implies 'that all potential participants have the same opportunity to proper
interpretations and explanations so that no preconceptions remain excluded
from view'.* An equal opportunity to apply 'regulatives' entails 'that all
potential participants have the same opportunity to order and prohibit, to
obey and refuse, thereby precluding the privileges that arise from one sided
norms'. A symmetrical distribution of chances with respect to applying
t representatives"gives all potential participants the same chance to express
intentions and attitudes, creating the circumstances in which subjects become
transparent to themselves and others in what they say and do'. Finally an
equal opportunity to apply 'communicatives' means that 'all potential participants
have the same chance to initiate and sustain discussion through questions and
answers, claims and counter-claims'. Clearly these conditions are very
idealistic but they form the vital backbone or superstructure of any ideal speech
situation.
In addition to, as well as being essentially (if implicitly) part of, these
symetrical chances there are some basic rules on compulsion and motivation.
* All items in quotes in this paragraph are from Thompson (1982) p. 124 unless
otherwise stated.
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Mthermas (1973A) puts these rules as follows:
'In a discourse, the 'force' of the argument is the
only permissable compulsion whereas the co-operative
search for truth is the only permissable motive' (p. 168)
Truth in this sense is not strictly the same as the validity claim truth
although clearly related. Truth in the above quote is more of an overarching
joint commitment to 'delve deep' and not to hold back from diligent searching.
In this sense both this 'search' and 'the force of the better argument' can be
seen as underlying commitments or objectives which coupled with the symmetrical
chances forms vital benchmarks or pointers to the ideal speech situation.
We now turn to the second set of issues concerning what we have called the
substructure of the ideal speech situation, which, in essence, looks more
closely at the way the validity claims can be satisfied. Where problems arise
on sincerity and intelligibility validity claims these can be solved between
parties providing the rules of equal opportunity discussed above are conducted
to the full. In such situations a consensus between parties is highly likely.
However, where problems arise on the truth and correctness validity claims
more detailed considerations are necessary. The solution to such problems
cannot be found in the appeal to some sort of 'facts'. Since Habermas (1973A)
points out:
'Facts are not constituted since they are not entities
in the world but correlates of propositions on the
level of argumentative reasoning' (p. 175)
(emphasis in the original)
On the contrary the solution to such problems lies in the very nature of what
constitutes these Habermasian 'facts': argument and discourse. Habermas' view
is that to solve problems in truth and correctness validity claims we must
conduct respectively a 'radicalised theoretical discourse' and a 'radicalised
practical discourse' until a consensus is reached.
It is the process of radicalisation in the discourse which is the vital
element, for without it 'the force of the better argument' would be meaningless.
Thus for instance in a theoretical discourse one may start with the seemingly
obvious but not stop at this point even though some consensus may be perceived.
165
It is necessary to 'radicalise the argument' and proceed to increasing levels
of reflection. Habermas (19738) depicts the levels involved as four as
Table 3.4.2(2) indicates. Held (1980) describes this increasing radical-
ization as follows:
In theoretical discourse there must be freedom to
enter a discourse; check questioned claims; evaluate
explanations; modify a given conceptual framework;
and reflect on the nature of knowledge as such. In
practical discourse it must be possible to let
commands or prohibitions enter discourse when they
can no longer be taken for granted; assess just-
ifications; alter conceptions of norms, etc.; and
reflect on the nature of political will. (p. 343)
A consensus reached in such a situation is a grounded (justified) consensus.
Whether or not such a consensus can ever be achieved is not the question
Habermas is concerned with. His concern is with the way the reasoning human
being in disagreement with another on one or both of these particular validity
claimsshould proceed to arrive at a consensus, in the end, which is 'justified'.
Putting all this together we have a complex theory indeed with regard to
ideal speech situations. Table 3.4.2 (3) attempts to capture something
of this complexity and is a useful summary of the above discussion. What this
essentially is is a check list which can be referred to in actual discursive
incidents to abstract from the specifics and see whether the 'universals'
are present. For instance suppose we are attempting to have a dialogue with
fellow researchers about the nature of an extant accounting system in a
particular enterprise context then we could 'jump out' of the specific
discussion to see whether our discourse was ideal. In this context we would
have to ensure that our underlying commitment was as stated: relying on the
force of the better argument and co-operatively agreeing that we were searching
for truth. We would probably be using, in the main constative, representative
and communicative speech acts but may possibly be using the regulative one as
well. Either way we would need to be assured that equal opportunities as
numerated in Table 3.4.2 (3) and discussed above are being given to all researchers.
Likewise it is to be expected that truth claims, in the main, will be the
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dominant area for question or sceptism. Even if a consensus has already
been reached we must be absolutely sure that such a consensus is grounded
in the sense that the theoretical discourse leading to it has been
radicalised. Only in this way by confirming the nature of our discourse
could we confirm whether our consensus on 'truth' about the accounting
system in question is truth or falsity to the researchers in question. In
other words is our consensus 'rational' i.e. a consensus attained in the
context that approximates the ideal speech situation? For as Held (1980)
rightly maintains and as we have already pointed out:
... a rational consensus... is for Habermas, the
ultimate criterion of truth or of the correctness
of norms' (p. 395)
Without such a rational consensus truth or correctness has no meaning to
Habermas.
Now clearly there have been disagreements surrounding this model in terms
of questions of justification, comprehensiveness and practicality of the ideas
and thus it would be wrong not to introduce some of these doubts and problems.
The following will look at the most recent of these by Thompson (1982) which
apart from its comprehensiveness affords a valuable and insightful response
byHabermas (1982) to the questions raised.
Thompson raises four 'theses' of Habermas model and then raises questions
in respect of each. The four theses are:
(1) that the utterance of a speech act raises four
validity—claims; (2) that communicatively competent
speakers have at their disposal a series of pragmatic
universals; (3) that an ideal speech situation which
can be constructed in terms of pragmatic universals,
is presupposed in everyday speech; and (4) that truth
is a validity—claim that can be rationally redeemed
in a discourse having the structure of an ideal speech
situation' (p. 125)
On the first thesis Thompson raises the question as to whether, in every speech
act, all four validity claims are always raised. Habermas' reply does not
meet this challenge directly. However, the above discussion has already covered
this point by indicating that in certain speech acts one of the validity claims
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may take precedence but that still, in all speech acts, the four validity
claims are raised at various levels of importance. On the second thesis
Thompson raises questions concerning ability in discourse as well as whether
it is only in speech that we gain understanding. Habermas' reply concentrates
on his work on 'ontogenesis' (individual development) to counter the former
and calls for a demonstration by Thompson of intersubjective knowledge without 
language to counter the latter. On the third thesis Thompson raises doubts
as to whether the ideal speech situation is possible given where everyday
speech is 'at'. Habermas t reply reinforces his belief in the viability of this
possibility and its consequent power to discover when there is 'cheating':
'Should one party make use of privileged access to
weapons, wealth or standing, in order to wring 
agreement from another party through the prospect
of sanctions or rewards, no one involved will be
in doubt that the presuppositions of argumentation
are no longer satisfied' (Habermas, 1982, p. 272/3)
On the fourth thesis Thompson raises the very basic problem concerning the
nature of truth and how to validate such a claim:
'One may have very good grounds for maintaining that
it will rain tomorrow, but the truth of this statement
is dependent upon what happens tomorrow and not upon
the grounds that one has today' (Thompson, 1982, p. 130)
Of course this has strong positivistic, Comtean overtones which have been
seriously questioned by the Kantian development to which Habermas subscribes.
Habermas, taking the more objectivist development of Kantian thought which
keeps alive the idea of an objective reality would be expected to be both
sympathetic and unsympathetic (at the same time) to the basic question
Thompson raises. His reply is as expected: it doesn't deny Thompson's view
but doesn't confirm it — it encompasses it but at a new level of debate. The
criteria of truth which Thompson is talking about in his example is nothing
more than a discursively agreed criteria which could change. Or as Habermas
(1982) puts it:
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'Criteria change with standards of rationality and
are subject in their turn to the dictate of
argumentative justification. What can count in a
given instance as a good reason is something that
depends on standards about which it must be possible
to argue' (p. 273)
Thus Habermas' theory of discourse with its concentration on the preconditions
surrounding the phenomena's claim to truth encompasses but relativises
Thonipson's example.
Thus in conclusion even though the theory of communicative competence
is, as McCarthy (1973) points out, 'in a highly speculative stage of
development' (p. 154) it is difficult to find any substantive grounds for
knocking down this fundamental corner-stone of Habermas' present work.
Clearly it is important to attempt such an endeavour since otherwise we are
denying the whole essence of the approach: argument and discourse so as to
arrive at a rational consensus. Apart from this not to do so and criticising
other levels in Habermas' work would not be shaking at the very foundations
of his endeavours. However, at present such foundations even though they look
sound and substantial may well require refinement and development to adequately
support the superstructure of his later ideas.
Finally before moving on to the next Section something* needs to be
said about the processes of bringing about a willingness, on the part of
discursive actors, to move towards an ideal speech situation.** As McCarthy
points out in his introduction to Habermas' Communication and the Evolution of 
Society (1979) this is an area where Habermas is still at the early stages of
developing an adequate research programme. However, his work has some
definable qualities. Basically he is concerned with both phylogenesis
(species-wide development) and ontogenesis (individual development).
* More will be said about this in Section 3.4.3 below.
** This of course is McCarthy's'second level' in Habermas' research
programme.
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These two sit somewhat uneasily together in Habermas work but with his
concentration on social evolution and psychoanalysis his bias* is more on
the latter with the former following rather than vice versa. The cornerstone
of this work is on the development of the Freudian understood 'ego'
particularly its cognitive, linguistic and interactive expression and its
affective and motivation keys to bring such developments about.
Such developments can occur, according to Habermas if there are adequate
'rational reconstructions' of competence to be used in the context of
'therapeutic dialogues' and a willingness on the part of those involved in
such dialogue to be 'self critical'. Rational reconstruction to Habermas
(1974)
'... deal with annonymous rule systems, which any
subjects whatsoever can comply with, insofar as
they have acquired the corresponding competence
with respect to these rules' (p. 22)
Whereas self criticism is a mode of reflection which
... brings to consciousness those determinants of
a self-formative process ... which ideologically
determine a contempary praxis and conception of
the world' (p. 22)
Thus a therapeutic dialogue, which is not 'discourse' due to the a symmetry
of the relationships, could and should generate self criticism (e.g. 'on the
particular self formative process of an ego', Habermas (1973A) p. 183) to
allow competences to develop so that rational reconstructions can be adopted.
For instance the ideal speech situation is a typical rational reconstruction
to which people could 'comply with' providing they have the competence to do
so which may or may not** be acquired through self criticism and a therapeutic
* But not exclusive bias see Habermas (1976) and (1979) for a demonstration
of his macro interests which still have clear links however to more
individual micro aspects - see Section 3.5 for more details on these
connections.
** This depends on whether the competencies are present or not at the
outset.
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dialogue.
We have now come to the end of this very long but very important
Section, without it the following would be meaningless. Before moving to
Section 3.4.3 which refers more directly to the three stages of Critical
Theory from Figure 3.4.1 it is worth setting the above discussion in the
context of this diagram. All the above discussion is concentrated on the
underlying validity claim of discourse. Even thought we have used the three
row titles ('radicalised theoretical discourse', 'therapeutic' 'discourses'
or 'dialogue', and 'radicalised practical discourse') these are not strictly
the same as the expression of these in the context of the design of the three
consensuses in Figure 3.4.1. The above discussion set these discourses in
the context of the ideal speech situation and the developments towards this
ideal stage, Figure 3.4.1 sets them solely in the context of particular
consensuses on particular issues. They are therefore, an outworking and
expression of the ideal speech situation and not a replacement for it.
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3.4.3 Habermas' Three Stages of Critical Theory in the Context of the 
Design of Accounting Systems 
As we pointed out in Section 3.4.1 the following discussion on the three
stages of Critical Theory will be set in the context of both the underlying
validity claims of discourse and in terms of the design of accounting systems.
Certainly the former is always the universal context the latter is but a
specific expression of a general model due to its centrality in this
particular study.
The first stage is the formulation of critical theorems (i.e. to arrive
at a consensus on theory via radicalised theoretical discourse.) In this
context there are a number of issues to be understood which can best be
exposed by a series of questions: 	 at is the focus ?. Who are the researdhers1
Why is a radicalised theoretical discourse necessary? What would such a
radicalised theoretical discourse look like in the context of the focus? What
is the standing of the resulting consensus on theory? Each of these five
questions will supply the basis for the following discussion.
Firstly,and somewhat briefly,on 'what is the focus?' the answer is,for
the purpose of this study,the accounting system (as defined in Section 1.2)
in particular enterprises. In Section 1.2 we defined an accounting system,
as:
'an enterprise based formal system which expresses
in fundamentally numerical terms past, present and
future financial actions of such enterprises'
Thus any system which satisfies this definition can legitimately be called
the focus for attention. However, such a focus includes the context in which
it is placed. This definition of an accounting system is grounded in an
enterprise context and thus the focus includes such contextual linkages.
In addition our focus is with the accounting systems in particular 
enterprises rather than some amorphous 'general' accounting system. As we
indicated	 above generality is not assumed at the outset - particularity and
uniqueness is the assumed state even though generality may be a possibility.
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This is, of course, because of critical theory's Kantian rather than
Cotatean roots. Thus the focus is on an accounting system in a particular
enterprise context; comparative analyses and a search for commonalities
are not ruled out but are not the primary focus.
Secondly an answer to 'who are the researchers?' is somewhat more
complex. In some ways an exhaustive answer to this is immaterial: it is
whoever wishes to take on the role and has the capabilities to perform the
task. Certainly Habermas envisages more than one researcher unless, of
course, an individual can adequately perform a radicalised theoretical
discourse with himself. If this is possible then a solitary researcher could
fulfil Habermas' overarching conditions. What is possibly more important is
not the number of researchers but rather their basic attitudes. What is
vital to act as a researcher in this context is the ability to adopt a
critical stance with respect to the phenomena one is researching. Fundamentally
this is requiring researchers, to be classed as such,to have an attitude
which accepts the possibility that, following our accounting application,
the accounting system could change out af all recognition and even the enterprise
of which it is part maybe should cease to exist. This invariably means that
only those whose survival does not depend on the continued existence of the
particular enterprise being researched could potentially qualify to be
researchers. Thus employees of the particular enterprise are unlikely to be
researchers in this sense since their survival depends on the survival of the
particular enterprise which will constrain the radicalised theoretical discourse
at the far extremes of its endeavour.
This takes us to our third question: 'why is radical theoretical discourse
necessary?' which links back into the ideal speech issues discussed in
Section 3.4.2. The discovery of critical theorems, as we will see below,
involves making various statements as to why the design of a particular
accounting system is as it appears to be. Such statements in the main, but
not exclusively, raise the truth claims we were discussing in Section 3.4.2.
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Thus the way to verify truth claims becomes the dominant issues to be
faced. To Habermas the way to confirm a truth claim is through a radical
theoretical discourse as discussed and thus this becomes a sufficient
and necessary prerequisite to arrive at a consensus on critical theorems.
This also links in to our fourth question: 'what would radicalised
theoretical discourse look like in the context of the focus?' an answer to
which can be found in an application of the ideal speech interpretations of
this type of discourse. Figure 3.4.3 (1) attempts to build on Habermas (1973B)
insights (summarised in Table 3.4.2 (2) ) introducing some of the dynamics
involved in this process. A radicalised theoretical discourse in the context
of accounting systems design starts with some statements about the accounting
system e.g. it contains a budget system, uses an income and expenditure
account etc. But even this must be metatheoretically criticised: what do you
mean by a budget system an income and expenditure account etc. The aim is to
arrive at some form of explanatory conclusion e.g. why this budget system,
why an income and expenditure account etc. Such conclusions come from a
logically related set of theoretical explanations the relationship of which
must be susceptible to metatheoretical criticism with regard to language and
logic used. These theoretical explanations have, to Habermas, three elements
from which suitable conclusions can be drawn: data (causes of events, motives
of behaviour), warrants (empirical uniformities, hypothetical laws etc.) and
backing (observations, factual accounts etc). For instance a possible
explanatory theory for why an income and expenditure account is used could
be: the treasurer who is a qualified accountant produced it (data), most
treasurers who are qualified accountants prefer income and expenditure
accounts (warrant), a recent survey by X shows this to be so (backing). But
the language and content of such data, warrant and backing must be reflexively
criticised so that the resulting explanation 'moves on' to deeper and deeper
roots. It is in this dynamic interrelated sense that a radicalised theoretical
discourse operates leading to consensus on theoretical explanations and
quite probably unexpected conclusions about the reasons for the accounting
174
systems in question.
Fifthly and finally on the question: 'what is the standing of the
resulting consensus on theory?' one has to seek an answer by appreciating
the standing of the consensus outcomefor a radicalised theoretical discourse.
If such an outcome is a consensus by the researchers which has exhausted all
the radical possibilities in the context of the dynamics of the model in
Figure 3.4.3 (1) then the consensus is 'grounded' and 'justified' to those 
researchers. Thus, the resulting consensus is justified only to those
researchers - this indeed is its standing. However, to Habermas, it is not
sufficient to leave the matter at this point there is a need to organise
processes of enlightenment:
'... in which such theorems are applied and can be
tested in a unique manner by the initiation of
processes of reflection carried on within certain
groups towards which these processes have been
directed' (Habermas, 1974, p. 32)
Habermas' concern to see this as a way to 'test' (and presumably alter) such
critical theorems suggest further relativity to the standing of the 'consensus
on theory'.
This brings us somewhat naturally to the second stage in Critical Theory:
processes of enlightenment. As in the above we will raise a number of pertinent
questions which will form the framework for the following discussion. We will
structure the following around answers to five questions: what is enlightnement?
Who are to be enlightened? Why is enlightenment necessary? How is enlightnment
brought about? What is a consensus on enlightenment and what is its use?
Hints towards an answer to the first question (on what is enlightenment?)
have already been given when discussing critical theorems. It is about the
belief in, and the nature and content of, the critical theorems which constitutes
enlightenment. We become enlightened about the matter to which the critical
theorems are addressed. In terms of our concern we become enlightened about
explanatory theories concerning accounting systems design. In this sense the
researchers are becoming enlightened in the search for critical theorems.
175
However, in Habermas' model enlightenment comes after critical theorems
are designed although it is very clearly connected to them. Enlightenment
to Habermas is a term he reserves particularly (in the context of this
model) for theresearched or 'target groups' comprehension of the design of
the critical theorems.
But it would be wrong to think that enlightenment is only the concern
is
of the researched or 'target group'. This brings us to our second questions:
who are to be enlightened? The impression from the above is that it is the
1
researched or the 'target group' — the researchers) have achieved such an
idealic state in the processes of arriving at the critical theorems. However,
such a static picture is not Habermas' intention. The very idea of submitting
critical theorems for 'test' in the enlightenment stage opens up the possibility
.	 )
for modification of these as the researchers and 'researched ' dialogue together
in an ideal speech situation. In such a way enlightenment in the context of
this model about newly formulated critical theorems can occur for both
.esearchers and researched.
Before moving on to the third question there is a subsidiary issue to be
looked at in the context of this second question namely: who are the
mearched
1
 or 'target group'? A simple answer to this is those who need to
be enlightened. But this is basically tautological. A way out of this cycle
is to suggest that initially those who need to be enlightened are those who,
in the present order of things, with regard to the phenomena in question, have
power directly or indirectly to change the phenomena. In terms of our
accounting concern this is basically those who either design or have the
ultimate responsibility for the design of the accounting system in particular
enterprise contexts. However, if other issues come to light which are
dynamically connected with the accounting system in which changes are required
the circle of enlightenment may well need to be widened.
Turning now to the third question on 'why is enlightenment necessary?' an
answer can be given at two levels. At one level it is the necessary procedure
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to arrive at 'genuine confirmation' of the critical theorems. Held (1980)
puts such concern as follows:
'Through the systematic application of the theory
developed in discourse, and self reflection on the
part of the subject/object of investigation the
theorems can be tested in the only way which can
lead to their genuine confirmation' (p. 348)
At another, and possibly more important, level is that enlightenment is
necessary, particularly for the researched, for without it understanding and
action oriented change will be impossible. Habermas (1974) puts such a
concern as follows:
'Only to the degree that organised enlightenment
and consultation lead to those groups toward
which this is directed actually recognising
themselves in the interpretations offered*, do
the analytically proposed interpretations
actually become consciousness, and does the
objectively attributed situation of interests
actually become the real interests of a group
capable of action' (p. 32)
Such enlightenment does not lead to change directly - there is a divide
between processes of enlightenment and practical action - but without initial
enlightenment, complacency and the acceptance of the status quo is the likely
expected future state.
On the matter of the fourth question on 'how to bring about enlightenment?'
an answer can be given in terms of, not surprisingly: discourse. Initially
there is need for a therapeutic 'discourse' or dialogue between researchers and
* Habermas in this quote is seeing the'phenomena of interest' for
enlightenment the researched themselves. However, in the context of
this study we are using the phenomena of interest to be the accounting
system which may or may not be an expression of the 'researched themselves'
even though they are responsible for its design. Some may accuse us of
abusing Habermas' model in the way we are using it. However, as we have
pointed out on a number of occasions Habermas is not really making hard
and fast rules on the specific areas of application for his general
model and thus applying these to accounting systems is just as legitimate
as any other 'phenomena of interest'.
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researched. It is not a proper discourse in the Habermas sense since
it starts from a basis of a-symmetry between the two parties and is
geared towards,in the context of this model,the adoption by the researched
of the conditions so that an ideal speech situation (and symmetry) can
ensue. Thus the initial a,symmetrical therapy is successfully achieved
when,and only when,equal opportunity to choose speech acts in the sense
envisaged in the ideal speech situation is realised. The successful outcome
of such therapy leads naturally into a discourse into the nature of the
critical theorems which will invariably raise,particularly,truth claims in
the speech acts relevant to these. In such a situation both researchers
and researched will then need to move into a radical theoretical discourse to
validify such claims.
The fifth and final two part question on 'what is a consensus on
enlightenment and what is its use?' has already been answered at different
points in the above but will be brought together since it provides a good
summary focus. A consensus on enlightenment is a mutual agreement coming
out of the condition of an ideal speech situation between both researchers and
researched on the contents of critical theorems with regard to a particular
phenomena of interest. As we have pointed out this 'phenomena of interest'
could be anything including the researched or target group themselves. However,
in the context of this study, as we have indicated on many occasions, this
phenomena of interest is the design of accounting systems in the enterprise
for which the researched are fundamentally responsible. Such enlightenment
is necessary since it allows both researchers and researched to clearly see
the accounting system in the particular enterprise with all its roots and
connections to underlying organisational phenomena laid bare. In addition
such enlightenment is a necessary pre-requisite and goad to change and
and development, particularly with regard to the design of the accounting
system but also, quite possibly, with respect to the underlying interconnected
organisational phenomena.
178
This brings us to the third and final stage of Habermas' model of
Critical Theory on the selection of strategies. Enlightenment even though
it may be 'good for its own sake' is never the end of the matter for
Habermas. Such enlightenment is intended to lead to practical action but
cannot give total direction to the nature of this action. Or as Habermas
(1974) puts it:
'While the theory legitimises the work of
enlightenment as well as providing its own
refutation when communication fails, and
can, in any case, be corrected, it can by
no means legitimate a fortiori the risky
decisions of strategic action. Decisions
for the political struggle cannot at the
outset be justified theoretically and then
be carried out organisationally' (p. 33)
thue again Habermas is using his interpretation of his model in the context
of the 'liberation of the proletariat' but the general intention is clear:
theory cannot lead and direct practical action.
To help us to understand what is involved in this practical action we
will, as we have done before, raise pertinent questions and structure the
discussion around answers to these. What is the focus for practical action?
Who are to undertake practical action? Why is a radicalised practical discourse
necessary? What would a radicalised practical discourse look like? What will
a consensus on practical action lead to? Answers to these five questions
will form the focus for the following.
A simple answer to the first question on 'what is the focus for practical
action?' is whatever is the phenomena of interest about which one has become
enlightened. However, this disguises the web of interconnected 'secondary'
issues which have given the 'primary' phenomena of interest its particular
shape and design which may need as much changing as the primary phenomena
itself. In terms of our accounting concern this is saying that our focus for
change is not only the accounting system (the primary phenomena of interest)
but also the underlying organisational roots (which have been laid bare in the
enlightenment stage) which give the primary phenomena meaning and context.
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Our focus therefore is the whole interconnected system surrounding the
accounting system.
An answer to the second question on 'who is to undertake practical
action?' is basically those who have been enlightened. As we have pointed
out enlightenment is intended to lead to practical action and in a like
manner practical action is impossible, in the sense used here, without the
insights supplied through enlightenment. Thus only those who are
enlightened can undertake practical action in the sense being used here.
Such enlightenment apart from encouraging change supplies vital background
information on interlinkages and without such insights the areas for change
would be unclear.
However even though we have suggested that it is the enlightened —
which includes both the researchers and researched or 'target group' — it
would be wrong not to recognise that the target group have a much greater
involvement in this action. It is,after all,their organisation, their
accounting system, using our particular focus, which is the domain of interest
and it is they, rather than the researchers, who have power and authority in
the present system to make decisions and act with regard to the phenomena
of interest and its related elements.
An answer to the third question on 'why is a radicalised practical
discourse necessary?' can be found through the design of the ideal speech
situation as discussed in Section 3.4.2. The discovery of practical actions,
as we will see below, involves making various statements about things to do.
Such statements in the main,but not exclusively, raise the correctness claims
we were discussing in Section 3.4.2. Thus the way to give validity to such
claims becomes the dominant issues to be faced and, as indicated, to
Habermas this is only possible if protagonists conduct a radicalised
practical discourse.
This naturally links to our fourth question on 'what would a radicalised
practical discourse look like?' an answer to which can be found in an
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application of the ideal speech interpretation of this type of discourse.
Figure 3.4.3 (2) attempts to build on Habermas (1973 B) insights on the
dynamics of radicalised practical discourse which were summarised in
Table 3.4.2 (2) above. The conclusions from such a discourse are commands
to do or to make prohibitions about something which must be grounded in
what Habermas calls theoretical justifications. In terms of our accounting
concern such commands or prohibitions could be related to the accounting
system (e.g. start budgeting, design the accounting system to be 'semi
confusing' etc.) or its related counterparts (e.g. stop spending money on
the bosses supposed 'expenses' etc). The theoretical justifications have, to
Habermas, to contain similar (but not the same interpreted) three elements
as in theoretical explanations from which suitable conclusions can be drawn:
data (grounds), warrant (behavioural/evaluative norms or principles),
backing (interpretation of needs (values), inferences, secondary implications
etc). For instance a possible justificatory theory for designing a 'semi
confusing' accounting system in the Hedberg and Jeinsson (1978) sense could
be as follows: the present accounting system produces apathy and stability
(data), apathy and stability is not good for this organisation since it
needs to be fundamentally changed and semi-confusing accounting systems would
aid this change (warrant), such fundamental change is necessary because ... and
semi confusing accounting systems have been demonstrated to encourage such
radical change (backing). But the language, logic and contents must be
constantly criticised by metatheoretical, metaethical and metapolitical
considerations: what do we really mean by T change','semi confusing'? Is
it really right that semi confusing accounting systems will lead to such
radical change? Is it right,at a more abstract level, that this organisation
is really in need of this proposed fundamental shift? What political views
are we demonstrating by these attitudes in the context of alternative
political persuasions? All these and other questions must centre around
the theoretical justifications constantly moving these on by uncovering
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and abandoning assumption sets. Above all this Habermas maintains we
need to reflect on where we are as people which will influence both the
theoretical justifications on specific issues and our 'meta' views as well.
In other words to Habermas, we need to reflect and formulate in ourselves
a 'rational critical will' so that such revisions in our views become a
reality.
Fifthly and finally the answer to the question 'What will a consensus
on practical action lead to?' is that change and development of relevant
variables will be the intended outcome even though the expected results may
not always be assured. Even though the whole intention of a radicalised
practical discourse is to 'shake the foundations' of any practical action
so that the resulting consensus is 'grounded' and 'justified' it still
does not guarantee the success of the action in terms of either its nature
or its intentions. For instance suppose we wanted to introduce a semi,
confusing accounting system (its nature) because that would lead to change
in the organisation (its intention) then there is no guarantee that either
expected result will be achieved. The first may be possible since it is
those who have the power and authority to make such decisions who have been
chosen for enlightenment in the way we have been discussing. However,
the second effect cannot be guaranteed even if it is coupled with other
strategies. In the end trial and error coupled with a willingness to
constantly shift back into a radicalised practical discourse becomes the
only way to proceed to ensure that change and development is achieved.
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3.5 HABERMAS' MODEL OF THEORY AND PRACTICE AND IT'S ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
INTERPRETATION IN THE CONTEXT OF A THEORY OF SOCIAL EVOLUTION
The contents of Section 3.4 on a number of occasions have indicated that
both the general model of Habermas linking theory and practice and it's
accounting system interpretation can be seen in the context of a process of
evolutionary development which now needs to be explored more fully. We will
explore these connections by using Habermas' latest work (1981 A & B)* as seen
primarily through the critical, comprehensive reviews of Giddens (1982) and
Thompson (1983).
Despite it's 1200 pages Habermas' latest work does not contain anything
comprehensively new in his thinking. But it does bring his current ideas and
insights together in one work providing an opportunity to obtain a much needed
overview:
'I don't think confirmed Habermas - watchers will learn
a great deal from this massive work, for nearly all the
main theorems it advances have been introduced in more
minor contexts over recent years. But it does bring
these together in a central source, and provides a
useful opportunity to appraise the current trend of
Habermas's thinking' (Giddens, 1982 p. 319)
His overarching task in this work is, as Thompson (1983) suggests, 	 to
elaborate an:
'... account which demonstrates the interconnections of
communicative action and social systems and which
provides a framework for comprehending the tensions
and tendencies, the conflicts and potentialities, that
characterise the industrial societies of today' (p. 279)
This task has dominated Habermas' agenda in what Gidden's calls the 'second
phase' of his writing:
'Habermas's later work can be seen as an attempt to give
flesh to the emancipatory potential of social analysis.
* Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns Band I: Handlungsrationalitat und 
Gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung (1981A) Band II: Zur Kritik der 
Funktionalistischen Vernunft (1981B)
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This endeavour has led Habermas away - just how far,
he has yet to specify - from the framework adopted in
Erkenntnis und Interesse.* It seems apparent that
Habermas would now regard the attempt to found critical
theory upon epistemology as misleading if not actually
mistaken.'
(Giddens, 1982, p. 319)
Despite the familiarity of this theme for this new work and the previous
exposure of many of the ideas Habermas does introduce into the text some of
the thinking and ideas of both Weber and Parsons which have not been quite
as prominent previously in his social theory.
The following will concentrate fundamentally on Habermas 'theory of social
evolution' which forms the central theme of this massive work and how this
relates to the model discussed in Section 3.4. Although there are many areas
of concern in Habermas (1981 A & B) the one which predominates throughout is
his attempt at a reconstruction of the theory of social evolution. It is from
this, as with other critical theorists as well as Marx, that Habermas draws
his conclusions about how societal development will, if left unhindered, and
can, if certain actions are undertaken, occur - a point which we have already
briefly touched on in Section 3.3. The model discussed in Section 3.4 above,
and it's accounting system application, therefore, need to be seen as intended
intrusions into an evolutionary process which is, to Habermas, on-going. To
understand this we must first understand Habermas' theory of social evolution
and the criticism which have been made against it** to which we now turn.
Figure 3.5(1) is an attempt at a diagrammatic presentation of Habermas'
theory of social evolution. As can be seen this is indeed a complex model
* Knowledge and Human Interests (1978)
** Some of the general criticims have already been discussed in Section
3.3 when talking about critical theory as a totality. The criticisms
one is talking about here refer specifically to Habermas' model.
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with terms and concepts which need to be understood if one is to get to the
heart of Habermas' intentions. To aid this process of understanding we will
divide the following into three parts which refer to specific elements in
Figure 3.5.(1). The first part looks at Habermas' understanding of 'life
world' and 'system' and the distinction between the two. The second part
looks at the processes of 'differentiation', 'decentration' and 'inner
colonization'. The third part looks at the underlying assumptions concerning
enlightenment and emancipation. This third part will lead into some summary
thoughts and criticisms before moving into some of the interrelationships
between this model and the one presented in Section 3.4.
We turn first to Habermas' understanding of 'Life world' and 'system'
and their respective distinctive characteristics. Habernas, sees life world
as referring:
'... to collectively shared background convictions,
to the diffuse, unproblematic horizon within which 
actors communicate with one another and seek to
reach an understanding. The life world of a society
or social group preserves and transmits the
interpretative work of preceding generations. It
forms a symbolic space, as it were, within which
cultural tradition, social integration and personal
identity are sustained and reproduced'
(Thompson, 1983 p. 285)
Systems, on the other hand, according to Habermas, following Parsonian thought,
can be conceptualised as:
... self regulating action-contexts which co-ordinate
actions around specific mechanisms or 'media', such
as money or power'
(Thompson, 1983 p. 285)
Quite clearly the distinction between the two is more apparent than real and
introduced largely for 'methodological' reasons yet Habermas is at pains to
maintain the distinctiveness of the two as well as their interconnection. As
we will see below to Habermas the very process of evolution leads to a
developing differentiation of the life world from the systems world using his
understanding of these concepts. In addition as differentiation occurs the
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life world, which to Habermas is primary in terms of the two, creates
steering mechanisms' which are intended to:
define the 'scope' (Spielraum) of system
differentiation'
(Thompson, 1983 P. 285)
The primary area for their steering endeavours centres around the important
'media' for systems action namely power and money. The most important
of these steering mechanisms, from a societal perspective, is, according to
Habermas, the state apparatus and the market economy both of which, of course,
are directed to the management of the important societal systems 'media' of
power and money.
We now turn to the second part of the explication of Figure 3.5(1) concerning
an understanding of the processes of 'differentiation' 'decentration' and
'inner colonisation'. Differentiation of both the life world from the systems
world as well as internally in each world over time are key elements in
Habermas' theory of social evolution. Habermas both likens this process as
well as linking it directly to Weber's conceptual insights into the processes
of 'rationalisation' particularly his understanding of the 'rationalisation
of world views' and 'social rationalisation' in the context of his analysis
of the historical development of Western civilization. For Habermas the
rationalisation of life worlds can be characterised in terms:
'.... of both the separation of spheres of value and the
advancement of levels of learning'
(Thompson, 1983, P. 286 Emphasis in original)
While Weber appreciated the first of these elements - the separation of the
spheres of value (suchas the cognitive, moral and expressive elements of
cultural rationalisation) - Habermas maintains Weber failed to appreciate the
processes which lead to such changing states. Habermas maintains that there
is a 'devaluation' process occuring when life worlds change - devaluing
previous beliefs and evaluating new belief structures - which is created by
increasing levels of learning.
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This links directly to Habermas' understanding to 'decentration' which
we will look at below after briefly looking at Habermas' understanding of the
rationalisation process of the systems world. Thompson (1983) puts such
understanding succinctly as follows:
'The rationalisation of social systems can be characterised
in terms of their growth in complexity. From this
perspective one can analyse the formation and expansion
of markets organised around the medium of money and the
steady growth of political and administrative organis-
ations'
(p. 286 Emphasis in original)
Thus, in Habermas' view, as the life world develops the social systems
develop as well by becoming more complex both in terms of their fundamental
nature as well as in terms of sub-system divisions and specialisation.
Yet such increasing complexity can have an adverse feedback effect on the
life world which Habermas calls the process of 'inner colonisation'.
Before looking at this, however, we need to return to the 'decentration'
process which Habermas maintains is key to an understanding of how life
worlds' develop. Habermas' understanding of decentration links directly to
his heavy reliance on Piaget's ontogenic studies of cognitive development.*
These studies trace how human beings (primarily children) progressively
demarcate the:
'... objective and social worlds from the subjective
world of experience - that is as a 'clecentration of
an egocentric understanding of the world'
(Thompson, 1983 p. 286)
This decentring process as it progresses allows individuals, according to Piaget
and Habermas, to be both more reflective as well as more rational making
consensus on understanding, social interaction and action and felt experiences
less dependent on 'pre-established beliefs or codes of behaviour' (Giddens, 1982,
* And the derivatives of this work particularly by Kohlberg.
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p. 323). Habermas' view is that such a decentring process is achieved by
growing levels of communicative competence in his theory of language. This
theory of language as presented in Section 3.4.2 above and summarised in Table
3.4.2 (1) highlights three major domains of 'reality', three modes of
communication, three types of speech acts and three major types of validity
claims which all relates in a one to one sense, to the three areas in Piaget's
decentring process. Thus to Habermas the development of life worlds is
dependent on the decentration process in the Piaget tradition which in turn
is dependent on expanding levels of communicative competence with regard to
constative, regulative and representative speech acts.
Finally in this second part we turn to Habermas' 'inner colonisation'
process. This process links primarily to the differentiation concept discussed
above: as evolutionary development ensues differentiation occurs in both the
life world and social systems world leading to higher levels of complexity
in the latter which has the potention, due to it's qausi-independence, to
react back on the life world and threaten to stifle it's ontogenic developments.
It is this process which Habermas calls the 'inner colonisation' of the life
world and, according to his analysis, it has two major repercussions. Firstly
it creates a very real legitimation and motivation 'crisis' for the life
world's steering mechanisms. They are felt to be failing in their alloted
task to 'define the scope of systems differentiation' and with such failure
create a crisis as to their ability to perform such tasks. Secondly, according
to Habermas, it creates protest movements such as the 'Greens' in Germany or
the CND in Britain which do not 'infringe directly upon class-specific interest
positions'* but are:
'... concerned with protecting the life world against
further colonization'
(Giddens, 1982, p. 330)
* Quoted in Thompson 1983 p. 288 from Habermas (1981B) p. 513
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Such an interpretation, of course, sees such movements as primarily defensive
against, and reactive to, 'overshooting'* of systems complexity. Whether
this really is evolutionary advance towards the goal of the emancipation of
humanity is debatable and it is to this, and related issues, we now need to
turn.
These issues are major elements in the third part of the explication of
Figure 3.5 (1) related to the underlying assumptions of this model in terms of
enlightenment and emancipation. For convenience we can divide the following
into three areas with regard to these issues: firstly concerning the nature
and accuracy of this model as a 'description' of societal evolutionary processes;
secondly concerning the beliefs of Habermas in the emancipatory nature of this
evolutionary process; thirdly concerning the implications of this evolutionary
model for the future. We will look at each of these in turn.
On the first point concerning the nature and accuracy of his model of
society there are two issues of importance which need to be appreciated. Firstly
concerning the claims for his theory. Fundamentally Habermas' model of
society builds on both Marx's and Weber's models** while at the same time
disagreeing with both and building a new: it is therefore an alternative model
for explaining how society, not necessarily totally Western society, has
changed over time, (i.e. it's social evolutionary process). Secondly concerning
the status of his theory. We have already raised doubts in Section 3.3 concerning
* How this can occur is not made plain by Habermas although as Thompson (1983)
indicates he sees the 'beginnings of such an explanation can be found ...
• in Marx's analysis of the processes of accumulation and valorisation of
capital' (p. 288) although not untypically he is critical of using such an
explanation either exclusively or with all assumptions implicit in such
a model.
** On balance based on his latest work Weber's model is more prevalent in
Habermas' social theory although Marx's intentions and aspects of his views
are also clearly apparent.
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the descriptive accuracy of critical theory more generally, viz a viz Marx's
interpretation of a model society, and Habermas theory is naturally caught in
this questioning. Of course these are epistemological and methodological
questions which, as much of this present study indicates, cannot be lightly
resolved. Equally it is surprising as Thompson (1983) indicates (p. 291)
how little space Habermas gives in his latest work to what constitutes 'truth'
and by implication what status he is claiming for the model of society he is
advancing. However, one can only assume that Habermas' theory of truth related
to a grounded consensus following the conditions of an ideal speech situation
discussed at length in Section 3.4 above is still his dominant
belief. In this sense either we can take Habermas' model of social evolution
as a grounded consensus or as a 'straw man' upon which argumentation is to be
addressed before attaining the status of a grounded consensus. Either way it
must, of necessity, be seen as truth to the dialoguing partners rather than some
universal claim to truth, unless, unknown to his readers, Habermas has changed
his views on such matters.
We turn now to possibly the central assumption underlying Habermas' model:
the emancipatory, enlightenment advances which are assumed to be implicit in
the social evolutionary processes he models. This brings us to our second
point. Giddens (1982) captures the essence of both the nature of this
evolutionary process and it's enlightenment, emancipation assumptions in the
following:
'The development of arenas of discourse, which he tries
to trace through the emergence of the 'world religions'
and the subsequent differentiation of science, morality
and art in modern culture signifies a general evolution
towards an expansion of rationality. The more we are
able rationally to ground the conduct of our lives in
the three main spheres of existence - relations with
the material world, with others, and in the expressive •
realm of aesthetics - the more advanced our form of
society can be said to be.
Enlightenment, obviously is no joke. The modern world
for Habermas is more enlightened than the primitive.'
(p. 322)
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Quite clearly such claims, as with the model itself, should be rightly
disputed and challenged in the context of argumentation. Already such a
process is underway with strong and persuasive arguments to counter such
views. This is to be expected and, in a somewhat perverse manner, reinforces
the argument the actors are disagreeing about i.e. the power and significance
of dialogue in terms of change and development! That notwithstanding the
important point to note at this stage is the claimed status of Habermas'
view, to himself, as well as in the view of others. Put another way Habermas
sees the social evolutionary process he describes as an advancement to a
better society in terms of enlightenment and emancipation yet others would,
on the one hand, question the accuracy of the model as well as, or in place
of, on the other hand questioning it's emancipatory developmental assumptions.
This brings us to our third and final point concerning the implication
of this model for the future. There seem to be two possibilities which
present themselves as to the future application of this model: either we can
leave it alone, so to speak, and allow it's claimed inbuilt momentum to
continue along it's claimed evolutionary emancipatory pathway and maybe predict
the changes which will ensue; or we can, in the light of the dynamics of the
model, attempt to impose strategies for change and development. The first of
these strategies, on the surface, appears to be the one which Habermas is
implicitly advocating in his latest work by his discussion as to both the
nature of current societal movements as well as in the prediction of the
direction of future developments. According to Giddens (1982) Habermas:
'... is inclined to see the new social movements as
primarily defensive, concerned with protecting the
life world against further colonisation. Ecological
and anti-nuclear movements are of this kind, since
they are characteristically linked with the impetus
to defend the natural world against despoilation,
and to recreate communal relationships of various
forms. Whatever the potential for specific movements,
however, Habermas affirms strongly that the 'stitching'
between system and life-world is likely to continue
in the near future to be their point of origin'
(p. 330)
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But such a model assumes that the life world has reached it's zenith and
that the:
... major problems facing advanced industrial societies
today have to do with the self-destructive consequences
of systems growth - a growth which threatens to silence
the potential for reflection which, with the
rationalisation of the life world has become accessible
to us.'
(Thompson, 1983 p. 288)
Yet surely this process of defence, even though vitally important, cannot be
seen as the only area which should be developed? Put another way if Habermas'
prediction is correct and this is the developmental path which will ensue is
it really that emancipatory and is there not some alternative strategy which
should be pursued to advance such a goal?
This brings us somewhat naturally to the second of the two strategies
for the future: directed developments. It is here that we find Habermas'
real desire and links directly to his very clear distinction between the 'logic
of development' and the 'dynamics of historical processes'. On the one hand
Figure 3.5 (1) and all it encapsulates can be seen as the 'dynamics of historical
processes' yet on the other there is the sneeking feeling that it is more a
picture of his 'logic of development' - Habermas in effect is seeing what he
wants to see in the past to give credence and support for what he wishes to
prescribe for the future... This hesitation notwithstanding what is clear is
that to Habermas we can speak of developmental logic:
... only when the structures of the life world vary in
a way which is not accidental but directed, that is, in
a way which is dependent on learning processes that can
be systematically reconstructed. Such reconstructions
have a hypothetical status; they cannot be proved
directly but can be supported by being incorporated
into theories which are used to explain other phenomena,
like the ontogenesis of language the development of
legal systems'
(Thompson, 1983 p. 291 emphasis in original).
In other words initiatives can be taken to develop the life world by learning
processes (i.e. creating an ideal speech situation and expanding communicative
competence) but the worth and validity of this systematic process is not
192
related to this process in itself but in the effect it actually has in
moving the life world and consequently steering mechanisms and systems world
'forward'. Yet despite the sense of these relationships at an abstract level
it would be true to say that Habermas has not really grappled with this
important aspect of development which leads Thompson (1983) to the view:
'that Habermas should be pressed to provide a more
detailed account of the nature and status of the
logic of development and a more precise statement
of what would count against it'
(p. 291/292 emphasis in original)
Quite clearly such a challenge is important but unsurprising due to the 'retreat'
of Habermas, and all critical theorists as Section 3.3 has already indicated,
away from the real processes of developmental change to the pre-conditions 
for such endeavours.
In sum Habermas seems to be seeing his model of social evolution in terms
of the 'dynamics of historical processes' both for the past and future yet at
. the same time could be seen to be viewing this model as more in terms of a
'logic of development' which needs to be worked out in the future even though,
to date, little progress has been made in this direction.
Although Thompson is right to challenge Habermas to be more explicit
about the 'nature and status of the logic of development' it would be wrong
to suggest that the 'embryos' of such matters are not already contained in
Habermas's previous work even though it is not clearly apparent in his 1981
opus. In fact Habermas' three stages of Critical Theory discussed in .
Section 3.4 and summarised diagrammatically in Figure 3.4.1 can be seen as
this important 'embryo' which conveniently allows us to make some important
links between the contents of this Section and 'the three stages' discussed
in Section 3.4. Figure 3.5 (2) traces these relationships diagrammatically.
As can be seen this Figure in somewhat simple form encapsulates Habermas'
understanding of the logic of development. The present life world, steering
mechanisms and diverse system are explored through research endeavours in the
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'formulation of critical theorem' stage which then passes to the 'processes of
enlightenment' stage where such ideas are critically evaluated by both
'researchers' and 'researched'. Finally movements in the life world leading to
changes in steering mechanisms and social systems comes in the 'selection
of strategies' stage when enlightened researchers and researched move the
'elements' forward along the progressive evolutionary continuum. Quite clearly
such a model is highly simplistic and fraught with problems - which isn't really
surprising given it's highly embryonic nature. However, rather than catalogue
these problems the following will be addressed to one dominant matter which is
both central to the criticism and which also links more directly to the
reasons for this present study.
This criticism centres around what could be called the 'macro' nature of
this model and the necessity to enrich this through more micro analysis. As
Figure 3.5 (2) stands the implication is for a total macro societal shift
which on the surface given the discourse requirements of the model is difficult
to envisage. This is because the discourse model requires the identification
of discursive parties in an arena of argumentation which is difficult, if not
impossible, to operationalise at such a macro level. The nearest equivalent,
however, would be some national government body who as a steering mechanism
is meant to be aware of the societal life world and defining the 'scope' of
the various social systems in it's change through the 'media' of power and money.
However, although this is an entirely legitimate, and necessary, area of concern
for operationalising this model it would be wrong to demand that it be
exclusively applied in such a context: individual, differentiated, micro social
systems have their own life worlds and steering mechanisms, admittedly set in the
macro context, in which incremental, evolutionary and emancipatory change is
possible and should be encouraged.
It is in this latter micro context the present study is situated and in
which it should be seen. More specifically the nature of this study using many
of the conceptual terms and ideas from this Section and the previous one can be
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portrayed as in Figure 3.5 (3). Before looking at some of the detailed aspects
of this Figure it is worth making plain the interdependent factors implicit
in this diagram. By taking this micro focus we are, in effect, looking in
depth at but one small element of the 'diverse systems' presented in Figures
3.5 (1) and 3.5 (2). Thus the 'life world' and the 'steering mechanisms'
presented in these Figures are on the surface independent from the similarly
named elements in Figure 3.5 (3). However, it would be wrong to see these
respective micro and macro models as independent: they are interdependent 
even though these relationships are highly complex. For instance the life
world of the macro system must have an effect and be affected by the life
worlds in the micro systems. Likewise the steering mechanisms of the macro
system must of necessity due to it's role have an effect* upon the actions,
intentions and planned changes of the micro systems. In sum the contents of
Figure 3.5 (3) must always be seen in the societal context of Figures 3.5 (1)
and 3.5 (2) even though all the interconnections may not be altogether
apparent.
We turn now to the detail of Figure 3.5 (3) and although, hopefully, the
contents should be self explanatory there are a number of points which need
amplification which we will discuss under three headings. Firstly concerning
the variables of the model. As we have already indicated the focus of this
study is specifically with regard to the Church of England thus it is the
elements of this institution which are being referred to. We have divided
these elements into the same three which Habermas uses in the macro context.
This is partly done to supply continuity with Habermas' societal variables
but also partly because of the realism of this methodological division at the
* Unless the social system is 'overshooting' the steering mechanisms
intentions - a state which Habermas' model forsees as possible.
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micro level: there is a seeming tangible system which uses money and power
as it's main media, there are steering mechanisms in the institution which
direct, and to an extent control, the movement of money and lodgement
of power which in turn do not occur in a vacuum but as an expression of a
value system (i.e. a life world). This means that the accounting system,
which is the focus for this study, being related to finance is, of necessity,
part* of the social system and can be seen either in it's basic nature, or,
in a more meaningful manner, by making plain the steering mechanism and life
world aspects which underly it's basic design.
The second area of amplification concerns the dynamics of the model.
As Figure 3.5(3) indicates there are four major stages in the dynamics of this
model. Firstly what could be called the 'quasi-ignorance' stage where some
people know something about the accounting system and maybe something about the
underlying steering mechanism and life world but, in general, remain rather
ignorant about all of these elements. The second stage is the 'formulation of
critical theorems' with all the implications and underlying features as
discussed in Section 3.4. Using the terms from Figure 3.4.3 (1) for a
'radicalised theoretical discourse' the clarification concerning the design of
the accounting system at the social system level is equivalent to 'statements
about systems' whereas the concluding consensus about the nature of the underlying
steering mechanism and life world can be seen together as 'theoretical
explanations'.** The third stage is the 'process of enlightenment' the features
of which have also been discussed at length in Section 3.4 when both researchers
* It is for this reason that in Figure 3.5(3) the accounting system is
shown as a sub-system of the total social system.
** Chapter 5 of this study presents such 'statements about systems' and
Chapter 6 the conclusion on 'theoretical explanations'.
196
and researched come together to arrive at a possibly new and different consensus
about the accounting system design and it's contextual underpinnings in the
steering mechanism and life world (i.e. new 'statements about systems' and new
'theoretical explanations'). The fourth and final stage is the 'selection of
strategies' the nature of which is also discussed at length in Section 3.4 where
enlightened researchers and researched, primarily led by the latter, work on
practical changes and development primarily in the life world and in the steering
mechanism but also, and consequently, in the accounting system design as well.
Quite clearly each stage follows on from the previous one and in the process the
assumption is that enlightenment and emancipation are increasing and the social
evolutionary process is advanced.
The third and final area of amplification concerns the 'constraints upon
knowing and acting' which impinge and disturb this seemingly straightforward
evolutionary advance. Quite clearly there are innumerable psychological,
sociological and societal constraints which could lead to a continuation of
some distortion in communication, sub-optimality in change strategies and
ultimately a somewhat 'messy' evolutionary advance. Many of these are to an
extent situation specific to the system and people involved and thus will be
left for detailed discussion in this study until later when the detail
surrounding the Church of England is explored. However, even at this stage it
is valuable to give some insight into the possible nature of these constraints.
The following looks at three possible examples of these constraints which
relate to the three linkages between the developmental stages of Figure 3.5 (3).
A possible constraint which could disturb the movement from the 'quasi-ignorance'
to 'formulation of critical theorems' stages could be of a cognitive nature.
For instance researchers may neither have the ability nor an adequate enough
acclimatisation with the institution to enable 'critical theorems' of the sort
envisaged to be formulated. Another constraint which could disturb the movement
from the 'critical theorems' to the 'enlightenment' stages could be connected
' with an attitude of unwillingness on the part of the researched to indulge in
such critical reflection for real 'psycho-social' reasons. Psycho-social
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analysis is as Wasdell (1983A) points out an attempt:
'... to generate a synthesis between intrapersonal and
social analysis' (p. 1)
based primarily on psychoanalysis due to it's avowed agenda:
'... to generate a system of understanding of human
behaviour which reaches from the depths of intra-
personal unconscious, through the family and the
small group, to the boundaries of major social
systems'
(Wasdell, 1983A, p.1)
Habermas, as will be recalled, uses psychoanalysis as an 'exemplar for critical
theory' (Held, 1980 p. 276) and uses such insights primarily in the sense that
Wasdell is using them to explain the nature and intentions of institutions.
Habermas (1978) puts this dynamic in context when he says:
'As long as the pressure of reality is overpowering
and ego organisation is weak, so that institutional
renunciation can only be brought about by forces
of effect, the species finds collective solutions
for the problem of defense, which resemble neurotic
solutions at the individual level. The same
configurations that drive the individual to neurosis
move society to establish institutions' (p. 276)
Thus if institutions are formed to act as a collective defence mechanism against
individual anxiety and the people who join such institutions wish to be so
defended they are going to be highly resistent to understanding the real
institutional life world on the grounds of the personal anxiety which could
ensue and against which they purposefully wished to be protected by membership
in the first place. This possible constraint also has a bearing on disturbing
the movement from the 'enlightenment' to the 'selection of strategies' stage:
individual participants adequately defended through current institutional
arrangements may not feel either able or willing to encourage changes even
though the hope and intention would be as Held (1980) suggests:
'... As the level of repression diminishes, the
institutional framework of a society can be
changed to accommodate a higher level of need
gratification' (p. 277)
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However, apart from these possible psycho-social constraints which could
reduce the level of change there are also societal, primarily legal,
constraints which could reduce possible developments even further. Thus the
macro steering mechanisms as their role suggests could seriously interfere
in the amount and nature of change in the micro system so that any developments
are restricted. However, as Habermas has already indicated social systems
are quasi-independent and can 'overshoot' the steering mechanism leading to
'crises' in these institutional mechanisms and 'inner colonisation' of the
macro life world.
Quite clearly all of the above points on constraints are examples only and
not intended to be exhaustive. In fact, the actual nature of these are
likely to be much more specific to the institution being analysed.
Thus to understand either the specific nature of these constraints or the
models being put forward in this Section or the previous one we need to get
involved in a specific outworking which is the intention behind the remainder
of this study. However, the thrust, nature and assumptions of these models
discussed in the abstract in the above must not be lost sight of in the detail
that follows since such insights supply vital benchmarks for evaluating the
status of the material to come.
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3.6 SOME CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This chapter has been addressed to justifying the need for adopting
a critical theoretical approach for satisfying this study's concern and to
the design of a detailed model in such a context.
To justify the use of a critical theory approach we have traced the
historical dynamics of Burrell and Morgan's framewurk so as to crystallise
the key question which needed to be faced to supply such justification.
The key question that was discovered was: do we want Kantian or Comtean
accounting? The answer argued for was a Kantian approach because such
reasoning permits subjective interpretations and doesn't assume universality-.•
important assumptions for the accounting systems in enterprise contexts which
may well possess such qualities. An analysis of language g of which our
defined accounting systems are part,helped to reinforce the need for taking
a Kantian rather than Comtean approach since the dominant approach in the
theory of language, following the later Wittgenstein, is fundamentally
Kantian. However, as indicated Kant's ideas left some ambivalence on
whether anything exists as distinct from our subjective interpretation of its
existence and whether radical change in terms of these phenomena are to be
encouraged or discouraged. Fichte and Hegel , the two primary followers of
Kant, emphasised different aspects of this ambivalence - the former took a
more 'subjective and no change' approach and the latter a more 'objective
and change' orientation. Thus the supplementary question became:do we want
a Fichtean or Hegelian approach for satisfying the concern of this study.
The answer argued for was aHegelian approach as expressed through critical
theory on the grounds that such an approach was more flexible and all
encompassing allowing both subjective and objective interpretations of reality
as well as facing the possibility of radical change. The Fichtean approach
and its derivatives and the later Marxian derivative of Hegalian thought both
put restrictions on this interpretation which were considered to be inappropriate
for the phenomena of interest of this study.
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Thus critical theory was seen to be able to supply the necessary
approach for this study and the remainder of the Chapter was addressed to
developing the detailed aspects of this. Firstly we attempted to expose
what we called the dominant theme of critical theory: the 'transformation
of society' and the need to see theory only in such a context. The problems
in interpreting this dominant concern were highlighted and the resulting
partial retreat to looking at the preconditions for change rather than the
actual 'transformation' was discussed. The relevance of this dominant theme,
even in it's abridged form, was shown to be completely compatible with the
concern of this study which was seen to be yet another justification for using
critical theory in this context. Secondly,on the basis of Habermas' standing
as the latest and possibly the most innovative of the critical theorists, we
argued a case for using his interpretation of this dominant theme and then
presented and discussed, in detail, his model of theory and practice. - an
overview of which is presented in Figures 3.4.1 and 3.5(3).
Habermas' model was discussed in terms of its particular application
in facing the general issues surrounding the design of accounting systems in
enterprise contexts although it was clearly indicated that this was one, out
.16
of many, possible interpretations of this model. Habermas, as we pointed out,
has not specified clearly the 'phenomena of interest' for his model even
though his rare interpretations have been on the 'proletariat and the political
struggle': a not unsurprising example with his dominant interest in social
evolution. Yet, as indicated, there.are many aspects to the political
struggle and to social evolution and the concern for the design of accounting
systems both fitted such requirements and could be seen legitimately as part
of this on-going process.
Thus, in conclusion, Habermas' model, suitably interpreted in terms of
accounting system design, is put forward as a general approach with regard
to such concerns. If we are concerned with understanding and developing
accounting systems in particular enterprise contexts then the argument is
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that this Habermasian model with it's concern for critical theorems,
enlightenment and practical action forms a suitable general methodological
approach for such endeavours. If such a concern is really the central rather
than some peripheral issue in accounting then the ramifications for our
literature and the nature of our knowledge are great indeed if and only if 
the logic of the argument which we have put forward in these three Chapters
which leads to the adoption of the Critical Theory approach is justified.
Such issues can only ever be resolved by critical debate, following the
logic of the ideal speech situation, if we are to arrive at some meaningful
consensus. Such a debate must wait for the future. In the meantime it is
important to see whether the model actually 'works' in an empirical situation.
The problems and successes of such an application will undoubtedly need to
be faced if we are going to have any success at all in arguing the case for
what is essentially a radical change in accounting thought.
The remainder of this study is addressed to such an endeavour - the
researcher's problems and successes in applying this model in understanding
and developing accounting systems in the Church of England.
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CHAPTER 4 
AN INSIGHT INTO THE NATURE OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND 
FROM A PREDOMINANTLY FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 
4.0 SOME INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS 
This, and the following two chapters are addressed to the design of
critical theorems with regard to the accounting systems in the Church of
England following as closely as possible the dynamics of a radicalised
theoretical discourse as depicted in Figure 3.4.3(1).
This Chapter attempts to give something of an overview as to the nature
of the Church of England from a predominantly financial perspective. This
perspective is chosen for four major reasons. Firstly because of this
study's overarching interest in accounting systems which, using the accounting
definition adopted in this study, is clearly related to the finances
of any institution. Thus to understand the finances gives pointers to understanding
the accounting systems. Secondly because it provides a vehicle for making
a choice on which of the many accounting systems we should look at. This
selection is necessary since, in effect, the Church of England has over 13,000
separate and unique funding, and therefore, accounting units, a comprehensive
study of all of which would not really be feasible. Thus any choice must be
careful and set in the overall context of the whole financial system. Thirdly
this perspective is selected due to the centrality of finance in this institution.
Finances and their contextual underpinnings have shaped the Church of England
more than many would readily admit despite it's more avowed altruistic and
spiritual objectives. Fourthly, and finally, a perspective has to be taken
when approaching such a diverse, complex historical institution such as the
Church of England. This institution, the most ancient in the land, dates back
over eighteen hundred years thus to capture any sort of comprehensive understanding
which covers all facets is virtually impossible. It is clearly more beneficial
to take one perspective and do it comprehensively rather than attempt a full
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picture and lose out on detail - such indeed is the assumption under which
the following is based.
This Chapter has two major sections to it with a final one which not
only presents the customary conclusions but gives clear pointers to the
accounting systems which appear to be the most obvious candidates for
investigation. Section 4.1 gives greater emphasis to the actual
detailed finances of the Church of England and the changes which have occurred
in their complex nature over the last twenty five years or so. Throughout
this Section we will look at many of the contextual underpinnings which are
reflected in these funds flows. This will be pursued more carefully anti
historically in Section 4.2 but still with the financial perspective clearly
in mind. In sum and in simple terms,Section 4.1 looks at finances first and
context second while Section 4.2 looks at context first and finances second
but with a constant financial perspective running throughout.
Before moving into the main body of this chapter it is worth reflecting
on how this material will be used in the context of the more accounting
oriented discussions of Chapters 5 and 6. As should be clear from the previous
chapters the dominant view of this study is that the accounting system of any
institution is some reflection or expression of the nature of that institution.
We are in this Chapter attempting to portray something of this underlying
nature which we will draw on, develop and amplify in the following chapters
as we move towards the design of the critical theorems with regard to the
accounting systems chosen.
4.1 THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND FROM A FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 
As a start to understanding the Church of England from a financial perspective
•
it is helpful to trace the major areas of income and expenditure of this
institution as a whole. Unfortunately up until 1963 no such picture is available.
There are clearly many different reasons for this which need not necessarily
concern us at this stage. However, in the Autumn of 1963 the General Synod of
the Church of England (the governing body of the church) appointed what came to
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be known as the Archbishops Advisors on Needs and Resources to advise 'on
the needs and resources of the Church of England and to keep these matters
under constant review.' These Advisors produced eight reports during the
period 1964 to 1975. The Advisors' appointment lapsed in 1976 and the work
was taken over by a new Joint Liaison Committee (between the Central Board of
Finance and the Church Commissioners*) who have to date produced three reports
(1978, 1980 and 1982).
These eleven reports together form the only comprehensive picture of the
Church of England as a whole from a financial perspective - but they date back
only to 1963 when the Advisors were originally appointed. A summary of this
information is given in Table 4.1(1). There are clearly many problems with
the accuracy of these figures which are inevitable in trying to consolidate
data from over 13,000 partially independent units who are neither obliged nor
necessarily willing to produce information on a uniform basis.** Despite
such doubts surrounding the figures the contents of Table 4.1(1) supply some
valuable general insights. We will look at two.
Firstly the Table shows the dominant areas of income and expenditure. The
income of the Church of England is fundamentally from two sources: investment
income and giving by current members in the parochial churches. The investment
income comes fromabroad asset base (historic cost value (net) £1,630,419,000
at 31st December 1983) held by the Church Commissioners which is the collected
endowments of the Church dating back over many centuries.*** The giving comes
See below and Section 4.2 for more details on the make up of these bodies.
** Certainly the Central Statistics Department of the Central Board of Finance
which officially came into existence in 1955 has made great strides in drawing
uniform comparative information out of, particularly, parishes yet the
implicit or explicit problems of aiming towards uniformity in a diverse
situation remain very real indeed.
*** Section 4.2 will discuss further the history and make up of these
endowments.
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from the current membership of the Church of England. Like so many statistics
of this complex enterprise it is difficult to say exactly who are the members
of the Church of England. However Table 4.1(2) give some idea of the total
membership based on electoral roll members (the official membership record),
Easter communicants and Christmas communicants. As can be seen this Table
traces these membership figures from 1956 to 1980 (the last date when full
statistics are available) as related to the population showing percentage changes
between these dates. Clearly these membership statistics are somewhat biased
upwards since there are many fringe members who may well be attenders at
Christmas and Easter and possibly on the official membership roll but not
necessarily 'full and active' members of the Church of England. It could be,
for this reason, that in recent years (since 1976) membership figures have
included 'normal' communicants and 'normal' sunday attenders as depicted in
Table 4.1(3) all of which give much reduced levels of current membership.
Whichever figure is taken as the membership of the Church of England two things
are clear: firstly it is declining and secondly it is from these that current
giving is received.
The remaining item of income which appears from 1976* onwards is basically
made up of three elements as Table 4.1(4) indicates. The parochial and clergy
fees constitutes the charges made for funerals and weddings. The fees are
based on a national scale modified annually by the Church Commissioners and
General Synod and have increased quite substantially in recent years. The part
time chaplaincy receipts comes almost exclusively from Area Health Authorities
in respect of a reimbursement for the services of hospital chaplains. The state
aid for churches is based on an agreement between the government and the Church
of England to give annually, from 1979, to the Church the equivalent of Elm in
1973 prices for the maintenance of historic church buildings. The agreement also
gave some assistance during the interim years 1977 to 1978 before the contractual
year of 1979.
* Some of these items were received before 1976 but did not feature in previous
reports by the Archbishop's Advisors.
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We now need to turn to the expenditure of the Church of England. As
Table 4.1(1) demonstrates the expenditure of the Church of England is
fundamentally on the ministry, .public worship and buildings although other
expenses such as administration are taking an increasing proportion of income.
The ministry element is fundamentally made up of the salaries, expenses,
housing, pensions and training of the full time and retired staff of the
institution. Table 4.1(5) presents the detailed breakdown of these expenses
between the various elements while Tables 4.1(6) and 4.1(7) gives some details
on the man (and woman) power over time and the ages of those in various roles
in mid-1981. Salaries of this staff have always formed the major element of the
ministry expenses but even though the percentage growth has been 63.3 and 199.6
for the decades 1963-1973 and 1973-1983 respectively these have, in fact, not
kept pace with inflation.* Although moves have been made, particularly in the
mid 1970's, to undertake some 'catching up' on staff salaries such a move was
abandoned in the end due to various pressures on financing.** However, coupled
with this desire to improve the salaries of the full time staff, moves*** have
been made to improve the payment of working expenses and maintain the housing
of the staff in a more orderly way both of which have been markedly successful
as the percentage growth figures indicate. Likewise the payment of pensions
has increased in real terms but also in the numbers of retired staff drawing
pensions as Table 4.1(8) indicates. The training of future assistant clergy
* Based on the Retail Price Index a 74% and 225% growth for the decades
1963-1973 and 1973-1983 respectively are required to maintain 1963 and
1973 buying power.
** We will return to some of these issues in forthcoming sections.
*** In 1967 the Church Assembly (the governing body which metamorphosed into
the General Synod in 1970) requested the Church Commissioners to initiate
consultations with Dioceses with a view to adopting suitable schemes to
ensureworking expenses were and are paid. Likewise the Repair and Benefice
Buildings Measure 1972 required dioceses to take on the responsibility of
ensuring that maintenance of parochial houses for full time staff was and is
carried out. Both of these initiatives came out of the neglect by the
Church either at the centre or at the local level to adequately compensate
staff for expenses or keep their houses (owned by the Church) in good repair.
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via the Church of England theological colleges (there were 14 such colleges
in 1982 training 873 future clergymen and deaconnesses) has always been
important yet, as Table 4.1(5) indicates, the cost of this training has increased
immensely during the last decade in comparison with 1963-73 and previous years.
The reason is not that there is a marked increase in the numbers being trained
(see Table 4.1(9) for some details on this) even though there is an upward turn
following the Archbishop's encouragement in 1977 to parish priests to 'foster
the vocation of the stipendiary ministry'!' The reasons are two fold: firstly
because the actual nature of the training is costing more and secondly, and
possibly more importantly, that the support received by local authority and
government grants is reducing markedly leaving a higher proportion to be met by
Church funds.
The other major expenditure area,as Table 4.1(1) indicates is on public•
worship and buildings. Public places of worship and the costs of upkeep and
functioning of these tangible sites have always played a major part in the life
of the Church of England.** As Table 4.1(10) indicates there were, at the end
of 1981 (the last date when full statistics are available), 16,806 such places
of worship in England which consumed £63.2m (average consumption 0761) as
compared with say the 1970 places of worship of 17,670 consuming £21.9m (average
£1239). The average expenditure has increased by 203.5% which is a reduction
in real terms since based on the retail price index between these dates to
maintain 1970 buying power in 1981 requires an increase of 278.2%. This seems
* Faced with a growing number of retirements (see Table 4.1(7) and 4.1(8) and
a falling number of ordinations the then Archbishop of Canterbury (Donald
Coggan) took the somewhat unprecedented step of writing to all clergy in
January 1977 encouraging them to encourage others to face and follow the possible
'call' to the stipendary ministry so as to stop the slide downwards in the
full time staff (see Table 4.1(6)).
** See Section 4.2 for more details about the history surrounding this.
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to indicate a possible deterioration in either the buildings or the service
offered through them. Another interesting point to note from Table 4.1(10)
is the total and percentage reduction in places of worship between 1957 and
1981. As can be seen this gives only a 6.5% reduction as compared with the
much higher reductions in membership (see Table 4.1(2)) and manpower to support
such buildings (see Table 4.1(6)). To understand why such a seeming anomaly
exists is clearly important but will not be explored here although later
sections will discuss this issue.
This brings us to the two final elements of expenditure in Table 4.1(1):
other items and gifts/donations. As Table 4.1(11) indicates the other expenses
are basically in two areas: education and organisation or administration
expenses.* As can be seen the bulk of the expenditure in this area is on
administering the Church. In real terms this has increased between 1976 and 1983
on the basis that the retail price index requires an 89% increase on 1976
figures to maintain that year's buying power. On the other hand the education
expenditure (the other 'other' item) has declined in real terms.
	 However,
it is not surprising to see the administrative costs increasing in the Church
of England because of the growing complexity of the institution along with, as
we shall see, an expanding amount of money, which needs to be administered,
which flows between internal accounts in this enterprise.**
The gifts and donations element of these other expenses constitutes the
giving by, particularly, the parochial Churches to, home and overseas
missions and charities.
Clearly there are other possible categories in this residual items which
may or may not be included in the figures. These two areas, however, are
considered by the Archbishop's Advisors and the Joint Liaison Committee to
constitute the dominant 'other' expenses.
** The issues surrounding these flows will be discussed further at the end
of this current Section.
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This then completes our somewhat brief summary of dominant areas of
income and expenditure in the Church of England as depicted in Table 4.1(1),
we turn now to the second general insight which is forthcoming from this Table
concerning the mix and change in income sources. As Table 4.1(1) indicates
throughout the twenty year period investment income has consistently accounted
for between thirty and forty percent of total expenditure. In fact as the two
decades growth figures indicate, real, as distinct from inflationary, increases
have occurred although in the latter ten years such development has not been as
great.* This reflects not only the careful management of historical resources
but also an ability to allow portfolios to grow probably more so in the 1963-1973
decade as compared with the following ten years.
The 'cushioning' from the interest of historic endowments for current
expenditure has been long and sustained although there are clear signs that the
substance of this will, and is, declining now and in the future. There are two
forces at work to make this inevitable. Firstly there is the financial force
which results in the total costs of the Church of England increasing at a
faster rate than the rate of growth in investment income. As a result, of
course, investment income naturally plays a less important role. Evidence for
this can be seen in the percentage growth figures for investment income and
total expenditure for the two decades 1963-1973 and 1973-1983: for the first
decade the growth of total costs actually went down in real terms** whereas
the growth of investment income went up (in real terms) by 18.9% (92.9% less 74%),
whereas in the second decade although there was real growth in investment
* In the decade 1963-1973 real growth was 18.9% (92.9% less 74.0%) and in
1973-1983, 16.8% (241.8% less 225.0%) - a 2.1% drop or 11% decline on
1963-1973 real growth.
** A 74% growth in 1973 is required to maintain 1963 buying power. Thus
there was a real decrease of 22.5% (74% less 51.5%).
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income of 15.8% (241.8% less the inflation element of 225.0%) there was a
real growth in total expenditure of 60% (285.0% less 225.0%). These figures
also indicate that the real growth in investment income is declining between
the two decades (18.9% in 1963-1973 and 15.9% in 1973-1983).
The second force at work is more altruistic and less inevitable in
terms of becoming reality. Increasingly a number of Churchman and others are
saying that the Church of England should not allow such cushioning to continue -
the income should not be spent on the Church's current costs but rather given
away to needy causes. The argument is simply that today's Church members
should meet the costs of today's Church and that it is enough to use the
buildings from past endowments without using the income from past capital as
well. Two recent consultations set up by the Central Board of Finance and
by the General Synod both took this view as their respective published reports
(1980, 1981) indicate:
'Most parishes should aim to become financially self-
supporting by about 1990... Over a time-scale to be
agreed, the Church of England should move towards being
able to say to the Church Commissioners: 'We do not
need any of the £42 million (or whatever the total is
by then) for our current work. Please use it instead
for our agreed programme of giving to others', the
necessary statutory authority being obtained from
Parliament for this purpose'.
(How should the Church Pay It's Way?, 1980, p. 10)
'The wealth controlled by the Church Commissioners is
unique in the Anglican Communion and therefore carries
unique responsibility. This responsibility should be
more clearly seen and be a model to others in their
investment policy. The wealth should increasingly be
used for mission, not just maintenance, so subventions
to parishes should be phased out by 1995, and money
redeployed in poor and underdeveloped areas at home
and overseas, for Anglicans and ecumenically. Where
necessary the law must be changed to make this possible.'
(To a Rebellious House?, 1981, pp. 47 & 48)
Whether these recommendations become reality remains to be seen.
However, one thing is certain: theproportion of investment income relative
to total income requirements will continue to decrease as the years progress and
if expenditures continue to rise as in the last few years giving by current members
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must inevitably increase to cover these needs - yet here lies some problems.
Giving by members is increasingly becoming the key element in how much or how
little the Church can expend. Yet it is not as simple as that since much of
the expenditure set out in Table 4.1(1) is , to a large extent , fixed covering as
it does staff costs and running expenses of buildings which are in existence.
Thus the question shifts to the ability of the current Church members to
cover the shortfall between 'inevitable' costs less investment income as is
clearly apparent in the nature of the recent reports by the Joint Liaison
Committee of the Central Board of Finance and the Church Commissioners (1978,
1980, 1982). But as percentage growth in giving figures in Table 4.1(1)
indicates there is an unpreparedness of current church members to respond to
this challenge precisely because of the cushioning from the past. So in 1963-1973
giving only rose by 27.9% - an actual real decrease of 46.1% (27.9% less 74.0%
inflationary element) because such money was not required to keep the institution
running. However, in the decade 1973-1983 to cover the costs a real growth in
1973 giving required is 58% (283.0% less 225.0% inflationary element). Such
a massive swing of expectations with a declining membership (see Tables 4.1(2)
and 4.1(3)) would be expected to cause some difficulties which undoubtedly it is
as will become apparent both in the following and in later sections.
This then concludes the insights which are forthcoming from the basic
summry of income and expenditure as presented in Figure 4.1(1); however, this
simple picture disguises some important financial complexities in the Church of
England and it is to these we now turn. We have, to date, somewhat casually
talked about the parishes and the dioceses and certain central funds (Church
Commissioners and the Central Board of Finance) but we now need to delve a
little deeper into these and their interconnections from a financial perspective.*
* More will be said as to their histories in Section 4.2.
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But first a few introductory comments.
The whole of England is divided into 2 provinces (Canterbury and York),
43 dioceses and 13,663 parishes (1981 figure) as Table 4.1(L2) indicates. The
parish unit is a geographical concept as is a diocese and all parishes have
one or more churches (16,806 in 1981) but can often by served by common
benefices (10,268 in 1981). A benefice is fundamentally a property right over
land (called glebe), and other property (parsonages and churches) which is
lodged in the person who is the present incumbent (a clergyman) of a, or number
of, parishes.
The central organisations although all based in London are not geographically
bound as are the dioceses and parishes. They are nine such units out of the
centre which have been created to serve particular and changing functional
needs.*
A great deal of money flows between these central, diocesan and parish units.
To give some idea of the magnitude of these amounts Tables 4.1(13) and 4.1(14)
give a picture of the detailed internal flows for 1978 and 1980 based on a
comprehensive analysis of the accounts plus the statistics from the Church of
England Yearbook.** These transfers can be coupled with a slightly different
analysis of income and expenditure (to Table 4.1(1) that is) to give the
comprehensive picture as presented in Tables 4.1(15) and 4.1(16) for 1978 and
1980.
Before looking at some of the important points which can come from this
analysis it is necessary to comment on the differences in the figures as
contained in Tables 4.1(1) and 4.1(15) and 4.1(16). Table 4.1(1) shows the
* More about the nature of these will be discussed in Section 4.2
** Unfortunately it was not possible to obtain all the accounts of the
43 dioceses for 1978 and 1980 but the figures for these are created
from a careful reconstruction of these based on both the sample seen
and some additional summary information.
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total income and expenditure for 1978 and 1980 as being the same amount in
respective years of £126.8m and £180.7m. The figures in 4.1(15) and 4.1(16)
are approximately between two to three million pounds up on these. The reason
for these differences is that there are errors and omissions in all the sets
of figures which reinforces again how difficult it is to get a completely
accurate picture of the Church of England as a whole. Having said that the
figures are accurate enough, and not that different from one another anyway,
to give one confidence that they give a reasonable, if approximate, picture
of the finances of this enterprise.
There are three sets of points to make which come from the contents of
these Tables — particularly Tables 4.1(15) and 4.1(16). Firstly with regard
to issues surrounding the income of the Church. Secondly on matters related
to the expenditure and thirdly on issues surrounding the internal transfers
between central, diocesan and parochial units.
Firstly then on income matters. As Tables 4.1(15) and 4.1(16) indicate
the source of income varies greatly between the different units. Income for
the Church Commissioners is entirely from past bequests and current transfers
with the latter increasing at a very fast rate indeed. Whereas income for the
parishes comes, in the main, from current sources although income from past
bequests and previous savings are not insignificant.* However, many of these
units are actually financed through internal flows. The principle units being
the General Synod Fund (which collects for and transfers to the following
three funds numbered 3 to 5 in Tables 4.1(15) and 4.1(16)), the Pensions
•
* This does not, however, includes the income from all past parochial bequests
most of which are currently held by the Church Commissioners on behalf of
the parishes. Thus part of the £44m and £60m income of the Church
Commissioners is parochial — see Section 4.2 for more details on this
complexity.
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Fund and the dioceses. Without adequate funding by internal transfers these
would not be able to perform their alloted tasks. The Investment Fund, on
the other hand, while receiving its income from current sources achieves
that through the capital of others, particularly Church units. In fact,
this fund was set up (in 1958) so that some of the past bequests of the
Church could be brought together and maximised through careful collective
management. Clearly not all* Church resources are invested with the
Investment Fund and the Fund also invests capital from non-Church sources.
We turn now to a number of points surrounding the expenditure profile
of Tables 4.1(15) and 4.1(16). The first important point to note is the
dominance of expenditure on parish related activities. Thus the central
even diocesan funds are not primarily concerned with their respective
central and diocesan activities but rather with their support
and encouragement of the parochial ministry. Thus, for instance, the Church
Commissioner's income is basically spent on the salaries housing and pensions
of the parochial and diocesan (bishops, archdeacons etc.) clergy - the former
being 'parish related' and the latter 'diocesan related'** the 'central related'
element involves the costs of administering these. The second thing to note is
the importance, as on the income side , of internal transfers in the expenditure
profile: payments are made from most of the units with the parishes, dioceses
and Church Commissioners leading the way. Comments about the expenditure
transfers need to be set in the context of points surrounding transfers generally,
thus it is to these we now turn.
* For instance the Church Commissioners inheritances are only partially
invested with the Investment Fund.	 •
** This, of course, highlights how arbitrary the expenditure classification
scheme of Tables 4.1(15) and 4.1(16) really is. Many, if not most, bishops
and other diocesan dignitaries would say their work is really more 'parish
related' rather than 'diocesan related'.
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There are a number of points to make with regard to these transfers.
Firstly to note their increasing maknitude. As Tables 4.1(13) and
4.1(14) indicate transfers have increased by £25,011,206 between 1978 and
1980 which represents a growth of 68.6% on the 1978 figure. The bulk of the
increases are traceable to two major changes between the parishes and the
dioceses (£12,581,556 increase) and dioceses and the Church Commissioners
(£9,182,500 increase) with the balance being explainable by a mixture of
upward movements with Pension Fund transfers being particularly prominent.
The second important point to note concerning these transfers is the importance
of the dioceses in these internal flows. The dioceses collectively handles
£31,705,242 and £54,781,019 of the 1978 and 1980 transfers which are
respectively 87% and 89.2% of the totals. Money is received from the Church
Commissioners for supporting parsonage repairs and from parishes for the balance
of expenditure items and paid out to the Church Commissioners for salaries
(which are paid through this body) to the Central Board of Finance and on
parsonage repairs and diocesan committees and administration. In fact, the
dioceses are pivotal in the whole financial system and are finding their
budgets increasing for reasons which are not entirely their making.
In fact, as Table 4.1(17) indicates their total budgets have increased
by 387.8% between 1973 and 1980 which is due largely to a 1,939.8% increase
in the parochial salaries (stipends) demands from the Church Commissioners
(who are, it will be recalled, the official paymasters). As Table 4.1(17)
so clearly demonstrates the bulk of this new money has had to come from the
parishes. This brings us naturally to our third point: the amount of money
to be gathered from parishes is both increasing in absolute amounts as well
as in proportion to total ordinary income. Table 4.1(18) gives something of
a feel for the magnitude of these changes between the years 1956 and 1980
indicating a growth in absolute amounts of 2,741.7% and in proportional
amounts from 8% of ordinary income in 1956 to 35.6% in 1980. As can be seen
the real changes occurred during the period 1973 and 1976 and have been
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consistently increasing since that time. Unfortunately,,due to a lag in the
gathering of statistics in the Church of England as a whole, it is difficult
to give actual details of changes since 1980. However, by looking at the
accounts of the Diocese of Sheffield both before and since 1980 it is
possible to use this as a microcosm of what is happening in the Church of
England as a whole particularly in more recent years.* As Table 4.1(19)
indicates the Diocese of Sheffield quotas have been consistently approximately
20% below the total increases for 1976, 1978 and 1980. If one transposes this
onto the quotas for 1981 to 1983 for the Diocese of Sheffield then the total
national quotas for 1983 would be E109,519,331 or 258.2% growth on the 1980
figures. Or alternatively, and possibly more realistically, if we assume
a similar percentage of the Sheffield quota viz a viz the total quotas for
1980 to continue in 1983 the total parochial quota will equal £71,895,165 - a
growth of 135.1% as in the Sheffield quotas. Whichever figure is taken the
point is clear: increases in parochial quotas has not abated since 1980 and
if anything have accelerated.
This then concludes our look at the Church of England from fundamentally
a financial perspective. Many issues have been raised and not dealt with
which was intended at this stage. The above and the following Section is
intended basically as background information on the Church of England. However
it is not some value neutral survey: the points raised are in the context of
* Using simple bivariate regression on these percentages in Table 4.1(19) gives
the following:	 R2 Standard Error
1956-1983 0.57 19.98
1970-1980 0.98 7.43
1976-1983 0.99 0.18
which suggests more than a coincidental relationship particularly in
later years.
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moving towards both the choice of accounting systems to be looked at (to be
introduced and discussed in Section 4.3) and the statements explanations and
conclusions (critical theorems in other words) relevant to these systems
(to be looked at in Chapter 5 and 6). As will become apparent we will be
drawing from the above and the following sections insight's'in the context of
these critical theorems as they take shape.
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4.2 SOME INSIGHT INTO THE HISTORICAL AND STRUCTURAL CONTEXT UNDERLYING 
THE FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK
Section 4.1 has attempted to portray something of the Church of England
from a financial perspective tracing both it's nature and changing nature
in the last twenty five years. We have already touched on some of the
contextual points underlying this framework (e.g. manpower, buildings,
parishes, dioceses etc.) yet have consistently held back from tracing the
origins of these phenonema. This Section is intended to make amends for this
so as to link the finances of the Church of England more clearly to the dynamics
of it's , particularly, historical context but without losing sight of the
dominant financial perspective of this whole Chapter .
The basic structure of the Church of England in terms of central, diocesan
and parochial units which became apparent in discussing the finances in Section
4.1 gives an entirely adequate design for the points to be made. Thus
Sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.3 will be addressed to issues related to respectively
diocesan, parochial and central matters.
This ordering is not arbitrary and is based on a chronological development
of this basic structure of the Church of England. In other words dioceses came
first, parishes second and the central units last. As will become apparent
dioceses can be traced back to the sixth century, parishes to the eighth and
the seedlings of centralisation to the eleventh just before and following the
Norman conquest. Clearly none of these dates are absolute but they highlight
an important chronological progression in the affairs of the Church of England
which needs to be understood if one is to put the finances, and their supporting
accounting systems, in their dynamic historical contexts.
4.2.1 The Development of Dioceses 
Although believing Christians, bishops and other clergy are traceable
from approximately 200 A.D., the growth of dioceses as we know them today date
back originally to the Roman mission of 597 by Augustine. The diocesan structure
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fundamentally is Roman in origin and thus Augustine, coming as he did on the
command and instruction of Pope Gregory , naturally intended to reproduce such
asystem in England.
However such a structure, partly through design and partly through
necessity, had to initially fit in with the Anglo-Saxon kingdoms which divided
up England. Although these kingdoms shifted and changed a great deal seven
major ones emerged* (Kent, East Saxons (Essex), West Saxons (Wessex), South
Saxons (Sussex), East Anglia, Mercia and Northumbria). The early dioceses were
coterminous with these kingdoms and were created as and when the respective
kings and queens permitted the cotermination to occur. Such important links
between State and Church, therefore, occurred at the very outset of this
institution and the issues surrounding such a linkage have been, and are, a major
)
factor in its total make-up.
The initial movements into these seven kingdoms was for this reason far
from orderly. Augustine, although the initiator of dioceses in England, spent
most of his time in the Kingdom of Kent bringing the coterminous diocese of
Canterbury into being. His missionary endeavours were not all that successful
or fruitful although the Diocese of London in the Kingdom of the East Saxons
(Essex) is traceable to him. However, although formulated by him in the year
of his death (604) it remained in some disarray until 630. Paulinus another
monk who worked both during and after Augustine's death in Kent can be seen to
be the originator of the Diocese of York in the Kingdom of Northumbria.
Paulinus' introduction to this Kingdom (in 625) was as an accompanying Bishop
to a Kentish princess who was to marry Edwin the King of Northumbria. The Diocese
of York was formulated in 627 but somewhat thrown into disarray by the overthrow
of King Edwin in 633 by Cadwallon. A subsequent defeat of Cadwallon brought
* Known to historians as the 'Heptarchy' (Fisher, 1973, p. 110)
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Oswald to the throne of Northumbria and re-established the Diocese not at
York but at Lindisfarne calling not on Canterbury but on Iona* to supply
the bishop, namely Aidan, to lead.
The move to make other major kingdoms into coterminous dioceses cannot
be traced directly to either Canterbury or York although they can be traced
to individuals who differed in their allegiance to respectively Rome and
Lindisfarne/Iona. The Diocese of Dunwich (East Anglia) came into being in 631
through a Burgundian bishop called Felix who was invited by the King of East Anglia
to that Kingdom to form a Christian diocese. The Kingdom of the West
Saxons became coterminous with the Diocese of Dorchester in 634 following
the burning evangelical drive of a Roman called Birinus. Due to some degree of
imposition of both himself and his faith on this Kingdom his labours were not:
1 ... crowned with immediate success'
(Moorman, 1973 p. 17)
The move to allow Christian influence into Mercia was much later due to the
nmistence of the heathen King. However, in 653 he allowed four Christian
priests of Lindisfarne,rather than Roman i persuasion to enter his Kingdom and
the Diocese of Mercia, coterminous with this domain, was created in 656.
Thus by 656 all the great Anglo Saxon kingdoms were, in effect, dioceses
as well with their own bishop** and cathedral building manned by a number of
clergy under the overall leadership of the bishop. The bishop was, in effect, the
spiritual leader and it was to him that parish priests (as and when they started
to appear (see Section 4.2.2 for details ) looked for instruction and help.
Augustine had it's
his exile from
* The later Celtic, church before Roman influence through
centre at Iona established by Columba in 563 following
Ireland.
** The creation of a diocese and the election of a bishop
and are seen as one and the same action.
to rule were seen,
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But the bishops and dioceses ,as we have already indicated i were, in these
early days, subservient to the king of the kingdom with which the diocese
was coterminous. The king was regarded not only as the head of the Church
but as:
	  the vicar of Christ among a Christian folk'
(from the Laws of Ethelred II quoted by Stenton (1943)
p. 538)
All appointments to bishoprics were made by the king and many of the king's
advisors were ecclesiastics. In the shire-courts a where Anglo-Saxon justice
and administration was conducted / the bishop was not only present but played
a large part in deciding judgements on all matters - not just spiritual. In
this way State and Church, in persona king and bishop, were interlocked and
intermeshed.
However, such a state was hardly well received by those bishops of Roman
persuasion since their 'vicar' was not the king but the pope. The importance
of pope and Rome rather than king and Kingdom was given new impetus by, somewhat
surprisingly Oswy the King of Northumbria. He and his wife were respectful
of different Christian traditions: he looked to Lindisfarne she to Rome. The
differences led to strange anomalies in Christian heritage including different
times for celebrating Easter. The King called a 'synod' at Whitby in 663
heard the evidence and voted in favour of Rome which in effect led ultimately
to the death of Lindisfarne and Celtic influence but also a reduction in the
power of the King viz a viz the Pope.
This judgement poupled with the appointment of Theodore in 669 - an
Archbishop not only of Roman persuasion but of immense charismatic and
administrative skill - resulted in major changes in both the physical nature of
dioceses as well as to whom bishops were beholden. The seeds of this change
had already occured in Augustine's time when he, in effect, created two bishops.
and dioceses in the Kingdom of Kent (Canterbury and Rochester) but was greatly
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hastened by Theodore and once started has continued throughout the centuries.
Before Theodore's arrival there were eight* dioceses in six kingdoms:
Canterbury and Rochester (Kent), London (Essex) Dunwich (East Anglia), Dorchester
(Wessex), Mercia (Mercia), Lindisfarne and York (Northumbria) in 690 there
were fourteen, in 1066 there were fifteen and today there are forty three.
With each change it is less and less possible to relate these directly either to
kingdoms (while they were in existence) or our present counties. These
physical locations and names of the dioceses in 690, 1066 and today are
presented in Figures 4.2.1(1), 4.2.1(2) and 4.2.1(3). Since it is not
altogether clear how these relate to the original dioceses and kingdoms Figures
4.2.1(4) and 4.2.1(5) are produced which traces roots of dioceses in the two
provinces in a chronological summary.
Despite these physical changes and the more subtle personal preferences
and pressures to look to Rome the Anglo-Saxon kingly involvement in the Church
was, and is, deep seated and has, and is, resurrected and resurrecting on many past
and present occasions in different guises. A classic example of this, in these
early times, was in terms of the attitudes of William I - the Norman Conquerer -
who became king of all** England in 1066 following his famous defeat of Harold
at Hastings. William's sole intention was to reform the Church of England and he
had the Pope's blessing for this endeavour. However, despite this he did not
* Possibly nine if one counts Sodor and Man which on the surface claims to be
the oldest of all dioceses dating back to 447 when Germanus was claimed to
be the bishop. However there are some considerable doubts surrounding the
creation of this diocese at such an early time.
** The separate kingdom became one largely through the further invasions by
the Danes. Only Wessex under Alfred survived and not only survived but
ultimately took over the land conquered by the Danes to make way for one
England and one king who was in the first place (in 900) of Wessex and
Alfred dissent. Further invasions by the Danes and the defeat of the
Wessex domination did not however change the fact that now there was only
one king and one kingdom.
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consider himself beholden to the Pope. He wanted to produce a 'better'
Church not one more subservient to the Ronan see and thus made it plain on his
investiture as King that he was, like his Anglo-Saxon predecessors, the head
of the Church. He was to nominate bishops and they were to be beholden to him
not the Pope. Thus the disagreements between Pope and King with the Church of
England as the prized element for dispute was 'writ large' long before Henry VIII's
more famous intervention in Church affairs.
In all this the bishops were in the forefront - they were the 'Church' -
to either Pope or king and their preferment and financial fortunes were based
on keeping 'in' with whoever had the 'upper hand'. In this sense bishops were
more involved with the intrigues of state rather than the 'cure of souls' in their
respective dioceses. Their ability or inability at this political level could
be clearly seen in the respective differences in the wealth and endowments of
bishops which varied greatly across the country. Clearly not all wealth came
from such political acceptability but undoubtedly it had a narked influence
on the immense disparity in the fortunes of bishops and hence dioceses.
However, with Henry VIII's Acts of Supremacy and the Elizabethan 'settlement'
the pope was lost forever in this battle. Equally with a growing government
supremacy from the Cromwellian Civil War and a shift in the political centrality
of the Church in English society changes in both bishops' intentions and
diocesan administration were inevitable. Such changes were greatly accelerated
from 1836 onwards when reform of the Church both from without (via government
laws) and from within (via changes in intentions in the full time staff force -
particularly bishops) became of dominant importance.
Since 1836 there have been many elements involved in bringing about this
change of which three are of particular significance. Firstly the finances of
bishops and their cathedrals were fundamentally changed by a newly established
national body (the Ecclesiastical Commissioners) from 1836 onwards. In effect
this body took over the capital finances of these diocesan dignitaries
equalised their income and used the income balances 'to make additional provision
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for the cure of souls in parishes where such assistance is most required'.
No longer was it a financial sinecure to be a bishop and as a consequence
anew more sensitive 'concerned-for-the-diocese' breed of men both sought
and became bishops. Secondly a new era of self-government for
the Church was dawning. But this self-government was not by the bishops
alone but by the whole of the Church: bishops, clergy and the, so called, laity.
This,of course s brought greater institutionalisation to the Church with growing
committee structures. A primary element in this was the 'diocesan conferences'
the first of which was held in 1866 initially annually and then more frequently
as business and supporting committees expanded. Thirdly, and somewhat coupled
with this increasing democratisation, dioceses, as distinct from bishops
(although they were, and are, normally the chairmen), from about 1914 onwards
had their own boards of finance. These and the Central Board (see Section 4.2.3)
came into existence following an inquiry into Church finance to bring some order
and organisation to the finances of the whole Church. It is, therefore, the
diocesan boards of finance which collect and expend money - the details of
which can be seen in Section 4.1 and Table 4.1(17).
Thus from the 1830's onwards far-reaching changes have been occurring both
in the activities, finances and nature of bishops as well as in the dioceses
they represent. But the historical position and nature of bishops cannot be
lightly eroded in a mere one hundred and fifty years! Many of them still have
automatic right to sit in the House of Lords and be involved with state affairs.
All of them are undoubtedly very influential in diocesan affairs. Many, if not
most, still have to carry the projected illusion(?) of being establishment
noblemen which, of course, is what they always were.
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4.2.2. The Development of Parishes 
The development of parishes as we know them also has roots in the Anglo.
Saxon period* primarily through the manorial system which came into being at
this time. As Fisher (1973) points out the Angles, Saxons and Jutes brought
with them a very clear system of social strata. We have already seen something
of the pinnacle of this in terms of kings but under these were noblemen,
commoners, freedmen and slaves. The noblemen owned land and wealth and
gathered those of the lower strata together to work and keep their estates
in return for housing and payment. It was in the context of such estates
parishes and parochial churches came into being.
As the Anglo-Saxon kings became Christians and allowed bishoprics and
dioceses to be created so Christian noblemen took the initiative of creating
both a Church and priest to serve and evangelise his estate. Thus it was in the
main noblemen who both built and endowed Church buildings throughout the seven
major kingdoms. However p such developments occurred on a very evolutionary
ad hoc basis depending on the attitude of the respective noblemen.** Unlike
the development of dioceses it is difficult to trace the origins of all the
many parishes which came into existence. However, the development started in
the eighth century was well advanced by the time of the Norman conquest and was
completed probably in the twelth century.
Despite the extended time horizon for the development of the parochial
system there is some pattern to both financing of the parochial unit as well
as the authority structures. On the matter of finance, patterns can be
discerned in both capital and income items. The lord of the manor built
* Although as Addleshaw (1959) indicates something equivalent to parishes
predates the Anglo .,Saxon period.
** A situation not dissimilar to the development of dioceses which, as will
be recalled, developed on the basis of the attitudes of the kings.
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and provided buildings and land for both the Church and priest. Parsonages
and Church buildings were often side by side surrounded by land (called 'glebe')
and given to the priest as a freehold from the lord's estate. Income of the
parochial unit was, in these early days,primarily income of the incumbent
(priest). Such income came fundamentally from four sources: from produce
from the glebe land, from trusts created by the benefactors, from offerings
of the faithful and from the 'tithe' which was a tenth of all produce produced
in the lord's estate which, of course, was co-terminous with the parish.
Turning now to the patterns surrounding authority structures what seems
to be plain is that both in Anglo• Saxon and Norman times the incumbent was the
mmorial lord's 'man' however he was also responsible to the bishop. It was
the lord of the manor who initiated, financed and appointed the incumbent in
a similar way to the relationship between king and bishop yet the former, unlike
the latter, had an ecclesiastical lord to whom he was also responsible. No
man could actually be appointed to a 'living' no matter how much the lord of
the manor desired it unless the bishop of the respective kingdom both instituted
and inducted him to such a position. However, once instituted he was a freeman
with his own land and responsibilities even though his close proximity to the
estate and the lord of the manor resulted in the incumbent giving greater,
relative, allegiance to the lay benefactor rather than the bishop.
As with bishops and dioceses the nature and wealth of parishes differed
greatly. The variety (as with bishops and dioceses) was caused by the
differences in the attitudes and generosity of the benefactors. In the parishes
these were the lords of the manor while in the dioceses, as we have seen, the
king(s) or pope were such benefactors. Like the king had the right to
appoint bishops so the lord of the manor had the right to appoint incumbents
to their parish livings. These rights of patronage still exist today even
though those exercising such right are often not descendents of the original
benefactors due to multiple transfers of such powers over the centuries.
With a lot of potential wealth to anybody who secured the incumbency of
227
particular parishes it was not at all surprising to see corruption coming
into the system. An early example of this was in Norman times. With the
Norman conquest came a growing infiltration of monasteries and support by the
new (Norman) lords of the manor for these institutions. As a result many
of these lords gave their rights of patronage to these monasteries on the
reasonable supposition that they were more equipped to know the correct people
to fill the position. However rather than do this directly the monasteries:
1 ... in the majority of cases, appropriated the whole of
benefice, seized the greater part of its tithes for
themselves, and appointed a vicarius or rector's
substitute l to run the parish on a starvation wage, and
with little or no security of tenure'.
(Tindal Hart, 1959, p. 13)
Some of the elements of this obvious abuse were righted by a canon of the
Lateran Council of 1215 which gave back to the vicarius (or vicar) his
freehold land and a 'living wage' but the substantial appropriations remained
particularly the 'great tithes' which formed a substantial proportion of the
wealth of the parochial units. These went to the monasteries and on their
dissolution by Henry VIII to the royal treasury.
Clearly not all patronage was passed over to the monasteries and not all
parochial wealth was appropriated in this way. The incumbents of many remaining
parishes (called rectors) continued to enjoy the benefits of endowments yet
these too were often subject to corruptive practices on a similar basis to the
work of the monasteries. Often minors or relations of the patron were elected
rectors while poorly paid vicarii or capellani (assistant curates) were
appointed to manage the parish.
Parishes and their incumbents, like dioceses and their bishops, have been
moulded and changed over the years: administratively from the early nineteenth
century and financially from, in the main, the early twentieth. On the
administrative side the issue surrounding the boundaries of parishes has been
the dominant concern. With shifting populations particularly during the industrial
revolution the traditional parish boundaries, based on the manorial system, were
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seen, on occasions, to be inadequate to serve, particularly, the towns.
As a result various acts and 'measures' (the Church's equivalent of acts of
parliament) have been passed* to allow new parishes to be created and old
parishes to be amalgamated suitably patronised in the context of the case
under consideration. Also on the administrative front have been changes
in the management of the parishes, away from the more autocratic leadership
to a more democratic approach. The democratisation of the parishes occurred
such sooner than in dioceses. The original move in this direction occurred
in the twelfth century with the creation of the office of 'churchwarden'
to assist the incumbent with the management of the parish. Both the power
and position of this lay appointment expanded as the centuries went by
particularly in the finances where money and land was left to them for the
upkeep and maintenance of the church. However lay involvement was not just
for the churchwardens and in due time more and more lay officers became
involved with the management and administration of the parish in some degree
of partnership with the incumbent. Greater democracy usually brings great
bureaucratisation and during the period 1870 to 1904 more and more parochial
church councils were being formed which finally became compulsory in 1921
(and further developed legally in 1956). These parochial church council's
take financial as well as leadership responsibilities. Or as Section 2 of
the 1956 Measure puts it the general function of the council is:
...to co-operate with the minister in the initiation
conduct and development of church work both within
the parish and outside'.
In terms of parish finances there have also been many changes but before
looking at the substantial shift in responsibilities three, somewhat unconnected,
* Church Building Acts 1818 to 1884 and the New Parishes Acts 1843 to 1884
all repealed and replaced by the New Parishes Measure 1943 and partially
repealed and replaced by the Pastoral Measure 1968.
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points need to be made. Firstly during the middle ages one further source
of parochial income was added to the list discussed above: namely the
Church rate. This was a legal tax on the parishioners for the maintenance
of the nave of the Church building.* The second introductory point is that
anomalies in the finances of the parishes, because of the different levels of
endowments, were very marked indeed and were recognised but not changed by the
Ecclesiastical Commissioners who, it will be recalled, realigned only bishops'
and cathedral staff fortunes. These parochial anomalies, however,remained
until well into the twentieth century. The third introductory point is to
repeat the matter concerning the present position of the parochial church
council viz a viz the parishes finances. As with diocesan boards of finance
the income is no longer that of the incumbents but of the dioceses or
parishes lodged in these new committees. Part of the reason for this is,
mdoubtedly,the slow centralisation of the respective personal fortunes of
both the bishops and parish priests.
This brings us naturally to looking more closely at this centralisation
process. The following will discuss this with respect to the five categories
of income discussed above in the order of tithes, rates, trusts, glebe and
offerings.
On the matter of tithes** this orginally was a voluntary contribution
although the benefits were so great that the tithe was soon made a compulsory
* In common law the incumbent was responsible for the upkeep of the chancel.
** Which, as discussed above, refers to the offering of one tenth of the
produce and income generated by those within the parish boundary to the
rector for his work in the parish.
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Um with legal support. However, as the centuries passed and the laws,
resentments and non-payments increased the system was close to breaking
point. Various acts at reducing eligibility to pay and stabilising the
tithe started in 1836 finally culminating in the 1925 Act which set the
level of the tithe duty for eighty five years. This same Act required
the remaining tithes to be collected, not by the individual parishes, but
by a centralised body called Queen Anne's Bounty Office (see Section 4.2.3
for more details on this). However, resentments at payment of this tithe
by the 'rump' of tithe payers (mostly farmers) to the Church still
continued to mount resulting in the Tithe Redemption Act of 1936 and the total
extinction of this source of income for the Church of England.
The compulsory payment of Church rates which also had legal support
was also extinguished as a source of income to the Church but at a much
earlier date. In a similar manner to the tithe the payment of a tax to
maintain the fabric was greatly resented as the age of tolerance in
religious allegiance continued. Non-conformists, Roman Catholics and the
non•religious generally were combined in their resentment as to the payment
of this tax for a building they never intended to use. Various attempts
were made to remove the tax from 1834 although it was not until Gladstone's
careful management that a bill (the Compulsory Church Rate Abolition Act) was
finally passed in 1868 and Church rates were no more a source of income.
Now the finance required and the maintenance of the Church building is the
responsibility of the parish and more specifically the parochial church council.
The third element in the income of incumbents which, as indicated above,
was, in essence, the income of the parochial unit was financial trusts set
up by the benefactors. These too have undergone substantial changes over the
years. However, the first move in this respect did not occur until 1951
(with the Benefices (Stabilisation of Income) Measure) which, in effect,
centralised all the trusts in the control of the Church Commissioners but
guaranteed that the capital and income so taken over would still be available
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to the respective benefices. This, therefore, was more an administrative
service change than a fundamental redistribution of the unequal wealth of
parishes. This came much later in 1976 with the Endowments and Glebe Measure
which dealt with not only glebe income but the income from trusts in the
hands of the Church Commissioners. We will look at the glebe below but the
change in the trust income here. In effect this pooled the income from these
trusts. It did this in a number of subtle ways. Firstly by putting a ceiling
(E1000)on the income from trusts for any one benefice with suitable transition
arrangements in terms of 'personal grants' for sitting incumbents who received
over E1000 before 1976. Secondly by, in effect, summarising all the trust
income for the benefices in a particular diocese and paying this to the
diocese rather than the individual incumbents.* In this way the individual
benefices cease to have the benefits of past specific endowments unless 
the diocese chooses to distribute the total trust income allocated to it in a
way which reflects such past endowments, although it is difficult to find
any diocese which does this.
The fourth element in the income of incumbents/parochial•units was
income generated from glebe land and this too has been centralised and
pooled. By the same Endowments and Glebe Measure of 1976 the technical
ownership and responsibilities of glebe land was transferred into diocesan
control to be managed by them with the income from which to be credited to
* The way this works is a little complicated. The Church Commissioners
(formally Ecclesiastical Commissioners) were originally augmenters of
clergy salaries but increasingly have become paymasters as centralisation
has occurred. The Church Commissioners pay the clergy direct but from
a separate Diocesan Stipends Fund held by the Commissioners. These
funds must constantly balance, the income to which comes from the trust
fund incomes presently under discussion, further grants from the income
of the Commissioners and the transfers from dioceses re: stipends (see
Table 4.1(17)) plus glebe income (see below).
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the respective diocesan stipends funds. Thus this source of income, like
the trust income, became pooled at the diocesan level although the disparity
between dioceses remained and remains untouched.* The effect, of course,
is to spread more evenly the income from the endowments of the past in the
context of dioceses and to remove thisfrom individual benefice ownership
and receipt.
This brings us to the fifth and final source of original income of the
incumbents/parishes: the offerings of the faithful. Two things have
happened with regard to these. Firstly they are no longer the natural right
of the incumbent but are, as already indicated, the income of the parochial
church council. Secondly with so much previous parochial income being either
stopped by law or pooled and equalised their position in importance has grown
out of all recognition as compared with their previous standing in Church
finance.
What we have therefore when looking at parishes are units which have
clear elements which originally were present but a revolutionised system of
finance. On the consistent nature of parishes these have always been local
based community units with defined boundaries for their pastoral care with a
Church building, a priest in charge who lives in a parsonage house close to
his Church building and people. Financially such units originally were both
independent and independently secure. However, this is not the case today.
Most previous endowments appear to have been taken away from a parochial
viewpoint whereas more and more is being asked from current membership in
terms of giving. Expenditure possibilities remain as independent parochial
responsibilities but are severly curtailed by not only giving levels but also
* For instance the 1981 diocesan income from glebe ranged from £521,000
(for Lincoln) to only £5,000 (for Bradord) while the trust income ranged
from £241,000 (for Oxford) to only £5,000 (for Sodor and Man). Clearly
there are different responsibilities with respect to these dioceses but
the anomalies still are real and apparent.
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by the growing demands of the diocese in quota which although greatly resented
is substantially for incumbents' salaries and housing (see Tables 4.1(15),
4.1(16) and 4.1(17) for details).
These changes are very recent and are still causing a lot of trouble and
tensions for the parishes - a point we will return to in later sections
and chapters.
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4.2.3 The Development of the Central Authorities 
Unlike the development of parishes and dioceses which are definable and,
to a certain extent, clear and obvious the development of some form of
centralised authorities in the Church of England have been diverse and
confusing. Undoubtedly the main reason is that the Church of England has been
fought over ever since it first became a clearly defined national institution.
Such fighting was precisely to obtain the coveted position of being the
central authority to guide, lead and often gather resources from this ancient
institution.
The possibility of some form of centralised authority only dawned when
there was but one king of England from about 900 A.D. However, up until
the Norman conquest the real dynamics of supremacy and control was not an
issue of great significance: Church and State worked closely and amicably
together in a somewhat uncluttered way. But from the Norman conquest onwards
the whole concept of centralised control of the Church of England became
a considered necessity and the fight for the privelege of being the 'helmsman'
became real and very apparent.
There have been varying helmsmen over the last nine hundred years - a
somewhat simplified picture of these are given in Table 4.2.3. This depicts
ten stages or ten different types of helmsmen over the years with ascendent
powers and challengers in the wings. It is not intended to go through this
Table in any depth since to do so would encompass most of the history of
England! Instead a few important points will be made. Firstly it is important
to note the dominance of the pope in the Table up to the end of Stage 4 and the
attempted return in Stage 6 with Queen Mary. Certainly William .I (the Conquerer)
held out against the pope'spressure for control as did William II and Henry I
but the Roman pontiff's domination in Church affairs was inevitable and of
a long duration. Secondly to note the very powerful influence of, particularly,
Henry VIII (Stage 5) and Elizabeth I (Stage 7) in the control of the Church -
for one hundred and forty years (minus five for Mary's interlude) the king's and
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queens of England played an extremely dominant role in Church affairs.
Undoubtedly this is the nearest to some absolute return to the original
Anglo-Saxon days although clearly there were marked differences. Thirdly to
note the importance of governments and consequent legislation in the control
of the Church. Even in the days of Henry VIII's domination
	 his intentions
were reflected in Acts of Parliament.* However with the beheading of Charles I
following the Civil War the kings and queens of England have tended to take
more of a back seat in both politics generally and also in Church affairs.
However, ever since the Elizabethan Settlement the kings and queens of England
are the 'supreme governors' of the Church but de facto (not de jure) particularly
during stages eight and nine of Table 4.2.3, this position fell to the
government.** Fourthly and finally it is important to note the growing
ascedency and final domination by the Church itself and it's centralised control.
Already the signs of this were apparent from 1704 (during stage nine) but came
to new levels after the Enabling Act of 1919 gave great powers to the Church
to co-ordinate and develop it's own activities but still subject to government
and royal assent.
It is only, therefore, from 1704 onwards that any form of central authorities
in the Church and for the co-ordination and control of the Church have come
into existence. Since our interest is with the Church rather than the State
we will concentrate on these developments from 1704 very largely because this
change in control authorities has generated central ecclesiastical units whichi
because they have costs attached, are reflected in the first nine elements in
Mae 4.1(15) and 4.1(16). However, it is important to note the partiality of
* Hence the bracketed 'G' in stages 5 and 7
** Hence the bracketed 'K' in stages 8, 9 and 10
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this - the centralised work since 1704 is largely additional to all that has
gone before. It would be wrong to belittle the work of the Church for the
Church from this time but it is still bound and shaped by many legal and
other factors which predate and postdate 1704.
We will attempt in the following to adopt a largely chronological approach
to these developments but will constantly keep in mind the nine funds
highlighted in Tables 4.1(15) and 4.1(16) which are a reflection of the total
central system of the Church of England.
The first real move on ecclesiastical control occurred in 1704 with the
establishment of what came to be known as Queen Anne's Bounty: the transfer
of the royal right to 'first fruits and tenths' into Church ownership. The
first fruits and tenths were royal taxes on the total income of benefices
(including bishoprics and 'chapters'). These were originally levied by, and paid to
the pope yet ever since Henry VIII's Acts of Supremacy had passed to the kings
and queens of England. First fruits constituted a years income of the respective
benefice as realised in the reign of Henry VIII. Tenths constituted an annual
ten per cent tax on all current income received by the respective benefices.
Queen Anne, a sensitive woman, troubled by the poverty of many of the clergy
compared with the wealth of others was moved and probably led by her ministers
and bishops (as Best (1964) p.31 suggests) to waive the rights to these taxes
and to allocate them to a new central Church authority for redistribution
amongst the poorer clergy. This new body not only redistributed this income
but also made many benefices exempt from payment by raising the tax threshold.
However, despite such reforms including the overarching transfer into Church
ownership the whole concept of payment of these amounts was greatly resented
but not finally abandoned until 1926.
The second move towards Church self-government came with the establishment
of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners in 1836. This body was set up to carry out
the recommendations of a government inquiry into Church finance. The recommendation
called for a rearrangement of diocesan areas, episcopal incomes, a re-organisation
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of the wealth of cathedral and collegiate churches and a redistribution of
wealth to poorer livings. To perform these tasks the Government was requested to
appoint a separate body beholden to parliament. Originally such a body was
not considered to be permanent, however, many ardent Churchmen and politicians
believed that the establishment of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners,as such,
would give the Church a real government of its own. Or as Best (1964) puts it:
'Their conception as a permanent board is probably to be
found mainly in the circumstance of the church's lacking
a 'government'. It had recently become increasingly felt
among the more reflective class of churchmen that this
lack was a serious one'. (p. 309 and 310)
Yet despite these intentions and despite the actual permanency of the Commissioners
due to the long delays in carrying out the original reforms coupled with new
tasks being committed to it the board was always and currently is a parliamentary
body involved in Church affairs. It's activities were, and are, bound by law
and even though some flexibility was allowed in this context it was not enough
to allow the Ecclesiastical Commissioners to become the governing body of the
Church of England: this required a new institution as we shall see.
Before looking at the make up of this it is important to note that
Queen Anne's Bounty and the Ecclesiastical Commissioners became amalgamated
in 1948 to form the Church Commissioners. Such an amalgamation was suggested
on many occasions before 1948 especially with the declining importance and
work of Queen Anne's Bounty and growing dominance of the Ecclesiastical
Commissioners but like so many things in Church affairs took a long time to
be realised.
As we have seen the Church Commissioners at various stages since 1951
have centralised the historical endowments of the parochial Churches but always
with the same aim in mind which guided the actions of their predecessors: a
fairer distribution of the income from historic endowments for the benefit of
the clergy. Or as the Commissioner's themselves put it in the introduction to
their Annual Report and Accounts:
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'The Commissioners' primary duties are to make better
provision for the stipends and housing of the clergy
and for the pensions of retired clerrgy and their
widows. In the carrying out of these responsibilities
they continue in the main the historic duties of their
two predecessor bodies, the Governors of Queen Anne's
Bounty and the Ecclesiastical Commissioners, in seeking
to bring about a fairer distribution of the income
derived from the historic endowments of the Church
entrusted to their care. This is indeed the Commissioner's
principal "raison d'etre".
(Taken from Church Commissioners' Report and Accounts
1975, p. 4)
Thus when the need for a Central Stipends Authority to monitor and update
the salaries of the full time staff force of the Church of England became
apparent in the early 1970's it became clear that the Church Commissioners
were the obvious body for such a task. Thus in 1972 the Church Commissioners
became the Central Stipends Authority as well.
Even though the Church Commissioners and their forbears can be seen to be
the first tentative movers towards self government as distinct from parliamentary
control of the Church of England there were never any subsequent attempts to
really expand the domain of influence of this body. The criterion shifted not
towards a developed Church Commissioners but rather a new national 'assembly'
with wide ranging legislative and administrative powers over the life of the
Church of England. Such a body was finally created in 1919. However, before
looking at its functions it is important to trace some of the circumstances
which led to it's emergence.
In addition to the more legislative and parliamentary reforms via, for
instance, the creation of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners there were also
moves and changes from within the Church which gave birth finally to this new
'assembly'. We have in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. already discussed the emergence
of diocesan conferences (the first in 1866) and parochial church councils (during
1870 - 1904) but these in turn can be seen to be sparked off by the re-emergence
of the 'convocations' of Canterbury and York in respectively 1852 and 1860.
The convocations were of early Norman origin and were a clerical forum for
policy matters with regard to the Church of England. The frequency of meeting,
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the clerics allowed to be members, the areas for discussion and the
relationship to parliament were constantly changing over the centuries.
In fact, for the previous two hundred years before 1852 they ceased to exist
at all for various reasons - parliament dealt with all ecclesiastical matters.
But their re-emergence in 1852 and 1860 was spurred on by a desire to reform
the Church from the inside without the intervention in parliament.
A new twist in the nature of this endeavour came in 1885 when a House of
Laymen was created in the Convocation of Canterbury followed a few years later
by a similar addition to the Convocation of York. These new additions were,
according to Smith (1922), to be:
'... consulted on all subjects which ordinarily occupied
the attention of convocation, saving only the definition
or interpretation of the faith and doctrine of the Church'
(p.10).
This was undoubtedly a significant change in Church affairs particularly at this
level although as we indicated lay participation, in the form of churchwardens,
had been a part of parochial life for many centuries.
But in the spirit of the times and with a new group of people with
different ideas at this level of Church life it was not surprising to see
somewhat radical changes being suggested. This came initially in 1897 when
the Canterbury House of Laymen passed the following resolution:
'That in the opinion of this House the Church of England
should, saving the Supremacy of the Crown and subject
to the veto of Parliament, have freedom for self
regulation by means of reformed Convocations with the
assistance in matters other than the definition of the
faith and doctrine of the Church, of a representative
body or bodies of the 'faithful laity'.
(Quoted in Smith (1922) p. 11)
Twenty two years later after a long, difficult and often tedious process the
Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act 1919 (or as more usually known: the
Enabling Act) was passed.
The Enabling Act was in essence organisational but its effect on Church -
State relations and on central control and authority on Church affairs has been
marked indeed. The Church Assembly which formulates 'measures which are
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then submitted via a Church Legislative Committee to a parliamentary
Ecclesiastical Committee for final ratification (to make a measure on
equivalent to any other Act) by the two Houses of Parliament. A measure:
... may relate to any matter concerning the Church of
England and may extend to the amendment or repeal in
whole or in part of any Act of Parliament, including
this Act.
Provided that a measure shall not make any
alteration in the composition or powers or duties of the
Ecclesiastical Committee, or in the procedure in
Parliament....'
(Quoted in Frindall (1972) P. 344)
Thus even though still subject to the State's final approval the Church of
England had an 'in house' procedural body for legislating it's own affairs.
The Church of England had, therefore, a real central authority of its
own which in turn had a ready made financial body to support it, a physical
home to house it and some central organisations already in existence. We
will look at these in turn. The Central Board of Finance had been created
some years earlier (incorporated in 1914) following an inquiry into Church
finance at the request of the Lambeth Conference (an annual meeting of
bishops) of 1910:
'... to bring order out of chaos and to raise new
money'
(Hayfield, 1958, p. 97)
The constitution of this Board was extended with the introduction of the
Church Assembly to act as it's 'financial executive'. The original Central
Board also set up, in 1915, a Central Church Fund as part of their plans to
bring order out of chaos which was and is a centralised collection agency
for gifts, donations and legacies to be used with the broad brief:
'... to meet any needs of the Church of England, at home
or abroad which are outside the scope of the Church
Commissioners and the Church Societies'.
Thus there was a ready made financial system already in existence with its
own ties to diocesan boards of finance (see Section 4.2.2) before the Church
Assembly was created which could be easily adapted to the new requirements.
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It also had a ready made physical location in Church House next to
Westminster Abbey to house it's activities. The building of Church House
was seen to be necessary so as 'to provide a suitable central building in
London for use by the Church of England and Institutions connected with it'
and was to be financed by public subscription to commemorate Queen Victoria's
Golden Jubilee (in 1888). Phased building commenced in the 1890's and was
finished in the first decade of the 1900's. Buildings in the Church of
England have always been filled and used and clearly Church House was, and is,
no exception. The Convocations started to meet in these premises in 1896
and the new extension (commenced in 1901) was building for, and housed, the
hall for the new House of Laymen. Likewise the Central Board of Finance and
the Central Advisory Council for the Ministry (see below) were sited there.
A new fund (the Corporation of the Church House) and administrative staff to
manage the building also became necessary and these too were situated in the
new complex. But there was and still is* excess capacity in the building to
house both the meeting of the Church Assembly and the inevitable growing
supporting administrative committees etc. which followed from the incorporation
of this new form of Church government. Thus a physical location was clearly
available for this new endeavour.
In addition to having an established financial system as well as a
suitable physical location there was also some central work already established
with respect to training ordinands. A Central Advisory Council for the
Ministry was established on the initiative of the Convocations in 1912:
'...to arrange for the selection of candidates, to arrange
for grants for their training, to help enlist the services
of men in the ministry to inspect theological colleges, and
to control the General Ordination Examination'.
(Mayfield, 1958, P. 74)
* Half of Church House is in fact today hired out to certain government
departments due to Church underutilisation viz a viz capacity available.
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Such a change i of course, required not only administrative assistance and
organisations but also a financial support system to collect and administer
grants as well as pay for its own administration. Thus there was already
a central system under the control of the Church in existence and working.
This not only set a precedent for the work of the new Church Assembly but
provided a ready made and, to an extent, established area of concern for the
deliberations of the new body - not that they were, or are, ever short of
business.
The Church Assembly - which metamorphosed into the General Synod in
1970 - has from its inception been agreeing measures some of which have had,
and are having, far reaching effects on the life of the Church of England.
But increasing work of this nature often resulted in more on-going centralised
work with its own needs for administration and finance. The result has been
a growing need for finance by the Central Board of Finance to maintain this
expanding support system.*
Apart from an expansion of the work under the direct auspice of the
General Assembly/Synod and the Central Board of Fund a number of measures
have created separate organisations. The two most obvious examples which
have their own separate physical location as well as funds are the Pensions
Board and the Investment Fund. Both were created by Measures** to cover
particular centralised needs to handle the problems of adequate pensions for
* We will look at these in more depth in Chapter 5. However at this stage
it is worth comparing the budget of the Central Board for 1921 and 1983
ignoring the Training for the Ministry element. The 1921 budget was only
£21,000 whereas for 1983 it was £2,821,050 a growth of 13,021% as compared
with an expected inflationary rise of approx. 1,243%.
** Clergy Pension Measure 1926 and the Church Funds Investment Measure
1958.
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the retired clergy and to facilitate the maximum use of Church funds through
careful investment - both of which were considered best performed by central,
but separate, organisations.
Thus. in conclusions the above presents an interesting progression in the
central authorities of the Church of England. With this and the other
background information on dioceses (Section 4.2.1) and parishes (Section
4.2.2) plus the financial insights of Section 4.1 we are now in a position
to bring some of this argument together and make certain judgements on which
of the many possible accounting systems we should look at. We pick up these
points in the following Section.
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4.3 CONCLUSION AND GUIDELINES ON THE CHOICE OF ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS FOR
INVESTIGATIONS
The purpose of this section is to draw out certain general points from
the contents of Section 4.1 and 4.2 which will afford a basis for making a
judgement about which of the many accounting systems in the Church of England
will be looked at in Chapters 5 and 6.
Although there are many points of significance raised in the previous
sections two of particular note as generalisations and as pointers to accounting
system choice stand out. The first of these is to note the evolutionary and
partially independent growth of dioceses and parishes and the more recent but
highly important moves towards centralised control and the effect of this.
Secondly to note the changing financial situation of the Church and the present
financial insecurity of the parochial church councils, the diocesan hoards of
finance and certain central units as compared with the more secure position,
financially, of the Church Commissioners. We will look at each of these in
turn and then use this discussion to give direction for the choice of the
accounting systems to be viewed.
On the first general point there are a number of matters to highlight -
three of which are of particular importance.
Firstly it is important to note the evolutionary but variable growth of
all the units in the Church of England. Dioceses evolved over many centuries,
first through missionary endeavours in Anglo-Saxon kingdoms and then through
a process of sub-division throughout the centuries up to 1927. Likewise
parishes evolved over a number of centuries until all of England was encompassed
by such systems and have been constantly changing their geographical boundaries
as needs and circumstances altered. Likewise the nature of centralised
controlling authorities has also evolved over the years but in a somewhat
different more revolutionary sense with major shifts and lurches in the process.
Such developments were, to a considerable degree, independent from one another
making the whole complex institution highly diverse and varied. Such basic
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variability has clearly become a deep seated characteristic of the whole
institution which undoubtedly causes many problems from a central control
viewpoint.
The second point to note is the close relationship between the Church
and whatever is, or was, the national ruling power and the consequent
inevitability of centralised control of this clearly national institution.
The Church in England came into existence because of the interest, drive and
wealth of the nobility of the time. This the State authorities (using this
term somewhat broadly) have always been involved in Church affairs. As the
Anglo-Saxon kingdoms became one and as the ruling class started to exercise
their right of leadership an obvious area for their endeavours was the one
institution their forbears played a part in creating: the Church. In this
sense centralised control was inevitable.
This leads us to our third point: such centralised control has differed
both as to who exercises it as well as the nature of the controlling
intentions. Table 4.2.3 has attempted to demonstrate the changing central
authorities in the Church of England with the kings and popes, governments and
the Church itself being dominant at particular times. We have already traced
the dynamics of this and need not repeat it here. However some additional
comment on control intentions are appropriate. Although it is somewhat
foolhardy to generalise there does appear to be three basic intentions behind
those who have sought to centrally control the Church of England: to be in
a position to gather resources from the Church, to be the helmsman for the
sake of it and to be in a position to reorganise it's disorderly nature.
Undoubtedly each of the stages in Table 4.2.3 can be seen as majoring on one
or more of these intentions. For instance stage I majored on the reorganisation
intention, stage 4 on the finance one and stage 5 on the helmsman and the
financial ones. Stages 8 to 10, however, have concentrated on the reorganisation
intention. From this viewpoint, therefore, the move from parliamentary to
Church government was not that significant. The only real difference was
Wm,
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not to do with intention or even in terms of nature* but rather who
performed the task. From 1704 onwards, and more particularly after 1919,
this task was, and is, performed by people who more obviously have a clear
commitment to, as well as intimate knowledge about, the Church of England.
This, of course, is not to denigrate either the commitment or knowledge of
the Church of many politicians either before 1704 or after this date.
However, slow but steady secularisation of parliament has occurred from
Elizabeth I's time and thus it was inevitable that if sensitive reform was
to be achieved this could only be done by people who knew what needed to be
done, namely the Church itself.
We now need to turn to the second summary point with which we started
this Section: on the changing financial situation of the Church of England.
There are two matters of importance to note in this context.
Firstly to note the change to greater equalisation and interrelationship
of the finances of the diverse units in the Church of England. Originally
both dioceses and parishes were independent financial units pursuing their
own individual policies with regard to obtaining income and patterns of
expenditure. The inequality of this wealth and the inability of the established
units in the Church to voluntarily redistribute such fortunes led to the
establishment of various centralised bodies (Queen Anne's Bounty and, more
particularly, the Ecclesiastical Commissioners which metamorphosed into the
Church Commissioners) to perform such functions with legal authority. This,
of course, led to a growing interrelationship of the units which make up the
Church of England. However this interrelationship was reinforced by two
* The Enabling Act requires the Church to produce measures as indicated
in Section 4.2.3 which are, in essence, not that different from Acts
of Parliament calling for a similar process to arrive at their content.
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further developments: firstly through the growth of the Church Assembly
and diocesan machinery and the need to finance these through the parochial
units; secondly because of the inability of the money from historic
endowments to satisfy the original intentions and the consequent need, because
of centralisation, to gather the shortfall from the parishes through the dioceses
to the Church Commissioners for ultimate payment out again to individual benefices
according to an equalised salary scale. Thus interrelationships between the
funds have increased greatly over the years and the magnitude likewise as
Tables 4.1(13) and 4.1(14) highlight.
This brings us to our second point with regard to finances concerning the
variable financial vulnerability of the various units, in part, because of the
nature of these interrelationships. Perhaps we could look at this in the context
of four of the most dominant fund units in the Church: the Church Commissioners,
the other main central funds*, the dioceses and the parishes.
Of these four only the Church Commissioners are not under pressure: they
are the legal holders of most of the past endowments of the Church and if the
income is insufficient to satisfy the expenditure needs then there is nothing
they can or should do necessarily. They have a legal right to use part of the
income to finance their central organisation thus as long as the endowments
are in their hands their survival is secured.
The parishes are the most vulnerable although there is a tendency to not
necessarily see it that way. The parishes are basically being squeezed from
many different perspectives. Much of their previous income has been removed
either by law or by pooling or equalisation as discussed in Section 4.2.2.
The financial demands both to maintain the present parochial work as well as
pay the quota for stipend augmentation and central/diocesan needs continues to
* The General Synod Fund and the Training for the Ministry Fund.
248
grow year by year while the active membership is, in the main, declining.
Yet there is still the underlying belief created largely because of the
centralisation process that the great 'mother Church' will somehow always
bale the parishes out financially if things get too bad. How much this is
fact or an illusion is difficult to say but it is undoubtedly an underlying
belief.
From a somewhat different perspective the dioceses and the central
funds are also extremely vulnerable financially speaking. Their survival
is totally dependent on the payment of funds from the parishes to the
dioceses - if these ceased then the various boards and councils could not
continue their work. The dioceses are, to a considerable extent, in the
'front line', so to speak, of this situation: it is they who have to collect
not only the funds for their own needs but also the shortfall for the Church
Commissioners as well as to meet the costs of the other major central funds.
With the growing magnitude of these demands and the increasing problems of
parishes to meet such requirements there is more and more awareness of the
vulnerability of the diocesan system which, in turn, is picked up and carried
through to the dependent central funds.
This concludes the summary of the main ideas which have been forthcoming
from the previous sections of this Chapter; we now need to use these insights
to give direction on which of the many accounting systems should form the
basis for the analysis in Chapters 5 and 6.
In the first place it is obviously important to set up some criteria for
choice - different criteria will invariably lead to differences in the choice
process. Three criteria are of particular importance. Firstly only those
physical units of significance in the whole institution should be candidates.
This must be so since we need to keep open to the possibility of making conclusions
about the institution as a whole. Secondly only those physical units which
are undergoing, or have undergone, major changes should be candidates. This is
important so that the change element is an additional contextual variable when
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investigating the design of the particular accounting system. This is not,
of course, at this stage, implying that change in the physical make up of
any unit will lead to, or be led by, changes in the accounting system design.
It is simply making a potential allowance for this possibility. Thirdly
only those physical units which reflect and represent the basic structure
of the Church of England should be candidates. This, in effect, says we
must select certain parochial, diocesan and central units for investigation,
since this reflects the basic structure of the Church of England.
These three criteria together naturally selects both parishes and dioceses
for investigation leaving the choice of which central units the only
problematic area. However, the criteria in fact narrow the choice to
essentially the General Synod Fund or the Church Commissioners, since the
remaining central funds are essentially spinoffs from one of these (except
the Central Fund for Ordination Candidates*) and hence not as significant. Thus
these two are clearly both of primary significance to the institution. However
it is probably only the General Synod Fund which has undergone the most change.
As we indicated in Section 4.2.3 the budget of this fund has increased out of
all proportion since it's inception which clearly demonstrates the changing
and expanding nature of the activities generated by the Church Assembly/General
Synod which it serves. The Church Commissioners, on the other hand, have had
a simple unchanging brief: 'the fairer distribution of the income derived
from the historic endowments of the Church'. The very fact that such process
commenced in 1704 and is still not complete does not detract from the essentially
unchanging nature of it's 'raison d'etre l . The work of the Church Assembly/
* However, these are increasingly being seen as part of the General Synod
Fund since even though they are accounted for separately they are financed
from dioceses as is the 'parent' fund.
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General Synod has been a changing unfolding process of discovery.
The criteria therefore point towards investigating the accounting
systems of parishes, dioceses and the General Synod Fund but this in total
is an unmanageable proposition. The General Synod Fund is entirely
manageable since it is a single organisation but there are 43 dioceses and
13,663 parishes all with their own possibly unique accounting systems: thus
a further process of choice is necessary if we are to arrive at any realistic
critical theorems concerning accounting system design. It is to this we
now turn.
